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BARRIERS TO ACCESSIBLE HOUSING: ENFORCE-
MENT ISSUES IN "DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION"
CASES UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Robert G. Schwemm *
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 1 Con-
gress added "handicap"2 to the bases of discrimination outlawed
by the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA")3 and also enacted three
special provisions to further insure equal housing opportunity for
persons with disabilities.4 One of these special provisions-§
3604(f)(3)(C) 5-mandates that all new multi-family housing be
designed and constructed with seven specified accessibility fea-
tures.6
Despite the accessibility requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-and
similar requirements in scores of state and local fair housing
laws-a great deal of the multi-family housing built since §
* Copyright 2006 Robert G. Schwemm. Ashland Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Amherst College. My thanks to
Michael Barrett, Chris Brancart, Mary Davis, Michael Evans, Sara Pratt, John Relman,
and Sarah Welling for their ideas and helpful comments on prior drafts of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
2. Id.; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89.
4. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. Although the FHAA used the term
"handicap," its definition of this word in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) is identical to the definition of
"disability" in two other principal federal statutes that ban discrimination based on this
factor. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Even with respect to the
FHAA, the term "disability" is often used instead of "handicap." See, e.g., Giebeler v. M &
B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). For these reasons, this article uses the
terms "handicap" and "disability" interchangeably and often uses the term "disability"
with respect to the FHAA's coverage of"handicap" discrimination.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000).
6. Id. For a list of these features, see infra text accompanying note 24.
7. The prohibitions of the FHA as amended by the FHAA are mirrored in "substan-
tially equivalent" fair housing laws in some thirty-six states and sixty-four localities. For a
list of these states and localities, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION app. C (2005).
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3604(f)(3)(C) became effective has failed to include the features
mandated by this provision. While the precise degree of noncom-
pliance with the FHAA's "design and construction" requirements
is hard to pin down, it is clearly substantial. Virtually every §
3604(f)(3)(C) testing program has found that the vast majority of
multi-family complexes contacted do not comply with the FHAA's
accessibility requirements, and other evidence, including studies
commissioned by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD"), also confirms the high degree of
noncompliance.' Meanwhile, in the years since the FHAA's acces-
sibility requirements have been in effect, hundreds of thousands
of new multi-family units have been constructed, and a quarter
million more are being built every year.9 To the extent that these
units do not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C), they not only amount to
discrimination against the tens of millions of Americans with dis-
abilities,1" but they also stand as lawsuits waiting to happen.
Litigation involving § 3604(f)(3)(C) was slow to develop, but its
pace has accelerated in recent years.' From a substantive per-
spective, much of this litigation is fairly simple-either a multi-
family housing complex has the features mandated by §
8. See infra Part III.
9. In the 1992-2001 period, some 3,333,000 units of rental housing were built,
slightly over half of which (1,682,000 units) were in structures with five or more units and
thus potentially subject to § 3604(f)(3)(C). See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2004, at 40 tbl.A-11 avail-
able at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2006). In 2002 and 2003, multi-family rental starts amounted to 275,000 and 262,000
units, respectively. See id. at 20; see also ROBERT BENNEFIELD & ROBERT BONNETTE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STRUCTURAL AND OCCUPANCY CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING: 2000,
at 1-3 (2003) (noting that over twenty million housing units in the United States in 2000
were in buildings with five or more apartments, although recognizing that many of these
were constructed before § 3604(f)(3)(C) became effective), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-32.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
10. According to the 2000 Census, 49.7 million people in the United States (19.3% of
the nation's total civilian noninstitutionalized population aged five or older) had some type
of long-lasting condition or disability. See JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.cen
sus.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-17.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The subset of persons with
mobility impairments, which is the particular concern of § 3604(f)(3)(C), included many of
the 21.2 million persons who had "a condition limiting basic physical activities, such as
walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying," and the 6.8 million persons who
had "a physical, mental, or emotional condition causing difficulty in dressing, bathing, or
getting around inside the home." See id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 84-89. For examples of specific cases, see infra
notes 83 and 136-39.
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3604(f)(3)(C) or it does not.12 The real difficulty in these cases has
turned out to be three other issues that may be raised by builders
and owners of noncompliant dwellings. These issues are:
(1) Who are proper defendants in an action based on a build-
ing's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)?
(2) Who are proper plaintiffs in such an action? and,
(3) When does the statute of limitations expire on such an ac-
tion?
The courts have occasionally ruled for defendants on the basis
of these issues, particularly the statute-of-limitations defense,
thereby providing "repose" for some illegally constructed build-
ings and also encouraging the multi-family housing industry to
continue to ignore the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C). The result
has been the frustration of Congress's intent that virtually all
modern multi-family housing be made accessible to people with
disabilities.
This article addresses the problems encountered in litigation
involving the FHAA's accessibility requirements. Part II sets
forth the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C) and related laws man-
dating accessibility in housing and also surveys the relevant en-
forcement provisions of the FHA. Part III reviews the evidence of
noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and examines some of the
reasons for this noncompliance. Part IV analyzes the three main
enforcement issues that arise in § 3604(f)(3)(C) litigation and of-
fers suggestions for how they should be resolved.
II. THE ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. The FHA's Prohibitions of "Handicap" Discrimination
The original FHA, passed in 1968, banned discrimination only
on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.'
3 
"Sex"
was added as a prohibited basis of discrimination in 1974,14 and
"familial status" and "handicap" were added by the FHAA in
12. Cf infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617 (1970).
14. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633, 728-29.
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1988.15 The FHAA's ban on handicap discrimination was intended
to be "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the
unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the Ameri-
can mainstream." 6 Furthermore, Congress believed that "[tihe
right to be free from housing discrimination is essential to the
goal of independent living."17
Congress sought to achieve this goal in two ways. First, it
added "handicap" to all of the FHA's basic substantive prohibi-
tions.'" Second, it enacted three special provisions to further en-
sure equal housing opportunity for persons with disabilities. One
is § 3604(f)(3)(C), the subject of this article. The other two require
that persons with disabilities be allowed to make any "reasonable
modifications" necessary for their "full enjoyment of the prem-
ises"19 and that "reasonable accommodations" be made "in rules,
15. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1619-20. In addition to adding handicap
and familial status to the prohibited bases of the FHA, the 1988 FHAA made some altera-
tions to the statute's substantive provision dealing with home financing and also made
substantial changes in the FHA's enforcement procedures. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605, 3610-14
(2000).
16. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179[hereinafter 1988 HOUSE REPORT]. This House Report, along with the floor debates, is the
principal source of legislative intent for the FHAA, because the Senate did not produce a
committee report for this statute. For a description of the FHAA's legislative history, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 5:4.
17. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 18.
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c)-(f), 3605-06, 3617 (2000). Actually, although Congress did
add "handicap" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in §§ 3604(c)-(e), 3605-06,
and 3617, it chose a different technique with respect to the FHA's two other major sub-
stantive prohibitions, § 3604(a)'s ban on discriminatory refusals to deal and § 3604(b)'s
ban on discriminatory terms and conditions. Rather than adding "handicap" to these pro-
visions, the FHAA copied their basic prohibitory language into two new provisions-§
3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2)-that banned discrimination "because of a handicap" of any
buyer, renter, or person residing or associated with such a buyer or renter. See infra note22. The reason for treating handicap discrimination in this special way apparently was to
make clear that the amended FHA would not condemn housing that is made available es-
pecially for people with disabilities (i.e., that the statute does not authorize "reverse dis-
crimination" suits against such housing by nonhandicapped persons). See, e.g., 1988
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 23-24 (describing § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) as prohib-
iting discrimination "against" handicapped persons); 54 Fed. Reg. 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989)(noting in HUD's commentary on its FHAA regulations that the statute "does not prohibit
the exclusion of non-handicapped persons from dwellings").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2000). The modifications authorized by § 3604(f)(3)(A)
may be made to a building of any age and at any time during a tenancy, see 54 Fed. Reg.
3248 (Jan. 23, 1989), and the "premises" that may be modified include lobbies, main en-
trances, and other common-use areas as well as the interior of a disabled tenant's unit. See
24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (defining "[p]remises"); id. § 100.203(a); 54 Fed. Reg. 3247-48(Jan. 23, 1989); see also Garza v. Raft, No. C-98-20476-JF-PVT, 1999 WL 33882969, at *3(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999). Only a few cases dealing with § 3604(11(3)(A) have been re-
ported, perhaps because the modifications authorized by this provision must be made "at
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policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford [a handicapped person] equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling. "20
Failure to comply with these three provisions was declared by
Congress in the FHAA to be discrimination "[flor purposes of this
subsection."21 The referenced subsection-§ 3604(f)-has only two
substantive prohibitions: § (f)(1) makes it unlawful to discrimi-
nate in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of a buyer's or
renter's handicap; and § (f)(2) makes it unlawful to discriminate
"in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwell-
ing, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with
such dwelling" because of a person's handicap.22 Thus, the
the expense of the handicapped person." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2000). All of the re-
ported cases have been brought by mobility-impaired residents who sought to install a
wheelchair ramp or similar device in order to enhance the accessibility of their units. See
Garza, 1999 WL 32882969, *1; Elliott v. Sherwood Manor Mobile Home Park, 947 F. Supp.
1574, 1576 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n, 159
F.R.D. 400, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Hunter v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 698 A.2d 25, 26 (N.J. Su-
per. 1997); SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 11D:7, n.4 (citing relevant cases).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000). Examples of required accommodations under §
3604(f)(3)(B) are waiver of an apartment complex's "no pet" rule to allow a blind tenant to
have a seeing-eye dog and waiver of a "first come/first served" rule concerning parking
spaces to allow a mobility-impaired resident to park near his unit. See 24 C.F.R. §
100.204(b) (2005). Determining whether a particular accommodation is mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(B) is a "highly fact-specific" endeavor requiring a "case-by-case" determination.
See, e.g., Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001); Groner v. Golden
Gate Gardens Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cal. Mo-
bile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994). The test is a practical one
that often requires balancing the cost of the requested accommodation to the housing pro-
vider against its benefit for the claimant. See, e.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428-29
(7th Cir. 1995). It is clear, however, that housing providers need not make accommoda-
tions that impose "undue financial or administrative burdens" on them or require a "fun-
damental alteration" in the nature of their programs. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M & B Assocs.,
343 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Groner, 250 F.3d at 1044.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (2000).
22. See id. § 3604(f)(1)-(2). There are other subparts of § 3604(f), but they do not in-
volve substantive prohibitions of discrimination. See id. § 3604(f)(4)-(9). The full text of §
3604(f)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful:
To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of-
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it
is so sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
Section 3604(f)(2) provides that it shall be unlawful:
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of-
(A) that person; or
2006]
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FHAA's accessibility requirements and the other two special pro-
visions of § 3604(f)(3) "augment the general prohibitions under
(f)(1) and (2). "23
B. The FHA's Accessibility Requirements
The FHAA's accessibility provision-§ 3 6 04(f)(3)(C)-provides
that illegal discrimination under § 3604(f) includes:
in connection with the design and construction of covered multifam-
ily dwellings for first occupancy after the date that is 30 months af-
ter September 13, 1988, a failure to design and construct those
dwellings in such a manner that-
(i) the public use and common use portions of such dwellings
are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons;
(ii) all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all
premises within such dwellings are sufficiently wide to allow
passage by handicapped persons in wheelchairs; and
(iii) all premises within such dwellings contain the following
features of adaptive design:
(I) an accessible route into and through the dwelling;
(II) light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats, and
other environmental controls in accessible locations;
(III) reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later in-
stallation of grab bars; and
(IV) usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an indi-
vidual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space.24
For purposes of this provision, "covered multifamily dwellings"
means elevator buildings containing four or more units and
ground-floor units in non-elevator buildings with four or more
units. 25 The thirty-month grace period provided in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it
is so sold, rented, or made available; or(C) any person associated with that person.
For more on these provisions, see supra note 18.
23. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 24.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000). Although this provision is constructed in a way
that suggests it imposes six requirements-one each in subparts (i) and (ii) and four in
subpart (iii)-it has been interpreted by HUD to impose seven requirements, with the ad-ditional mandate of an "[a] ccessible building entrance on an accessible route" being recog-
nized as a separate requirement implicit in subparts (i) and (iii)(I). See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg.9472, 9503-15 (Mar. 6, 1991) (providing HUD's guidelines for meeting these seven re-
quirements).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(7) (2000). For the FHA's definition of "[d]welling," see id. §
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means that its requirements apply only to units constructed for
first occupancy after March 13, 1991.26
The House Report supporting the FHAA set forth the ra-
tionale for the design-and-construction requirements mandated
by § 3604(f)(3)(C):
Because persons with mobility impairments need to be able to get
into and around a dwelling unit (or else they are in effect excluded
because of their handicap), the bill requires that in the future cov-
ered multifamily dwellings be accessible and adaptable. This means
that doors and hallways must be wide enough to accommodate
wheelchairs, switches and other controls must be in convenient loca-
tions, most rooms and spaces must be on an accessible route, and
disabled persons should be able to easily make additional accommo-
dations if needed, such as installing grab bars in the bathroom,
without major renovation or structural change.
27
The House Report also noted: "A person using a wheelchair is
just as effectively excluded from the opportunity to live in a par-
ticular dwelling by the lack of access into a unit and by too nar-
row doorways as by a posted sign saying 'No Handicapped People
Allowed."'28 Furthermore, the accessibility features mandated by
the FHAA were seen as "essential for equal access and to avoid
future de facto exclusion of persons with handicaps."29
Congress viewed the accessibility requirements imposed by §
3604(f)(3)(C) as "modest."" It did not intend to impose "unreason-
able requirements" or a "standard of total accessibility,"31 but
rather saw the "basic features" required by § 3604(f)(3)(C) as
amounting to "minimal standards" that would be "easy to incor-
3602(b).
26. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005). The purpose of this thirty-month delay, as ex-
plained by one of the FHAA's sponsors, was to "allow architects and builders adequate
time to finish building projects already under way and make design modifications that will
be adequate in the future." 134 CONG. REC. S10,544-02 (Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
27. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 18.
28. Id. at 25. This point was also made in the Senate floor debates. See 134 CONG.
REC. S10,491 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (noting that the architectural barriers that
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) would eliminate cause the "physical exclusion" of individuals with disabili-
ties from much of the nation's housing stock and "are like 'Keep Out' signs to a substantial
part of our populations").
29. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.
30. Id. at 18, 25.
31. Id. at 26-27.
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porate in housing design and construction."32 Furthermore, ac-
cording to the House Report, the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements
could be met without making new multi-family housing "look un-
usual" and without "significant additional costs."33
The FHAA directed HUD to promulgate regulations to imple-
ment this statute and in particular to provide technical assis-
tance to help achieve its accessibility requirements.3 Pursuant to
these directives, HUD issued implementing regulations in 1989
that expounded on the FHAA's design-and-construction require-
ments. 35 Two years later, HUD issued a set of "Fair Housing Ac-
cessibility Guidelines," which became effective on the same
date-March 13, 1991-as the accessibility requirements them-
selves. 36 These Guidelines provided detailed technical assistance
about how designers and builders could comply with each of the §
3604(f)(3)(C) requirements. 37 Though not mandatory, the HUD
Guidelines were intended to provide a "safe harbor" by describing
minimum standards of compliance with the FHAA's accessibility
requirements. 38 In 1996, HUD published another "safe-harbor"
document entitled "Fair Housing Act Design Manual," which was
updated in 1998.3' As the agency charged by Congress with en-
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 18; see also 134 CONG. REC. H4898-04 (1988) (statement of Rep. Shumer)
(noting, as a supporter of the bill, that the FHAA's accessibility requirements "present a
reasonable framework for tearing down longstanding barriers to discrimination at mini-
mal cost" and amount to "a carefully crafted compromise ... [that] strikes the correct bal-
ance between the needs of the handicapped and the costs to society of accommodating
these individuals"); 134 CONG. REC. S10,464 (1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (noting, as
a supporter of the bill, that the FHAA's accessibility requirements "are the result of
lengthy negotiations between the disability community and architects, builders, and man-
agers to achieve a reasonable balance between meeting the intent of the bill, to assure
equal opportunity in housing for individuals with handicaps, while minimizing both con-
struction costs and potential issues of marketability").
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 note, 3604(f)(5)(C), 3614(a) (2000); see also infra text accom-
panying note 240.
35. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (listing relevant definitions); id. § 100.205 (listing
substantive design-and-construction requirements); 54 Fed. Reg. 3243-44, 3249-52 (Jan.
23, 1989).
36. 56 Fed. Reg. 9472-9515 (Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter HUD Accessibility Guidelines].
Three years later, HUD supplemented this guidance with additional information on this
subject. See 59 Fed. Reg. 33,362-68 (June 28, 1994) [hereinafter HUD Questions and An-
swers].
37. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 9472-74 (Mar. 6, 1991).
38. See id. at 9472-73, 9476.
39. OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., FAIR HOUSING ACT DESIGN MANUAL (1988) [hereinafter HUD DESIGN MANUAL],
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/destech/fairhousing.html (last visited
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forcing the FHA-FHAA, HUD's views encompassed in these regu-
lations and other materials are entitled to substantial deference
in applying the statute.4 °
Reflecting the FHAA's legislative history, HUD's accessibility
regulations recognize that certain conditions (e.g., a hilly terrain)
may justify not complying with some of the FHAA's design-and-
construction requirements in specific cases.4' However, because
the FHA-FHAA is remedial civil rights legislation that is to be ac-
corded a generous construction,42 the courts have made clear that
exemptions from this statute are to be narrowly construed, 43 and
defendants who claim the benefit of such an exemption bear the
burden of proving that their situation qualifies for the particular
Feb. 20, 2006) . By 2005, HUD had recognized a total of seven different documents as safe
harbors for compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). See 70 Fed. Reg. 9740 (Feb. 28, 2005).
40. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2002). See generally Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that an agency's
regulations interpreting a statute are to be followed so long as they are "a permissible con-
struction of the statute").
HUD interpretations of the FHA, even when not encompassed in a regulation, have
historically been accorded substantial deference by the Supreme Court of the United
States. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) (stating
that the fact that HUD "consistently has treated [the issue presented here in a certain
way] . . . commands considerable deference"); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 210 (1972) (stating that a long-standing interpretation of the FHA by HUD fair hous-
ing staff "is entitled to great weight"). See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 228-31 (2001) (describing the degree of deference owed to an agency's non-regulation
interpretations of the statutes it enforces).
Cases that have accorded deference to HUD's accessibility regulations or guidelines in-
clude: United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 263 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004); Mem-
phis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,779,
at 16,779.3-.9 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2004); Fair Housing Council v. Vill. of Olde St. An-
drews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706, 718-19 (W.D. Ky. 2003). But see United States v. Taigen &
Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142-43 (D. Idaho 2003) (refusing to follow the view ex-
pressed in the HUD Design Manual concerning the timeliness of § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims, see
infra note 415 and accompanying text, on the ground that this view does not deserve the
same degree of deference as a HUD regulation).
41. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (recognizing "the possibility that
certain natural terrain may pose unique building problems" justifying noncompliance with
the FHAA's accessibility requirements because of "the need to protect the physical integ-
rity of multi-family housing that may be built on such sites"); 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005)
(waiving § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s "accessible route" requirement where "it is impractical to [pro-
vide such a route] because of the terrain or unusual characteristics of the site"). Cases
dealing with the "impracticable site" defense are cited infra note 118.
42. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1995);
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 205, 212; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
380 (1982) (noting the "broad remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act").
43. See, e.g., City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731-32; see also SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at
§ 9:3, n.4 (providing examples of such cases).
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
exemption claimed." These principles apply to § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases, 45 and courts have also held that housing providers whose
dwellings depart from the HUD Guidelines have the burden of
showing that their construction features nonetheless comply with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C). 46 In short, absent proof justifying an individual-
ized exemption, all covered multi-family dwellings constructed af-
ter March 13, 1991, must contain each of the accessibility fea-
tures mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C). 47
C. Other Laws Requiring Accessible Housing
Congress explicitly provided in the FHAA that this statute does
not "invalidate or limit any [other law] ... requiring dwellings to
be designed and constructed in a manner that affords... greater
access than is required by § [3604(f)(3)(C)] ."4 As noted above,
scores of state and local fair housing laws impose substantially
equivalent requirements to those in § 3604(f)(3)(C). 49 In addition,
two other federal statutes barring disability discrimination apply
44. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 9:3, n.2 (referencing such cases).
45. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005) (providing that, in FHAA design-and-
construction cases, "[t]he burden of establishing impracticality because of terrain or un-
usual site characteristics is on the person or persons who designed or constructed the
housing facility"); see also infra note 118 (citing cases that reject the "impractical site" de-
fense).
46. See, e.g., Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. 16,779, at 16,779.3 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp.
2d at 1154; United States v. Hallmark Homes, Inc., No. CV01-432-N-EJL, 2003 WL
23219807, at *8 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2003).
47. That § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessibility requirements apply to all covered multi-family
dwellings is underscored by fact that in both the House and Senate floor debates on this
provision, efforts to limit its requirements to only a certain percentage of covered units
were overwhelmingly rejected. See 134 CONG. REC. H4898-4902 (1988) (rejecting by a 330-
78 vote in the House an amendment offered by Rep. McCollum that would have permitted
housing providers to construct only ten percent of covered multi-family dwellings in such a
manner that they are, or can be adapted to be, accessible and usable by handicapped per-
sons); 134 CONG. REC. S10,532-42 (1988) (rejecting by a 84-12 vote in the Senate an
amendment offered by Sen. Humphrey that would have limited the design-and-
construction requirements to only twenty percent of the units or in the case of multiple
building units, twenty percent of the buildings). In advocating his amendment, Sen. Hum-
phrey regularly noted that the bill as proposed-and ultimately enacted-provided for
"100 percent" coverage of the units in new multi-family housing. See id. at S10,533,
S10,536.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(8) (2000).
49. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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to certain types of housing and include some accessibility re-
quirements of their own.5"
One is § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits
discrimination against people with disabilities in any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.5 This law covers
municipal housing authorities and other housing providers that
receive financial assistance from HUD or some other federal
agency.52 HUD regulations promulgated under § 504 impose ac-
cessibility requirements on the housing covered, at least for some
units. 3
The other relevant federal statute is the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 4 which includes two titles that may
apply in some housing cases. Title II of the ADA applies a § 504-
like mandate to services, programs, and activities of state and lo-
cal governments,55 which includes housing facilities that receive
50. In addition to the two statutes discussed in the text, under the authority of the
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 ("ABA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-56 (2000), HUD has issued
regulations requiring that United States-constructed, -leased, and -financed residential
structures containing fifteen or more housing units "be designed, constructed or altered to
ensure that physically handicapped persons have access to, and use of, these structures."
24 C.F.R. § 40.4 (2005). This requirement may be satisfied by complying with the specifi-
cations contained in the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. Id. ABA cases involving
housing are rare. For one example, see Indep. Hous. Servs. v. Fillmore Center Assocs., 840
F. Supp. 1328, 1342-43 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the subject property was not cov-
ered by the ABA).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
52. See, e.g., Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of
Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2004); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F.
Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
53. These regulations, which went into effect on June 2, 1988, require that at least
five percent of the total dwelling units in newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated
multi-family housing projects meet the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards ("UFAS")
for people with mobility impairments, and that an additional two percent of such units be
made fully accessible to people with hearing or vision impairments. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.22,
8.23 (2005); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 20,233 (June 2, 1988). Furthermore, when one or more
dwelling units in an existing facility are altered-but the alterations do not rise to the
level of substantial alterations-the units must be made accessible to the mobility im-
paired, until five percent of the units in the facility are accessible. See 24 C.F.R. §
8.23(b)(1) (2005). In addition, accessible dwelling units must, to the "maximum extent fea-
sible," be distributed throughout projects. Id. § 8.26. And they must "be available in a suf-
ficient range of sizes and amenities so that a qualified individual with handicaps' choice of
living arrangements is, as a whole, comparable to that of other persons eligible for housing
assistance under the same program." Id. In addition to these construction requirements,
the HUD regulations require all existing § 504-covered housing to make reasonable modi-
fications to units and common areas so that the housing is "readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with handicaps." Id. § 8.24; see also id. § 8.33.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
55. Id. § 12132.
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assistance from such governments.5 6 Title III of the ADA prohib-
its disability discrimination in public accommodations.57 Facilities
covered by Title III generally do not include housing units subject
to the FHA,"8 but this part of the ADA may nevertheless be rele-
vant to housing matters in two ways: (1) it applies to housing de-
velopments' sales and rental offices that might not be covered by
the FHA;59 and (2) its coverage extends to homeless shelters,
nursing homes, and similar establishments whose provision of
temporary-stay lodging may or may not be subject to the FHA.6'
Public accommodations covered by Title III must comply with
that statute's accessibility standards, which require that covered
facilities designed and constructed for first occupancy after Janu-
ary 26, 1993, or substantially altered after that date, must com-
ply with the ADAAG standards.6' Title III also requires removal
of "architectural barriers ... in existing facilities ... where such
removal is readily achievable."62
Thus, depending on factors such as the nature of the facility
involved and whether it receives government assistance, a hous-
ing complex may be covered by § 504 and/or the ADA as well as
56. See, e.g., Indep. Hous. Servs., 840 F. Supp. at 1343-44. Under federal regulations
implementing Title II, units in housing facilities covered by this law and constructed after
January 26, 1992, must comply with UFAS or the ADA's Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities ("ADAAG"). See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (2005); see also id. pt. 36, app.
A (setting forth the ADAAG standards). In addition, alterations to existing Title II-covered
housing must, to the "maximum extent feasible," be done "in such manner that the altered
portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities."
Id. § 35.151(b). A further requirement applicable to existing Title II-covered housing is
that it must be operated so that, "when viewed in its entirety," it "is readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities." Id. § 35.150(a).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
58. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2005) (providing the definition of "commercial facilities").
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) (2000) (providing that Title III's coverage includes a
"sales or rental establishment"); see, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50
(holding that apartment complex's ground-floor unit which had been converted into a
rental office is covered by Title III); Sapp v. MHI P'ship, 199 F. Supp. 2d 578, 583-87 (N.D.
Tex. 2002) (holding that housing development's sales office in model home is covered by
Title III).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), (F), (K) (2000) (providing that Title III's coverage in-
cludes any privately owned "place of lodging" (other than those with five or fewer rooms
for rent where the proprietor resides), "hospital, or other service establishment," and any
"senior citizen center, homeless shelter .... or other social service center establishment");
28 C.F.R. pt 36, app. B, at 683 (2005) (providing that nursing homes that provide certain
services may be covered by the ADA's Title III).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12183(a)(1) (2000); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.401-.406 (2005).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
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the FHA. Indeed, a number of cases have been reported where
both the FHA and one of these other laws were held to apply.63
While a given design-and-construction case may thus support
claims under a variety of laws, the focus of this article is the FHA
because it is the most comprehensive of all federal laws dealing
with disability discrimination in housing. The FHA is also the
model for most state and local fair housing laws, many of which
impose housing accessibility standards identical to or stronger
than those of the FHA.64 Furthermore, as described more fully in
the next section, the FHA's enforcement provisions are generally
superior to other federal laws barring disability discrimination,
because the FHA provides for a full range of relief for a wide vari-
ety of potential plaintiffs against an unlimited class of defen-
dants65 while under the other federal disability statutes the relief
available and proper parties may be substantially narrower.66
D. The FHA's Enforcement Procedures
The FHA provides for three methods of enforcement. First,
pursuant to § 3613, a civil action may be brought by any "ag-
grieved person ... not later than 2 years after the occurrence or
the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice."67
The class of potential plaintiffs covered by the phrase "aggrieved
63. See, e.g., Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d
775, 781-87 (7th Cir. 2002); Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,
294 F.3d 35, 45-55 (2d Cir. 2002); Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 836-41 (7th
Cir. 2001); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 682-83 (2005) (providing that nursing homes and other
"mixed use" facilities may be covered by both the FHA and ADA).
64. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part II.D.
66. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that punitive dam-
ages may not be awarded in private suits under the ADA's Title II or § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act); Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Pitts-
burgh, 382 F.3d 412, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that private plaintiffs may not sue to
enforce HUD's accessibility regulations promulgated under § 504); United States v. Forest
Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 969-70 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the wife of a disabled
person may sue under the FHA but not under § 504); infra note 162 (noting that only in-
junctive relief is available in private suits under Title III of the ADA and describing Title
III's restrictive language concerning the types of entities that may be sued).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2000). The FHA's definition of "aggrieved person" is provided
infra note 273. For purposes of § 3613 and the FHA's other enforcement techniques, a
"[d]iscriminatory housing practice'" is defined as "an act that is unlawful" under the
FHA's substantive provisions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617). See id. § 3602(f). For a de-
tailed description of § 3613 actions, see SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 25.
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person" includes all individuals and entities who are injured in
any way by an FHA violation,68 with standing to sue extending to
the outer limits allowed by Article III of the Constitution.69 Sec-
tion 3613 does not specify who may be named as a defendant,
which means that anyone who is responsible under general tort
principles for an FHA violation is a proper defendant." Relief
available in a § 3613 case includes actual and punitive damages,
injunctions and other orders, and attorney's fees.7'
The second method of enforcing the FHA is an administrative
proceeding pursuant to §§ 3610-3612.72 Such a proceeding is initi-
ated by the filing of a complaint with HUD "not later than within
one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has oc-
curred or terminated" by an "aggrieved person," a phrase that
covers the same broad class of potential complainants as in §
3613 cases.73 HUD itself may also file such a complaint on its own
initiative.74 FHA complaints to HUD may end up being referred
to a "substantially equivalent" state or local agency; 75 being taken
to court where the case will be prosecuted by the Department of
Justice (or its state or local equivalent) and may result in the
same types of relief being awarded to the aggrieved person as in a§ 3613 action;76 or tried before an administrative law judge who
may award actual (but not punitive) damages to the aggrieved
person, injunctive relief, and civil penalties of up to $55,000.77
68. "Person" is defined in the FHA to include "corporations," "associations," and many
other entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2000); see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79 & n.19(applying this definition to include a non-profit corporation).
69. See, e.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 372; Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 109 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Article III re-
quires three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered some actual, particularized "in-jury in fact" (2) that is causally connected ("fairly ... traceable") to the defendant's chal-
lenged action and (3) that is likely to be "redressed by a favorable decision." E.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
70. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2000).
72. Id. §§ 3610-12. For a detailed description of such administrative proceedings, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 24.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100-09 (holding
that standing to sue is equally broad under the FHA's direct-suit and complaint-to-HUD
provisions).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
75. See id. § 3610(f).
76. See id. § 3612(a), (o).
77. See 24 C.F.R. § 180.670(b)(3) (2005).
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The third method of FHA enforcement is a civil action brought
by the Attorney General pursuant to § 3614.78 This provision may
be invoked only if the defendant has "engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance" to FHA rights or if a "group of persons has
been denied any [FHA] rights ... and such denial raises an issue
of general public importance."79 Such a case may result in injunc-
tive relief, monetary damages to aggrieved persons, and civil
penalties of up to $110,000.80 The FHA itself does not provide a
statute of limitations for such § 3614 actions; under these circum-
stances, courts have generally allowed § 3614 claims for injunc-
tive relief at any time, but have imposed a three-year limitations
period for § 3614 claims for monetary damages and a five-year
limitations period for § 3614 claims for civil penalties."'
Overall, therefore, the FHA's three enforcement methods pro-
vide for a full range of monetary and injunctive relief to the wid-
est possible group of potential plaintiffs in a variety of tribunals.
Furthermore, the FHA, unlike some other civil rights statutes,
generally does not limit the types of defendants who may be held
responsible for its substantive violations.8 2 Finally, and of par-
ticular importance for purposes of this article, the FHA's authori-
zation of injunctive relief has been held to include orders requir-
ing such defendants to retrofit inaccessible housing units or
otherwise correct their § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.8 3
While the FHA thus provides for a generally strong enforce-
ment system, the reality is that compliance with the FHA's acces-
sibility requirements has proven to be a serious problem. The de-
78. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2000). For a detailed description of § 3614 actions, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 26.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2000). For FHA design-and-construction cases that have been
held to satisfy § 3614(a)'s "pattern or practice" and "group denial of rights" requirements,
see, respectively, infra notes 431 and 280.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(b)(3) (2005).
81. See infra notes 381-85 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1148; United States v. Pac. Nw.
Elec., Inc., No. CV-01-019-S-BLW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *46 (D. Idaho Mar. 19,
2003); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465-67 (D. Md.
2000); Balachowski v. Boidy, No. 95-C-6340, 2000 WL 1365391, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
20, 2000); HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,136, at 26,128-30 (HUD
ALJ 1998); see also United States v. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490-
91 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (discussing defendant's claim that proposed retrofits would be too
costly).
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gree of noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and some of the rea-
sons proffered for such noncompliance are explored in Part III.
III. THE DEGREE OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE FHA's
ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND SOME REASONS THEREFOR
A. Early Testing Studies and Litigation
The degree of noncompliance with the FHA's accessibility re-
quirements appears to be substantial, although precise estimates
are difficult to come by. Virtually no § 3604(f)(3)(C) litigation oc-
curred in the 1991-1995 period. 4 During this period, however,
the first serious effort to test for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations oc-
curred when a Baltimore fair housing organization investigated
fifty-seven multi-family developments in its area, determined
that forty-four were noncompliant, and eventually brought suit
against six of these developers." In 1996, the Department of Jus-
tice, in cooperation with a Chicago disability-rights group, inves-
tigated some forty-nine multi-family housing developments in the
Chicago metropolitan area and determined that only one was in
full compliance with the FHA's accessibility requirements. 6 In
August of 1998, a review of some fifty multi-family developments
in Idaho found that none complied with § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessi-
ble-front-entrance requirement. 7 In June of 1999, a disabled min-
ister in Denver looked at the nine apartment complexes in her
area that claimed to have accessible units in her price range and
84. The only case reported during 1991-1995 that the author has been able to find isVan Rafelghem v. Gunn, 2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep., 19,378 (S.D. Ohio May 4,1993), where the plaintiff-couple settled with the defendant-builder for modifications tothe plaintiffs' unit, one dollar in damages, and attorney's fees. This case did not produce a
decision on the merits.
85. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 n.5 (D.Md. 2000). The BNI testing program began in 1993, id. at 460, and resulted in a number of
reported decisions in addition to the one involving LOB. See, e.g., Baltimore Neighbor-
hoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700 (D. Md. 1999); BaltimoreNeighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. Md. 1998); BaltimoreNeighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236 (D. Md.
1997).
86. See Justice in Fair Housing Enforcement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2437 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10-11 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 House Hearings] (statement of William J. Malleris, President,
Maple Court Development, Inc.).
87. See id. at 27, 29.
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found that none met the FHA's accessibility requirements." More
recent studies continue to find a high degree of noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C)."9
B. The HUD Conformance Study
In 1997, HUD commissioned a study to estimate conformance
with its 1991 Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines.9 ° This study
examined a randomly selected sample of 397 multi-family devel-
opments constructed in various parts of the country between 1991
and 1997. 9"
One of the oddities of this study is that it made no effort to de-
termine whether these developments complied with §
3604(f)(3)(C) and therefore did not provide any measure of "the
degree of overall conformance" with the FHA's accessibility re-
quirements.92 Rather, it identified for each of the seven FHA re-
quirements a number of subsidiary elements and then gave each
development a score of 0 to 100 for each of these 291 identified
elements.93 The developments' scores were then added together to
88. See id. at 62.
89. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: BARRIERS AT EVERY STEP 3,
42, 51 (2005) (finding, based on 2004 testing program, that over one-third of advertised
rental dwellings in the Chicago area were not accessible for wheelchair users to visit),
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/DDS-Barriers.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2006). In 2005, a study in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, found that none of the sixty-five multi-
family complexes contacted fully complied with the § 3604(f)(3)(C) mandates (copy on file
with the author).
90. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
MULTIFAMILY BUILDING CONFORMANCE WITH THE FAIR HOUSING ACCESSIBILITY
GUIDELINES, at v (2003) [hereinafter HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY], available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/fairhsg/multifamily.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
The 1991 Guidelines are cited supra note 36. The HUD Conformance Study was prompted
in part "because evidence from the field, complaints filed with HUD, and private litigation
suggested that some architects, contractors, and building owners ... were building multi-
family projects that did not comply with the [FHA's] design and construction require-
ments." Id. at v.
91. HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at v, vi, 2. The data gathering, which
included physical inspections of the developments, was done in 1998-99. Id. at 2-3.
92. Id. at v. The study acknowledged that its determination not to focus on §
3604(f)(3)(C) compliance meant that it was not usable "for enforcement purposes." Id. at 3.
93. See id. at vi-viii. For example, § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessible-route requirement was
considered to involve five such subsidiary elements, and a multi-family housing unit con-
forming to all five of these elements received a score of 100, while a unit conforming to
four received a score of eighty, one conforming to three received a score of sixty, and so on
down. Id. at vii. For a detailed description of most of the 291 subsidiary items, see id. at
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produce a composite score for each element, thereby supposedly
giving a "broad national view of conformance."94 The study con-
cluded that "[olver 80 percent of surveyed elements were in con-
formance for a large majority of buildings."95
From an enforcement perspective, the relevance of this and
other conclusions reached in this study is hard to fathom. The
FHA mandates the inclusion of seven specified accessibility fea-
tures, not a certain percentage of their perceived subsidiary ele-
ments. Thus, it is quite possible for a development to be found in
violation of each FHA requirement even though it complies with
over eighty percent of the subsidiary elements surveyed in the
HUD study. Furthermore, § 3604(f)(3)(C) requires that all seven
of its requirements be included; it is no defense in an individual
case for a developer to show that its building complies with some,
or even most, of these requirements. 6
34-46.
94. Id. at v; see also id. at iii (claiming that this study provides a "useful baseline as-
sessment of conformance levels at a national level").
95. Id. at iii. Overall conformance scores were also produced for each of the seven
FHA requirements. The study characterized these scores as "uniformly high" for Require-
ments 1, 2, 3, and 4 (in the 76-98 range); "somewhat lower" for Requirements 5 and 7 (in
the 72-97 range); and "lowest overall" for Requirement 6 (in the 73-85 range). Id. at ix,
28-33 (presenting the composite conformance scores for each of the measures).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 263-65 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that builder-owner's violation of the first requirement of § 3604(f)(3)(C) is
sufficient for liability justifying preliminary injunctive relief); Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *41-42 (determining that defendants are liable for violat-
ing only some of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (D. Md. 2000) (determining that developer is liable for violat-
ing the grab-bar-reinforcement requirement of § 3604(f)(3)(C)(iii)(III)); Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999)(determining defendants' liability based on evaluation of each of the seven § 3604(f)(3)(C)
requirements).
Thus, even if one were to believe that each of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s seven requirements was
complied with by ninety percent of all developments-a conclusion that the HUD study
manifestly did not reach-this would not indicate an overall rate of total FHA-compliance
of ninety percent unless the same ten percent of developments accounted for all of the
noncompliance. Indeed, in this scenario, the overall rate of full FHA-compliance could be
as low as forty-eight percent if there were no overlap among those developments that
failed to comply with Requirement 1, those that failed to comply with Requirement 2,
those that failed to comply with Requirement 3, and so on, so that the overall figure for
some noncompliance among all developments would be derived by multiplying ninety per-
cent by itself seven times, which equals just under forty-eight percent.
This exercise shows that what might appear at first blush to be an impressively highfigure for compliance with individual requirements can mask a fairly high degree of over-
all noncompliance, given that the statutory mandate in § 3604(f)(3)(C) is that all require-
ments be complied with. The exercise also serves to reinforce the need to understand that
the HUD study's findings of "high" levels of conformance with most of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s re-
[Vol. 40:753
ACCESSIBLE HOUSING
C. Some Excuses for Noncompliance and the Role of Local
Building Codes
By 1999, the combination of a growing number of enforcement
suits and what was perceived to be a high degree of noncompli-
ance so alarmed the multi-family housing industry that it sought
to have the FHA amended to bar application of § 3604(f)(3)(C) to
all current buildings that had been constructed after receiving a
building permit (i.e., to virtually all existing multi-family hous-
ing)." The proposed amendment did not pass, but in House hear-
ings on it, representatives of the National Association of Home
Builders and other builder advocates provided some reasons for
the high degree of noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). The prin-
cipal reason they cited was lack of awareness by builders of the
FHA's accessibility requirements.9" Two related justifications
were that HUD's guidance and other educational efforts concern-
ing these requirements had been inadequate and that because the
process of obtaining a building permit was thought to guarantee
compliance with all legal requirements, and not just those of the
local building code, builders in areas where the local code did not
incorporate the FHA's accessibility requirements were often sur-
prised to learn after construction was completed that their dwell-
ings did not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C). 99
quirements, see supra note 95, do not establish a similarly high level of full compliance
among all those developments subject to this provision.
97. The proposed amendment was in the form of a bill, H.R. 2437, introduced by Con-
gressman Walter Jones, providing that the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C) would not apply
to any building designed for first occupancy on the date of the enactment of this bill that
had "received a building permit or other similar approval from the relevant State or local
building authorities as meeting the requirements of the applicable building code." See
1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 3. Because virtually all multi-family housing is
constructed with a building permit, this bill would have "effectively immunize[d] from fed-
eral enforcement all noncompliant buildings constructed in the last eight years," a period
in which "hundreds of thousands of housing units [were] built." Id. at 51 (statement of Bill
Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
98. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 15 (statement of Mark Ellis Tipton,
builder and past president of the National Association of Home Builders) (stating that
"[tihe problem clearly is a lack of awareness"); id. at 37 (citing study concluding that "77
percent of the people still don't know about [the FHA accessibility requirements]"). Fur-
thermore, in litigation conducted years after this hearing, builders and architects accused
of violating § 3604(f)(3)(C) continued to cite lack of awareness of this provision as the rea-
son for their failure to incorporate the FHA's accessibility features in newly constructed
housing. See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1137, 1151-52; Hallmark
Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 232119807, at *7; Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at
767.
99. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 5 (statement of Len Tozer, Tozer
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These points were hotly contested by disability advocates, the
Department of Justice, and even some individual builders who
had constructed FHA-compliant developments."' These witnesses
suggested that some builders deliberately ignored the §
3604(f)(3)(C) requirements, even to the point of not following the
accessibility features provided for in their buildings' architectural
plans, and that many others consciously avoided learning about
the FHA's requirements. °1
Even if the reason many builders fail to comply with §
3604(f)(3)(C) is good faith ignorance of its mandates, it is clear
that such ignorance is not a sufficient legal excuse to avoid liabil-
ity for violating this provision.10 2 Nor does HUD's perceived fail-
ings in educating the building industry legally justify the latter's
noncompliance with this provision.0 3 Indeed, as a general matter,
a defendant's state of mind is simply not relevant to the liability
issue in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, and in particular, a showing that
Builders, Inc.); id. at 14 (statement of Mark Ellis Tipton, builder and past president of the
National Association of Home Builders).
100. See id. at 19-20, 27, 56, 58, 62 (statements of disability advocates); id. at 50-52(statements of a representative of the Dep't of Justice); id. at 10-11 (statement of an indi-
vidual builder).
101. See id. at 11, 19-20, 27, 56, 58, 62; see also id. at 52 (noting that the Department
of Justice has seen "situations where a builder simply ignored the accessible features of an
architect's design plan"); HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at 48 (finding that
architectural "[pilans consistently show higher conformance with the Guidelines than
completed buildings").
102. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL
232119807, at *7; see also 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 37 (statement of Rep.Frank) (noting the applicability to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases of the "old principle" that "igno-
rance of the law is no excuse"); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62(holding that builder cannot escape § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability based on reliance on its archi-
tect's assurance of FHA compliance); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d at 490(holding that perceived lack of need for accessible housing in the area is irrelevant to and
thus provides no defense for builder's liability under § 3604(f)(3)(C)). See generally Texaco,Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982) ("[Plersons owning property within a State are
charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposi-
tion of such property."); id. at 532 n.25 ("All persons are charged with knowledge of theprovisions of statutes. . . .") (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276,283 (1925)); Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) ("[E]veryone is charged
with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large.. ").
In a related point, courts have made clear that § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements are not
too "vague" to be enforced. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51; Hallmark
Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *6-7.
103. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-53; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003
WL 23219807, at *7; cf. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (holding thatbuilder can not escape § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability based on prior approval of its plans by local
HUD officials).
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the defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent is not re-
quired in such cases.1" 4
The one point made by noncompliant builders that has gener-
ated some positive response is the need to have local building
codes better reflect the FHA's accessibility requirements.
Throughout the 1990s, there was no clear relationship between
local building codes and the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements. In some
states and localities, these codes included § 3604(f)(3)(C)-like re-
quirements, and indeed some did so even before this provision be-
came effective.0 5 Many other jurisdictions, however, did not in-
clude such requirements. 0 6  Thus, the tens of thousands of
building codes throughout the country lacked anything like a na-
tional accessibility standard,0 7 and indeed there were even four
different "model" codes-the International Building Code, the
Standard Building Code, the Uniform Building Code, and the
code of the Building Officials and Code Administrators, Interna-
tional, Inc. (BOCA).'i 8
A number of steps have been taken to have building codes bet-
ter reflect the FHA's accessibility requirements. In 1997, the De-
104. See Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760, 762; Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *46-48; cf. Good Shepherd Manor Found. v. City of
Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[flailure to reasonably accommo-
date" in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(B)-which, like § 3604(f)(3)(C), is declared by the statute
to be illegal "discrimination" under § 3604(f)--is "an alternative theory of liability" sepa-
rate from intentional discrimination); Indep. Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F.
Supp. 698, 707 (D. Or. 1997) (holding that the defendant's mental state (i.e, whether its
violations were intentional, negligent, or innocent) is generally irrelevant to the issue of
liability in a design-and-construction case under Title III of the ADA). This factor, how-
ever, may be relevant to punitive damages and/or civil penalties. See Quality Built Constr.,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760, 766-67.
105. See, e.g., 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 19 (statement of Brian D. Black,
Director of Building Codes and Standards, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association) (re-
ferring to "many State and local jurisdictions [that] have enforced building codes that
meet or exceed the construction requirements of the Fair Housing Act," including New
York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia); id. at 60 (letter from Kathleen L. Wilde, Oregon Ad-
vocacy Center) (referring to "many states [where] the federal standards regarding adapt-
able multi-family housing have been incorporated into the state building code" and in par-
ticular to Oregon where this was done in 1993); id. at 61 (letter from Joy Weeber, Ron
Mace Center for Disability Community Development) (referring to a North Carolina build-
ing code that pre-dated § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
106. See, e.g., id. at 41 (statement of William J. Malleris, developer of accessible hous-
ing) (referring to municipalities that opted not to include an accessibility provision in their
local building codes).
107. In 1999, there were over 40,000 state and local jurisdictions that had adopted and
were enforcing building codes. See id. at 24.
108. See id. at 52; HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at v.
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partment of Justice, HUD, and a number of state attorneys gen-
eral wrote to local permitting officials urging them to provide no-
tice of the FHA's accessibility requirements. 9 For its part, Con-
gress, in its fiscal year 2000 appropriations, directed HUD to
review the various model building codes to determine whether
their accessibility provisions were consistent with HUD guidance
on the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements, 110 a review that was com-
pleted in 2000."' In the meantime, officials responsible for the
various model building codes undertook, through the creation of
the International Code Council, to produce a single document
governing multi-family housing accessibility requirements. 112 In2000, the ICC produced an "International Building Code" whose
accessibility provisions met or exceeded § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s require-
ments and which is now regarded by HUD as an additional "safe
harbor" for § 3604(f)(3)(C) compliance. 13
While these code-based efforts to achieve compliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) will no doubt be helpful, they provide no guarantees.
For one thing, there are still many places in the country that
have not adopted a modern building code as part of their housing
permitting process." 4 For another, individual jurisdictions that
have adopted such a code may not include all of the accessibility
features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) in their particular version of
the code."' Finally, even if by some future time all multi-family
housing proposals would be denied building permits unless they
were to comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-so that only "rogue" builders
would not be adhering to the FHA accessibility requirements-
the question of what to do with the millions of noncompliant units
built between 1991 and this future full-compliance date would
still remain.
109. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 52.
110. See id.
111. See Final Report of HUD Review of Model Building Codes, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,740-94
(Mar. 23, 2000).
112. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 22.
113. See id. at 25; HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at 3; see also Final Re-port of HUD Review of the Fair Housing Accessibility Requirements in the 2003 Interna-
tional Building Code, 70 Fed. Reg. 9738 (Feb. 28, 2005) (providing HUD's grant of condi-tional safe harbor approval to the 2003 edition of this Code and anticipating similar
approval for the 2006 edition).
114. For a list of the states and localities that have adopted the International BuildingCode since its promulgation in 2000, see the International Code Council's website athttp://www.iccsafe.org/government/adoption.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
115. See, e.g., 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 41 (referring to municipalities
that opted not to include an accessibility provision in their local building codes).
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IV. LEGAL BARRIERS TO ENFORCING THE FHA's
ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
A. Overview: Substantive vs. Other Defenses
As noted in the previous section, a variety of "lack-of-bad-
intent" and "partial compliance" defenses have been asserted in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, all of which have failed, at least with respect
to the basic issue of liability.116 The only other substantive de-
fenses in these cases are that the dwellings involved are not cov-
ered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) 117 or that noncompliance is excused due to
an "impractical site.""' These substantive defenses must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but, as a general rule, they
have failed in most reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. 19 Once all such
substantive excuses have been rejected, there is little left for a
developer to do beyond accepting responsibility for its noncompli-
ant building, either through a settlement or an adverse court rul-
ing.120
Of course, a successful § 3604(f)(3)(C) lawsuit requires a proper
defendant, a proper plaintiff, and a timely claim. Defendants ac-
cused of violating this provision have on occasion questioned the
presence of one or more of these three elements. Indeed, given the
substantive clarity of § 3604(f)(3)(C) as outlined above, 12 1 a chal-
lenge to these elements is often the only possible defense to liabil-
ity in such a case. These elements are dealt with in the next three
sections.
116. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706,
716-19 (W.D. Ky. 2003); see also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing the
dwellings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a description of the "impractical site"
defense; see also Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. 16,779, at 16,779.4-6 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (rejecting the "impractical site"
defense); Montana Fair Hous. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1066 (D.
Mont. 1999) (rejecting the "impractical site" defense); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v.
Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 706-07 (D. Md. 1999) (rejecting the "impracti-
cal site" defense); HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 1 25,136, at 26,125-27
(HUD ALJ 1998) (rejecting the "impractical site" defense).
119. See supra notes 117-18.
120. See, e.g., Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *8; Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *47.
121. See supra notes 24-26, 41-47 and accompanying text.
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B. Identifying Proper Defendants: Who May be Sued for §
3604(f)(3)(C) Violations?
1. The Basic Liability Standard and Obvious Defendants
Unlike some other federal civil rights statutes, the Fair Hous-
ing Act's substantive prohibitions generally do not specify the
types of persons or entities that may be held liable for engaging
in the discriminatory practices outlawed.122 Specifically with re-
spect to the FHA's accessibility requirements, § 3604(f)(3)(C)
makes the "failure to design and construct" multi-family dwell-
ings with the required features "discrimination" for purposes of §
3604(f)(1) and § (f)(2), 123 provisions which simply outlaw disability
discrimination in certain housing transactions without specifying
who may be held accountable for such a violation.1 24
The "failure to design and construct" language of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
might be thought to limit the targets of this provision to those
who "design" or "construct" covered multi-family dwellings, but
this interpretation seems wrong. As one court has observed, §
3604(f)(3)(C) "is not a description of who is liable. Rather, it is a
description of what actions constitute discrimination."1 25
122. See, e.g., infra notes 128-29. By way of contrast, Title VII, the principal federal
employment discrimination statute, limits its prohibitions to "employers," "labor organiza-
tions," and two other specified entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(d); see also id. §§
12111(2), 12112(a) (limiting the ADA's employment provisions to "employer[s," "labor or-
ganization[s]," and two other specified entities); id. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a) (limiting the
ADA's public accommodations provisions to "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates" certain specified types of private entities).
One exception to the FHA's general approach of not identifying specific types of poten-
tial defendants is 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), which prohibits "any person or other entity whose
business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions" from discrimi-
nating in such a transaction. Id. § 3605(a). This provision, however, is not relevant to the
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) cases that are the subject of this article.
123. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., infra note 125; Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236, at 16,236.4 (D. Md. 1997) ("The FHA does not specify
who may be held liable for violations of these [accessibility] provisions"). As discussed su-
pra note 18, the texts of § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) are patterned after § 3604(a) and §
3604(b), which, as Judge Easterbrook has observed in another context, are written "in the
passive voice-banning an outcome while not saying who the actor is, or how such actors
bring about the forbidden consequence." NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d
287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (noting that the
FHA "focuses on prohibited acts").
125. Doering v. Pontarelli Builders, Inc., No. 01-C-2924, 2001 WL 1464897, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 16, 2001); see also Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
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Some § 3604(f)(3)(C) defendants have argued that the phrase
"design and construct" means that only someone who does both of
these tasks can be held liable for violating this provision (e.g.,
that an architect who only designs, but does not also construct, a
noncompliant building should escape liability). The courts have
generally rejected this view, 126 noting that its acceptance would
essentially mean that no single entity could then be held respon-
sible for a "failure to design and construct" (i.e., because neither
the "designer" nor the "constructor" did both functions). 27
In rejecting this defense, one court suggested an alternative in-
terpretation of Congress's use of the conjunction in the "design
and construct" phrase-that is, that it requires both acts for a
violation, albeit not necessarily by the same party, so that, for ex-
Supp. 2d 661, 664 (D. Md. 1998) (the '-design and construct'" phrase "addresses" but "[b]y
its own terms . . . does not specify the parties who may be held liable"); Brief for United
States, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, in Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. T.R.
Seven Oaks, No. 1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/housing/documents/amicusl.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (noting that "[tihe fo-
cus of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] is on the failure to achieve the desired legislative goal, not on the
identities of parties responsible for that failure").
126. See, e.g., Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *1, 4; Montana Fair Hous. v. Am. Capital
Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062, 1068-69 (D. Mont. 1999); Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662, 664-65 (D. Md. 1998); United States
v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97C8175, 1998 WL 42265 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1998). But see
Whitaker v. West Vill. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-0411-P, 2004 WL 2046771, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2004) (accepting this argument and dismissing § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim
against a builder who was not also accused of designing the subject property).
A similar defense has been accepted in some cases under the ADA's Title III (public ac-
commodations). See, e.g., Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1033-36 (9th
Cir. 2001); Whitaker, 2004 WL 1778963, at *2-3; Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe
Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 945 F. Supp. 1-2 (D.D.C. 1996). But see Johanson v. Huizenga
Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (upholding Title III claim
against architect); United States v. Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d 822, 824-27 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Title III liability may extend to motel owner's franchisor if it exercised a sig-
nificant degree of control over the design and construction of the owner's inaccessible mo-
tel). The basis for accepting this defense, however, is specific language in Title III that dif-
fers from that used in the FHA and is therefore not persuasive in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. See
infra note 162; Barker v. Emory Univ., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,712, at
16,712.2 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2003); Doering, 2001 WL 1464897 at *3-4; Rommel Builders,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
127. See supra note 126. As Judge Shadur observed in an early decision on this point,
"the notion that each of two parties working together, one performing the first function
and the other performing the second function, is thereby insulated from liability is a frank
absurdity." Hartz Constr. Co., 1998 WL 42265, at *1; see also Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 664 ("Defendant's narrow interpretation of the 'design and construct' provision
would defeat the purpose of the FHAA by allowing architects and builders who are in-
volved in either the design or construction, but not both, to escape liability .. "). But see
Whitaker, 2004 WL 1778963, at *4 (assuming that both actions must be done by a particu-
lar defendant, but upholding claim against architect accused of both designing and super-
vising construction).
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ample, "a nonconforming design that was never constructed"
would not violate § 3604(f)(3)(C). 12' According to this opinion, "the
statute should probably be read to imply that for discrimination
to occur, there must be both nonconforming design and noncon-
forming construction; an architect who designs a nonconforming
building that is never constructed should probably escape liabil-
ity."12
9
In any event, the general view has emerged that a wide range
of participants in the "design-and-construct" process may be
named as proper defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Thus, ac-
cording to one influential district court opinion: "When a group of
entities enters into the design and construction of a covered
dwelling, all participants in the process as a whole are bound to
follow the FHAA .... In essence, any entity who contributes to a
violation of the FHAA would be liable." 30 HUD and the Depart-
ment of Justice have agreed with this approach. 3'
128. Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *4.
129. Id. This is also the position taken by the Department of Justice, which has argued:
Had Congress used the word "or," the Act would have made unlawful the
mere "design" of an inaccessible dwelling, even where actual construction was
never contemplated or achieved. Congress was concerned with a "failure to
design and construct... [accessible] dwellings," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), not
the mere drafting of blueprints for dwellings that never get built.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supporting petitioners, T.R. Seven Oaks, No.
1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997) (alterations in original).
On the other hand, where a building is designed in conformance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)
but is not built with the mandated accessibility features, a violation by the builder would
presumably occur. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
130. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (emphasis in the original). Accord
Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (quoting the Rommel Builders standard
set forth in the text); Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (quoting the Rommel
Builders standard set forth in the text); Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7990, at *43 (quoting the Rommel Builders standard set forth in the text); Montana Fair
Hous. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069 (D. Mont. 1999) (quoting Rom-
mel Builders standard set forth in the text); see also Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *4
(stating that "those who are wrongful participants [in such discrimination] are subject to
liability for violating the FHAA"); cf. Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d at 826 (interpreting simi-
lar provision in Title III of the ADA to extend liability to anyone possessing a "significant
degree of control over the final design and construction of a facility").
131. See HUD DESIGN MArNUAL, supra note 39, at 22 ("[Rlesponsibility for complying
with the law rests with any and all persons involved in the design and construction of cov-
ered multi-family dwellings. This means [that the] complaint could be filed against all per-
sons involved in the design and construction of the building, including architects, builders,
building contractors, the owners, etc."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, sup-
porting petitioners, T.R. Seven Oaks, No. 1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997) (providing
that § 3604(f)(3)(C) "requires all parties involved in that 'design and construction' process
to conform their involvement, whatever its scope, to the requirements of the Fair Housing
[Vol. 40:753
ACCESSIBLE HOUSING
This seems correct, as least for those entities whose contribu-
tion to the design-and-construction process is substantial. The
Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that an FHA
violation is essentially a tort and that FHA claims are to be gov-
erned by ordinary tort principles absent explicit instruction to the
contrary in the statute. 32 Under ordinary tort principles, an actor
is liable for harm to another if the actor's tortious conduct is a
"legal cause" of that harm (i.e., is a "substantial factor" in bring-
ing about the harm).133 Thus, each entity whose participation in
the design-and-construction process of a multi-family housing
complex could reasonably be seen as a substantial factor in caus-
ing a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation should be liable.
This would obviously include a single company that owns the
underlying land and also develops the project, builds the physical
structure, and becomes landlord to the building's tenants. 3 4 Some
or all of these functions, however, may be carried out by separate
entities. It is not uncommon, for example, for a builder to be em-
ployed by the landowner/developer and have "no right to work on
the development outside of its contractual relationship with the
owner/developer.""'3 Still, the cases generally assume that the
Act").
132. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
195-96 (1974).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-31 (1965) [hereinafter SECOND
TORTS RESTATEMENT]. These provisions of the Torts Restatement deal with negligent con-
duct, but a more recent version of this Restatement makes clear that the "legal cause"-
"substantial factor" standard deals with all types of tortious conduct. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 1, B18 cmt. c (2000) [hereinafter AP-
PORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT] (noting that, for all tort claims, the basic requirement for an
actor's liability is "legal cause," which means that the actor's tortious conduct "must be a
factual cause of the plaintiffs injury and a substantial factor in bringing about the plain-
tiffs damages" (citing SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a)); see also id. §§ A18 cmt.
C, C18 cmt. c, D18 cmt. e, El8 cmt. f (citing SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a).
A "substantial" cause, according to the cited Comment a in § 431 of the Second Torts
Restatement, means that "the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular
sense" and distinguishing this concept from causes that are "so insignificant that no ordi-
nary mind would think of them as causes." SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a.
134. Builder-landlords are mentioned in the modern Torts Restatement as examples of
entities whose contribution to harm suffered by another as a result of a defect in the build-
ing is assumed to be substantial enough to make them liable. E.g., APPORTIONMENT RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 133, § 22 cmt. f, illus. 8 (describing a builder-landlord that is as-
sumed to be liable for defects in construction); see also id. § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (describing
a landlord that is assumed to be liable for furnace explosion along with furnace's manufac-
turer and installer).
135. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
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builder is liable for a project's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations 136 along
with the owner/developer, 3 ' perhaps because the builder and
owner/developer are often part of a single corporate entity or per-
haps because the builder's participation in the design-and-
construction process is so substantial. As for other entities, §
3604(f)(3)(C) claims have also been maintained, consistent with
the "substantial participant" standard, against architects 38 and a
variety of other participants in the design-and-construction proc-
ess. 1
39
Of course, not every participant in this process should be liable
when the resulting dwelling violates § 3604(f)(3)(C). Only those
entities that design or construct in violation of the statute (i.e.,
behave tortiously) would be held responsible. 4 ° Thus, for exam-
136. Many cases exist where § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims have been brought against builders.
See Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260; Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at
758-59, 762; Moseke v. Miller and Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 493-94 (E.D. Va.
2002); Montana Fair Hous., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60; Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp.
2d at 662-65; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 9495 (Mar. 6, 1991) (providing that the builder must
bear "[aill costs associated with incorporating the new design and construction require-
ments of the Fair Housing Act").
137. Many cases exist where § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims have been brought against
owner/developers. See Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260; Quality Built Constr. Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 762; Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49; Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459-60 (D. Md. 2000); Eastern Para-
lyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (claim against original developer); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(b), (d) (2005) (giving
examples of FHA accessibility requirements that focus on the role of the "real estate de-
veloper" or "developer").
138. See, e.g., Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260 n.1; Quality Built Constr., Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 758-59, 765; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *7; Barker
v. Emory Univ., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. [ 16,712 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2003);
Moseke, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94; Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *1; Montana Fair
Hous., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60.
139. See, e.g., Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. 16,779, at 16,779.1 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (maintaining claims against engi-
neers); Whitaker, 2004 WL 1773704, *1 (maintaining claims against civil engineer); East-
ern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (maintaining claims against de-
signer-builder of pre-fabricated units used in the development); Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236, at 16,236.4 (D. Md. 1997)
(maintaining claims against real estate firm that exercised authority over condominium's
"Architectural Review Board" which "had considerable influence over a myriad of features
arguably relevant to FHA compliance").
140. See APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 1, A18, B18, C18, D18,
El8 (providing that, for liability in all tort claims, an actor's "independent tortious con-
duct" must be a legal cause of the plaintiffs injury); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 324 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]:
[It is] essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with re-
sponsibility shall be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with the intent
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ple, if the architect's plans call for accessible entrance ways and
the builder deviates from those plans in violation of the FHA,
then the architect would not be liable because he was not a
"wrongful participant."141 Furthermore, "entities such as subcon-
tractors and individual workers who do not participate in the
wrongful conduct resulting in a [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] violation" would
also not be liable. 14 2 On the other hand, "if an architect draws up
plans with noncomplying entrance ways, and a builder follows the
plan resulting in a covered dwelling with an inaccessible en-
tranceway, both entities would be liable as both were wrongful
participants."
2. Effect of Sale of the Property
a. Overview: "Piercing the Veil" and "Successor Liability"
Theories
How would the sale of a multi-family dwelling constructed
without the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) affect the poten-
tial liability of its new owner and the original owner-developer-
builder?14 Little has been written about this issue, but it is ex-
requisite to committing a tort, or with negligence. One who innocently, and
carefully, does an act which happens to further the tortious purpose of an-
other is not acting in concert with the other.
141. See Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665 n.2; see also Quality Built Constr.,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 762 n.2, 765 (noting that liability was not sought regarding non-
compliant outside features against architect who was only responsible for designing the
units' interiors). The scenario described in the text is apparently not an unusual one. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
142. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 664; Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d at 826
(interpreting similarly worded provision in Title III of the ADA not to cover those persons
who are only "tangentially or remotely connected with" the design-and-construction proc-
ess).
This is not to say that employees or other agents of a proper defendant who carry out
orders in violation of the FHA cannot also be held liable, for indeed they can. See, e.g., Dil-
lon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1979); Jeanty v. McKee & Poague,
Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1974). The assumption of the Rommel Builders
statement quoted in the text, however, is that such agents did not actually play a substan-
tial role in the design-and-construction violation alleged. To the extent that they do, then
even subcontractors and workers may be liable along with their builder-employers.
143. Rommel Builders, 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 at 665 n.2; see also Quality Built Constr., Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (rejecting builder's argument that it is shielded from liability
because its architect was responsible for designing the units properly). For a discussion of
indemnification, contribution, and other claims between defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases, see infra Part IV.B.4.
144. For purposes of this section, "builder" will be used to connote the entity primarily
responsible for the original design-and-construction process, although it is recognized that
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tremely important, because virtually all of the millions of non-
compliant units constructed since 1991 will eventually be sold,
and some multi-family developments, such as condominiums, are
built with the intention of being sold promptly. If only the origi-
nal builder is responsible for bringing a development into compli-
ance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-and then only for so long as the builder
is involved with that development-the chances of this responsi-
bility actually being fulfilled will fade over time. Furthermore,
the continued status of the development as inaccessible housing
will mean that persons with disabilities are discouraged from liv-
ing there indefinitely unless the current owner is also responsible
for correcting the facility's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.
Few courts have considered this issue. What opinions there are
have generally concluded that the original builder remains liable
even after the property is sold, 145 but that the new owner is not
liable,146 although little helpful analysis is offered to buttress
these conclusions. For example, in Silver State Fair Housing
Council v. ERGS, Inc., 4 the court upheld a § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim
against the original builder of an apartment complex completed
some years earlier under a "continuing violation" theory, 4 but
refused to apply this theory against the current owner, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the builder that had taken no part in the de-
sign-and-construction process of the complex. 49 Silver State, how-
ever, was essentially concerned with statute-of-limitations issues,
a separate matter that is considered later in Part IV.D. Most
other opinions that have commented on the effect of an inaccessi-
ble development's sale have involved condominiums, where the
purchasers were seen primarily as consumers rather than busi-
ness ventures intent upon offering their newly acquired units to
the public for profit. 5 ° This latter situation (e.g., the sale of an
apartment building to a commercial buyer) is the one most likely
such an entity might also be the developer, landowner, or other such participant. See su-
pra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 147-48; Balachowski v. Boidy, No. 95-C-6340, 2000 WL 1365391,
at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (holding that the original builder is the "appropriate" en-
tity to be ordered to retrofit and pay damages because he caused the violations and should
have corrected them).
146. See infra notes 147, 191.
147. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Nev. 2005).
148. Id. at 1220-22. For a discussion of the "continuing violation" theory, see infra Part
IV.D.2.b.
149. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
150. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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to raise difficult and important issues as to who is responsible for
the building's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that sales to companies
closely related to the builder would not significantly alter §
3604(f)(3)(C) liability in two particular situations. One is where
the property is sold to a subsidiary corporation that is so clearly
just a shell of the builder that a court would be justified in "pierc-
ing" the subsidiary's "corporate veil" to hold the builder responsi-
ble for the sub's liabilities. The veil-piercing doctrine, being a
"fundamental principle of corporate law, "151 can certainly be in-
voked in FHA cases. 152 Thus, for example, a builder that has con-
structed an inaccessible apartment complex might create a sub-
sidiary to which it sells this property, which is what occurred in
Silver State. 53 If the subsidiary is a well-funded company that
observes the corporate formalities, then this arrangement is
likely to shield the parent from the subsidiary's liabilities, but the
absence of these factors could well make the parent liable
through veil-piercing where the subsidiary's corporate form has
been misused to accomplish a wrongful purpose.154
151. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
152. See, e.g., Holley v. Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003) (holding that FHA claims are generally to be
governed by traditional legal principles).
153. See 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. Another typical scenario involving a parent-sub rela-
tionship in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) setting would be for a large development company to create a
subsidiary corporation to build the parent's new apartment complex. Under these circum-
stances, the question raised by the potential applicability of the veil-piercing doctrine
would be whether the parent, along with its builder sub, would be liable for the latter's §
3604(f)(3)(C) violations. Cf. Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1176
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding the parent of a construction company that had no officers or di-
rectors to be a proper defendant in a design-and-construction case under Title III of the
ADA).
154. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-64. One of the oddities of the Silver State opin-
ion was that it referred to veil-piercing as a way to impose liability on a subsidiary for the
wrongs of its parent, see 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220, an upside-down approach that ignores
the fact that this doctrine is used to impose liability on parent-shareholders for the wrongs
of their subsidiary corporations. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62-63 (describing veil-
piercing principles in CERCLA case); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-41 (7th
Cir. 1999) (describing how Bestfoods veil-piercing principles apply in Title VII cases to po-
tentially hold parent liable for the discriminatory acts of its subsidiary corporation); Jo-
hanson, 963 F. Supp. at 1176. Thus, while the veil-piercing doctrine is certainly available
to attribute liability to a parent for its subsidiary's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations, this theory
presumably could not be used, as Silver State suggested, to impose liability on a subsidi-
ary corporation that purchases an inaccessible development from its parent. See 362 F.
Supp. 2d at 1222.
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A second type of sale that will not allow related entities to
avoid liability is when a builder of inaccessible housing sells all of
its assets to, or merges or consolidates with, another company.
Under traditional "successor liability" principles, the purchaser(successor) company would ordinarily be liable for the harm
caused by its predecessor's defective products if the sale "consti-
tutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor" or "results
in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor."1"5
Successor liability principles have been applied in civil rights
and other federal statutory actions,'56 and they would presumably
govern FHA cases as well. 57 These principles would justify at-
tributing a builder's liability to its successor company where, for
example, the new company, as a result of a merger or consolida-
tion with the builder or the purchase of all of the builder's assets,
simply amounts to a continuation of the builder's business.15 This
is not, however, the typical § 3604(f)(3)(C) situation. Presumably
in most cases where a builder constructs an inaccessible multi-
family dwelling and sells it to another, the builder remains in
business and is only selling this one particular property. When
such a "piecemeal" sale of assets is involved, the purchaser ordi-
narily does not succeed to the builder's liability, absent an
agreement for the assumption of such liability or a fraudulent
conveyance designed to shield the builder from liability.159 How-
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12(c), (d) (1998) [hereinaf-
ter PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]. The other two circumstances provided in this rule
for successor liability are when the sale "is accompanied by an agreement for the successor
to assume such liability" or "results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for
the debts or liabilities of the predecessor." Id. § 12(a), (b). Imposing liability on successor
companies is considered appropriate in the four situations listed in § 12(a)-(d), because a
contrary result would "unfairly deprive future products liability plaintiffs of the remedies
that would otherwise have been available against the predecessor." Id. § 12 cmt. b. On the
other hand, successor liability is not deemed appropriate when another's assets are ac-quired "piecemeal, other than as part of a going concern, [because the purchaser] cannot,by that fact alone, be said to have either manufactured or sold defective products." Id.
For a discussion of whether an inaccessibly constructed multi-family dwelling is a "de-
fective product" under modern tort principles, see infra notes 172-78 and accompanying
text.
156. See, e.g., Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 260-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying successorliability principles in Title VII case); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1245-47 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that traditional successor liability principles govern
CERCLA cases); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944-46 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying succes-
sor liability principles in Title VII case).
157. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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ever, where the purchasing company acquires and continues to
operate another firm's entire product line (e.g., all of the apart-
ment complexes of a large building company that has other busi-
nesses), some courts have held the acquiring company liable for
the selling company's defective products.
161
b. Continuing Liability of the Original Builder
In Silver State, the court clearly felt that the original builder
was fully responsible for the § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations alleged and
concluded that, as a policy matter, it would be inappropriate to
allow such a defendant to "evade FHA liability simply by offload-
ing the property after completion."' 6 ' To support this conclusion,
the court cited certain features of the FHA, such as its provision
for punitive damages to punish violators and the absence of any
statutory language limiting the types of entities that may be
sued.'62 According to the Silver State opinion: "If Congress had
In the absence of the circumstances described in Subsections (a) through (d),
a successor company that buys productive assets from another company is
not liable for harm caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distrib-
uted by the predecessor prior to the successor's acquisition of assets. When
the assets are purchased piecemeal, the alleged successor did not "sell or dis-
tribute" the product under the liability rule stated in § 1 [the basic products
liability rule]; and attempts to establish continuation of the corporate entity
are recognized only under the terms set forth in this Section.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 12 cmt. c.
160. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 375, at 1040 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS];
cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 170-71, 181-85 (1973) (applying this
principle to a labor law case). In Golden State Bottling, the Supreme Court upheld an
NLRB reinstatement order against the purchaser of one of the businesses of another com-
pany that had earlier engaged in unfair labor practices. See 414 U.S. at 172. The Court
refused to limit the doctrine of successor liability to situations involving sale of all of a
predecessor's assets, because, "so long as there is a continuity in the 'employing industry,'
the public policies underlying the doctrine will be served by its broad application." Id. at
183 n.5.
161. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
162. Id. Although not mentioned in the Silver State opinion, the contrast between the
FHA on these two points and the design-and-construction provision in the ADA's Title III
(public accommodation) is noteworthy. First, while privately initiated FHA cases can yield
actual and punitive damages and all other appropriate relief, see supra notes 71 and 76-77
and accompanying texts, relief in such cases under Title III is generally limited to equita-
ble orders to make the facility accessible, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2000), which means that
such relief can only be "meaningful against the person currently in control of the build-
ing." Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001). Second, while
the FHA does not limit the class of persons who may be sued, see supra notes 68-69 and
73 and accompanying texts, Title III's prohibitions are explicitly limited to "any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a) (2000). Indeed, the legislative history of Title III, which was enacted two years
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wished to remove liability for construction-based discriminatory
housing practices upon the sale or transfer of the offending prop-
erty, it could have said so."1 6 3
Reliance on the absence of statutory language, however, is not
an entirely satisfactory basis for determining whether a former
owner remains liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations. As noted
above, the Supreme Court has made clear that congressional si-
lence in the FHA should be interpreted as a directive from Con-
gress to apply traditional tort principles in determining who is a
proper defendant under this statute,"6 and Silver State did not
consider these principles.
Two sets of traditional tort principles are relevant to the prob-
lem of assessing liability in the sale-of-an-inaccessible-dwelling
situation: (1) those governing the liability of a vendor of real
property; and (2) those governing products liability. As to the
first, the basic rule is that a vendor of real property is ordinarily
permitted to
shift all responsibility for the condition of the land to the pur-
chaser .... Thus, in the absence of express agreement or misrepre-
sentation, the purchaser is expected to make his own examination
and draw his own conclusions as to the condition of the land; and the
vendor is, in general, not liable for any harm resulting to him or oth-
ers from any defects existing at the time of transfer. 1 6
The main exception to this rule is that "the vendor is under a
duty to disclose to the vendee any hidden defects which he knows
or should know may present an unreasonable risk of harm to per-
sons on the premises, and which he may anticipate that the
after the 1988 FHAA, shows that, while it was originally proposed without a limitation on
who could be sued, the "owns, leases (or leases to), or operates" language was later added
as a restriction on the types of entities that could be named as defendants. See Lonberg,259 F.3d at 1035 n.7. This limiting language is the reason some courts have held that Title
III claims cannot be brought against architects and others who, while participating in thedesign-and-construction process, do not own, lease, or operate the resulting facility. See,
e.g., id. at 1033-36; supra note 126 (citing other Title III cases). In any event, the SilverState opinion appropriately pointed to the more expansive provisions of the FHA in justify-ing its holding that the original builder there could be made liable for noncompliance with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C).
163. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
164. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
165. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 64, at 446-47. See also DOBBS, supra note160, § 376, at 1043 (noting that, traditionally, a builder was subject neither to strict liabil-ity nor liability even for negligence once it had turned over improved real property to a
new owner).
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vendee will not discover."166 Even if a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation
could be considered a "hidden defect" triggering this exception-
hardly an obvious conclusion given that most § 3604(f)(3)(C) vio-
lations are not "hidden" from anyone and indeed would presuma-
bly be quite apparent to disabled residents 6 7-this exception only
requires the vendor to disclose such defects to the purchaser in
order to avoid liability. Even if this is not done, the vendor's li-
ability is still subject to some time limit, usually expiring "once
the vendee has had a reasonable time to discover and remedy the
condition."16 Under this set of principles, therefore, the builder of
an inaccessible dwelling could expect to avoid liability for such
defects by simply "offloading" the property after its completion.
Tort principles dealing with liability for defective products,
however, do point toward continuing liability for the original
builder. The basic rule in this field is that an entity "engaged in
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for
harm to persons or property caused by the defect."'69 This is basi-
cally a rule of strict liability,7 ' and it applies not only to a prod-
uct's manufacturer but also to all other commercial entities that
sell or distribute the product.' 7' Furthermore, courts have, begin-
166. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 64, at 447. Another exception deals with
the risk of harm to those outside of the premises, id. at 448, but this presumably is less
relevant in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases than the risk to persons on the premises.
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting apartment builder's contention that accessibility barriers and other § 3604(f)(3)(C)
violations "would be readily apparent to anyone attempting to rent or buy"). One excep-
tion might be the requirement in § 3604(f)(3)(C)(iii)(III) of "reinforcements in bathroom
walls to allow later installation of grab bars." See generally SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT,
supra note 133, § 353(1) (describing a hidden defective condition in real property that
might lead to a vendor's liability as being when "(a) the vendee does not know or have rea-
son to know of the condition or the risk involved, and (b) the vendor... has reason to be-
lieve that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk").
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, at 449.
169. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1.
170. See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. a (describing the evolution of products liability since the
1960s as strict liability in tort); DOBBS, supra note 160, § 353, at 974-75 (describing the
evolution of manufacturers' liability for their defective products as dating from the "strict
liability" holding in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)).
171. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1 cmt. e (noting that the
basic strict liability rule for defective products "provides that all commercial sellers and
distributors of products, including nonmanufacturing sellers and distributors such as
wholesalers and retailers, are subject to liability for selling products that are defective");
see also id. § 2 cmt. o (noting that strict liability extends to nonmanufacturing sellers such
as wholesalers and retailers). However, such liability only covers commercial entities that
'are engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing the type of product that
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ning in the 1960s, come to include many types of housing among
the products subject to' this rule,172 overcoming the traditional
view described in the previous paragraph that a vendor of im-
proved real estate is not liable for defects in the property after it
is sold.'73 Under modern products liability rules, therefore, multi-
family housing builders along with other manufacturers of defec-
tive products remain liable after their products are sold for harm
caused by defects in the products.
There are three principal ways in which a product may be held
to be defective, one of which is when it is "defective in design,"
i.e., "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reason-
able alternative design by the seller or other distributor, . . . and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe." 74 The concept of a "reasonable alternative de-
sign" in design-defect cases generally requires courts to apply "a
risk-utility test to determine whether a harmful design is also a
harmed the plaintiff. The rule does not apply to a noncommercial seller or distributor of
such products. Thus, it does not apply to ... the private owner of an automobile who sells
it to another." Id. § 1 cmt. c.
172. See id. § 19 cmt. e, at 281-82. The Restatement rule dealing with whether im-proved real property should be considered a product is inconclusive, providing an affirma-
tive answer only "when the context of [the real property's] distribution and use is suffi-
ciently analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is
appropriate to apply [products liability rules]." Id. § 19. The commentary on this rule,however, suggests that most multi-family housing complexes subject to § 3604(f)(3)(C)
would be considered products. This commentary notes that, while courts historically were
reluctant to view a contractor that builds and sells one house at a time as a mass producer
of manufactured products, this reluctance has been overcome "in a number of contexts,"including those involving mass builders, prefabricated homes, and, of particular impor-
tance here, in cases where strict liability is imposed "for defects in construction whendwellings are built ... on a major scale, as in a large housing project." Id. § 19 cmt. e; see
also APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 32 cmt. f, illus. 8 (builder-landlord
assumed to be liable for defects in construction). The commentary dates the beginning ofthis shift toward viewing housing as a product to a 1965 case, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965), and notes numerous cases and articles from the 1980s and1990s that extended the new strict-liability standard to builders of individual houses and
condominiums. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 19 reporters' note.
173. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
174. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 2(b). Alternatively, a prod-
uct is defective if it "contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from itsintended design," id. § 2(a), or if "inadequate instructions or warnings" have been given in
certain circumstances. Id. § 2(c). The former basis for finding a multi-family housing de-
velopment defective would presumably occur when the building's plans called for all of thefeatures required by § 3604(f)(3)(C) but the builder departed from those plans, a situationthat apparently has occurred with some frequency. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
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defective design."'75 In § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, this has presumably
already been done by Congress through its enactment of this pro-
vision.176 Thus, assuming that § 3604(f)(3)(C) can be seen for pur-
poses of products liability law as a safety statute,
177 a builder of
inaccessible multi-family housing, like any other manufacturer of
a defective product, would be liable for the harm caused by its
housing even after the property is sold to another. Such a
builder's liability might eventually be excused by the expiration
of the FHA's statutes of limitations, but this would be equally
true for a builder that held on to the property.
178
c. Subsequent Owners' Liability
i. Overview: Connection to the § 3604(f)(3)(C) Violation
Does § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability extend to entities that have pur-
chased inaccessible multi-family dwellings? This would certainly
be possible in those situations, discussed above, where the new
owner is simply the corporate alter ego of the builder or is a
commercial entity whose sole function is to sell the builder's
175. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 355, at 980. See also PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT,
supra note 155, § 2 cmt. d:
[Deciding] whether the [product's] specifications themselves create unreason-
able risks ... requires reference to a standard outside the specifications....
[Tihe test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable
cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if
so, whether the omission of the alternative design by the seller or a predeces-
sor in the distributive chain rendered the product not reasonably safe.
176. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 4 (dealing with the sig-
nificance in defective design cases of noncompliance with product safety statutes); DOBBS,
supra note 160, § 360, at 992 (dealing with the significance in defective design cases of
noncompliance with product safety statutes).
177. The fact that § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s mandated design features are primarily intended to
expand housing opportunities for persons with disabilities does not bar it from being seen
as a safety statute for purposes of products liability law. Indeed, it is clear that accessibil-
ity requirements like those in § 3604(f)(3)(C) do protect the health and safety of persons
with mobility impairments, as a number of cases have demonstrated. See, e.g., Sapp v.
MHI P'ship, 199 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (granting summary judgment to
disabled homeseeker who allegedly "sustained serious injuries to her shoulder and elbow"
from being propelled out of her wheelchair as a result of the defendant-builder's sales area
being inaccessible in violation of the ADA); Balachowski v. Boidy, No. 95-C-6340, 2000 WL
1365391, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (noting that the inaccessible features of plain-
tiffs apartment caused her to, inter alia, be in "constant fear" of serious injuries, feel "ex-
tremely unsafe," fear that she would "flip" her wheelchair and land underneath it, and be
injured on several occasions, some of which required emergency-room care).
178. Statute-of-limitations issues are discussed infra in Part IV.D.
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flawed product.17 0 The focus here, however, is purchasers that are
genuinely independent from those responsible for the design-and-
construction process. Such a subsequent owner, having not par-
ticipated in the "failure to design and construct" as mandated by§ 3604(f)(3)(C), would presumably argue that it has not acted in
any way that violates the FHA.
This is not entirely obvious, however, given the manner in
which the FHA deals with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations. As
noted above, the FHA makes the failure to design and construct
in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) "discrimination" for purposes of§ 3604(f)(1) and § 3 6 04 (f)(2)-provisions that ban disability dis-
crimination in, respectively, "the sale or rental" of a dwelling and
"the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such
a dwelling."8 ° Thus, the FHA violation that noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) leads to is disability-based discrimination in the sale
or rental of a dwelling. Obviously, the entity that is most clearly
engaged in such a sale or rental would be the building's current
owner. 181
179. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (explaining corporate alter ego);
supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing liability rules applicable to commercial
sellers and distributors of defective products).
180. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. The full texts of § 3604(f)(1) and §
3604(0(2) are set forth supra note 22.
181. The FHA's statutory structure described in the text is similar to that employed inthe ADA's Title III, which has a general rule banning disability discrimination in public
accommodations and then provides in subsequent provisions that certain activities, includ-ing the failure to design and construct new facilities so that they are readily accessible,
amounts to discrimination within the general rule. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12 182(a), 12 183(a)(1)(2000) (respectively, the general rule and design-and-construct provision). Case law deal-ing with who is a proper defendant under Title III is not particularly helpful in analyzingthe comparable problem under the FHA, however, because, unlike the FHA, Title III'sgeneral rule is explicitly limited to "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or oper-
ates" a place of public accommodation. See supra note 162.
In addition, the specific issue dealt with in the text-whether a subsequent purchaser
of an inaccessibly constructed property should be liable under the FHA-has rarely beenimportant in Title III litigation. This is probably because Title III has other provisions
that make current owners of public accommodations liable for, inter alia: denying theirdisabled customers the same opportunity "to participate in or benefit from . . . [the] ac-
commodations" as is afforded other individuals; "fail[ing] to take such steps as may be nec-
essary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segre-gated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of
auxiliary aids and services"; and "fail[ing] to remove architectural barriers ... in existingfacilities. . . where such removal is readily achievable." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i),(b)(2)(A)(iii), (b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000). Liability under these provisions exists whether or not the
owner participated in the accommodation's design and construction, which means that adisabled customer may successfully sue the current owner of an inaccessible facility with-
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Consider the situation in which the owner-landlord of a nonac-
cessible apartment building is visited by a mobility-impaired pro-
spective tenant. According to the Congress that passed the 1988
FHAA, such a prospect is "just as effectively excluded from the
opportunity to live in [that] particular dwelling by [its] lack of ac-
cess .. .as by a posted sign saying 'No Handicapped People Al-
lowed.""82 The assumption of this statement is that such a sign
would clearly violate the FHAA as a form of discriminatory exclu-
sion by the current landlord, and the thrust of the statement is
that the same conclusion should result from the building's inac-
cessible features. This would be so even if a prior owner originally
put up the "No Handicapped People Allowed" sign or constructed
the building's inaccessible features. If either the sign or the ab-
sence of mandated accessibility features are still in place, Con-
gress assumed that the current landlord was responsible for ex-
cluding mobility-impaired tenants.
Furthermore, even if the inaccessible features do not literally
"make unavailable" a dwelling to the disabled prospect in viola-
tion of § 3604(f)(1), they would surely violate § 3604(f)(2), which
bars discrimination against persons with disabilities in, inter
alia, the "privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling" and in the "fa-
cilities in connection with such dwelling."18 3 The analogy here
would be not to a sign excluding disabled persons, but to a land-
lord's policy of forbidding them to use certain facilities or enjoy
certain privileges that are made available to non-disabled per-
sons. A policy of not allowing persons with disabilities to use, say,
the public areas of an apartment building would be a blatant vio-
out having to rely on the design-and-construction provision. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line, 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2179-81 (2005); Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d
1063, 1064 n.1, 1069-70 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995); Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d
1358, 1369-70 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
The FHA does not include such additional accessibility-related provisions, and, in par-
ticular, its "reasonable modifications" provision puts the financial burden for making addi-
tional structural changes on disabled persons, not building owners. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 210-14 (discussing the interplay between the
FHA's 'reasonable modifications" and "design and construction" provisions). The result is
that, unlike Title III, the FHA's mandates concerning physical accessibility are primarily,
if not exclusively, defined by its design-and-construction provision, making the issue of
whether subsequent owners are proper defendants with respect to this provision uniquely
important to this law's enforcement.
182. See supra text accompanying note 28.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000); see Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097,
1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that (f)(2) "prohibits a broader set of behavior" than (f)(1)).
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lation of § (f)(2) by the current landlord 184 and one that presuma-
bly could not be defended on the ground that it had originated
with a prior owner. If, as Congress insisted, the failure to have
the accessibility features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) can effec-
tively exclude disabled persons from a building, then such a fail-
ure can surely amount to discrimination in "privileges" and "fa-
cilities" in violation of § (f)(2) regardless of whether the current
owner was initially responsible for the building's improper con-
struction.
A current owner's responsibility for the relevant FHA violation
would seem even more clear in the case of a non-disabled tenant
who later becomes mobility-impaired, say due to a stroke or car
accident. Now for the first time suffering discrimination as a re-
sult of his building's inaccessible features, this newly disabled
tenant would surely look to the current landlord as the one re-
sponsible for limiting his "privileges of rental" in violation of §
(f)(2). Indeed, no one other than the current landlord has control
of the rental terms that are the focus of § (f)(2).18 5
This is not to say that a disabled tenant or would-be tenant
might not also have an FHA claim against the original builder or
that the current owner against whom a § (f)(1)-(2) claim is
brought may not be able to seek contribution or other relief from
that builder.'86 But these possibilities do not bar the concept of a §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based § (fl(l)-(2) claim against the current owner.8 7
Indeed, placing some responsibility on current owners to bring
their dwellings into compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) might be nec-
essary to achieve this provision's fundamental goal of insuring
that all multi-family housing built after 1991 contain the man-
dated accessibility features.
184. See, e.g., Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 175-78 (D.P.R. 1995) (uphold-
ing § 3604(f)(2) claims on behalf of mentally disabled resident who was prohibited from
using the common areas of her condominium building); see also 1988 HOUSE REPORT, su-
pra note 16, at 23 (noting that § 3604(f)(2) guarantees "that an individual could not be dis-
criminatorily barred from access to recreation facilities, parking privileges, cleaning and
janitorial services and other facilities, uses of premises, benefits and privileges made
available to other tenants").
185. Cf. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (com-
menting that retrofit orders in design-and-construction cases under Title III of the ADA
can only be "meaningful against the person currently in control of the building").
186. Contribution among multiple defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is discussed infra
in Part IV.B.4.
187. Cf. APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (assum-
ing that landlord would be strictly liable for furnace explosion along with furnace's manu-
facturer and installer).
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In determining whether to impose liability on new owners for
their dwellings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), it may be
useful to distinguish those owners who have acquired the prop-
erty as homeowner-consumers (e.g., in condominium situations)
from those commercial entities that have purchased multi-family
developments as business ventures with the intention of renting
or selling their units to the public. These two categories of new
owners are discussed separately in the next two sections.
ii. Condominium Purchasers
Thus far, courts have been reluctant to impose liability on new
owners of condominiums for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations. For exam-
ple, in HUD v. Perland,'8 HUD's Chief Administrative Law
Judge held the developers of a condominium complex liable, but
assumed that relief could not also extend to the buyer of an indi-
vidual unit or the condominium association that had become
owner of the common areas, an assumption apparently shared by
HUD as the charging party which had not named these entities
as defendants." 9 Similarly, in a series of decisions involving a
Baltimore-area condominium development, the court held that,
while an effective retrofit order against the original builder re-
quired the joinder of the association that now held title to the
common areas as a party necessary for complete relief,19 ° such an
188. Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,136, at 26,124-30 (HUD AL 1998).
189. Id. at 26,128 (citing HUD's brief in support of the proposition that the developers'
transfer of ownership of the individual unit and common areas bars injunctive relief affect-
ing the non-party purchasers of these properties).
190. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471-73 (D.
Md. 2000); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700,
705, 712 (D. Md. 1999); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 661, 662 (D. Md. 1998); see also 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 54-56
(statement of the National Association of Realtors) (opposing liability of subsequent pur-
chasers of inaccessible buildings while recognizing the appropriateness of naming them as
parties for the purpose of effectuating retrofit relief). See generally SECOND TORTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 211 ("A duty ... imposed or created by legislative enact-
ment carries with it the privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose
of performing or exercising such duty ... in so far as the entry is reasonably necessary to
such performance or exercise, if, but only if, all the requirements of the enactment are ful-
filled."). In Rommel Builders, the court concluded that it was "appropriate to keep LGGCI
[the condominium association] in the case so long as it represents the owners of the com-
mon areas with alleged violations," noting that "LGGCI's presence as a party in the suit
appears imperative in order to afford full relief." 40 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
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owner was not liable for any other relief or for any substantive
violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C). 9'
It seems to be the sense of these condominium decisions that
the homeowner-buyers of inaccessible properties have not only
not participated in the flawed design-and-construction process,
but, as final consumers of a defective product, are among the vic-
tims, rather than the perpetrators, of whatever FHA violations
exist in their homes. Furthermore, as long as such purchasers
simply live in their units and do not offer them for sale or rent,
the theory of liability outlined in the previous section-that a §
3604(f)(1)-(2) claim may lie against a new owner for the sale or
rental of a dwelling not built in compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
would not apply.19 However, whether a condominium owner who
sells or rents his inaccessible dwelling may thereby be subject to
a § (f)(1)-(2) claim is obviously a more difficult issue, as will be
seen when the obligations of a non-builder landlord are explored
in the next section. Even in these situations, however, application
of traditional tort principles would not extend the same degree of
liability to noncommercial sellers and renters of defective prod-
191. See Rommel Builders, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (recognizing that condominium asso-
ciation that now owns inaccessible common areas "bears no financial obligation to plain-
tiffs in this case").
192. Another possible source of protection for such individual condominium buyers is
42 U.S.C. § 3613(d), a provision that protects bona fide home purchasers from having their
contract rights disrupted by the relief ordered in private FHA lawsuits. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(g)(4) (2000) (providing virtually identical restriction in FHA cases resulting from
complaints to HUD). See generally Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417,
1424 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that § 3613(d) precludes courts from ordering "innocent
white tenants to vacate apartments to remedy discrimination against blacks or other mi-
norities by the apartment management"). In Rommel Builders, the condominium associa-
tion argued that § 3613(d) barred a retrofit order relating to the common areas it con-
trolled, but the court disagreed. 40 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. According to the Rommel
Builders opinion:
In this case, plaintiffs are not seeking an order to retrofit individual units
owned by bona fide purchasers, but rather for an order establishing a fund
for retrofitting common areas .... This relief sought is akin to the relief or-
dered in [Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n, 933 F. Supp 1394,
1407-08 (N.D. Ill. 1996)1 where the sales of individual units were not voided,
but some aspect of bona fide purchasers' property rights were affected.
Id. at 712. Thus, the Rommel Builders court, while believing that § 3613(d) did not bar the
relief requested there, did suggest that it might be invoked to protect individual purchas-
ers of condominium units from retrofit orders in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Thus far, however,
no court has so ruled, and indeed none has held that § 3613(d) has any applicability be-
yond protecting bona fide residents from being ousted from their homes. In addition, it
should be noted that this provision only limits equitable relief, not also damage awards, in
private FHA suits, and that it does not apply at all in FHA cases brought by the Attorney
General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3614.
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ucts as to those who distribute such products as part of a business
venture.'93 Still, once a purchaser of a condominium unit offers it
for re-sale or rental, the nondiscrimination commands of § (f)(1)-
(2) would apply,'94 and, for its part, the condominium association
that controls the common areas would presumably be subject to
liability based on the inaccessible features of those areas to the
same degree that the individual selling or renting his unit would
be for the inaccessible features of that unit. 95
iii. Commercial Purchasers
This section deals with entities independent of the builder that
purchase inaccessibly constructed multi-family dwellings as a
business venture with the intention of renting their units to the
public. As will be shown, based on traditional tort principles deal-
ing with a landlord's liability for defects in its property, such pur-
chaser-landlords might well be liable under § 3604(f)(1)-(2) for
their dwellings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) despite their
lack of participation in the flawed design-and-construction proc-
ess.
Historically at common law, a landlord bore no responsibility
"either to the tenant or to others entering the land for defective
conditions existing at the time of the lease."196 In the decades
leading up to enactment of the 1988 FHAA, however, virtually
every state abandoned this position in favor of a rule imposing a
193. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1 cmt. c (providing that
the private owner of an automobile who sells it to another is not subject to the same rule of
strict liability for the product's defects as is a commercial seller of that product).
194. The statute would apply subject to the FHA's "Mrs. Murphy" and single-family-
house exemptions in 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). For a description of these exemptions, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 9:4.
195. Indeed, a condominium association might even be sued in these circumstances by
one of its own homeowner-members if, for example, that person becomes disabled or his
ability to sell his unit is hampered by the lack of accessible features in the overall devel-
opment. Cf. Simovits v. Chanticleer Condo. Ass'n, 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1403-05 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (rejecting condominium association's defenses of estoppel, laches, unclean hands,
and waiver in connection with individual owner's suit based on his attempt to sell his unit
encumbered by an age-restrictive covenant that violated the FHA's ban on familial status
discrimination); HUD v. Guglielmi, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 1 25,004 (HUD ALT
1990) (ruling for mobile home owner whose landlord prevented the sale of her home to a
family with children); HUD v. Murphy, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,002, at 25,018-
19, 25,053-58 (HUD ALT 1990) (ruling similarly for multiple complainants).
196. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 63, at 435; see also DOBBS, supra note 160,
§ 240, at 625-26, § 376, at 1044-45.
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duty of reasonable care on landlords in the management of their
residential properties, a rule that included an obligation to main-
tain leased dwellings in a habitable condition. 9 7 This duty of rea-
sonable care with its implied warranty of habitability means that
a landlord is subject to liability "for conditions of which he is
aware, or of which he could have known in the exercise of reason-
able care."'98 Furthermore, a landlord is under a duty to "inspect[]
the rental dwelling and correct[] any defects disclosed by that in-
spection that would render the dwelling uninhabitable,"'99 and is
ordinarily "chargeable with notice of conditions which existed
prior to the time that the tenant takes possession."2 0 Importantly
for purposes of this article, this duty to reasonably inspect and
repair the premises includes complying with applicable housing
laws, and the failure to do so may constitute negligence per se.2'
197. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT ch. 17, at
155-56, § 17.6 cmt. c, at 233 (1977) [hereinafter LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT]
(noting that the position of landlord nonliability set forth in the 1965 RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS was being replaced by a rule holding landlords liable "to tenants and others
on the leased property on the basis of the general law of negligence" and taking the posi-
tion that "there is an implied warranty of habitability by the landlord in regard to residen-
tial property"); see also Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 909-10 (Cal. 1995) (re-
viewing various states' positions); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as
Lease: Habitability Protections and the Low-Income Purchaser, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293, 297
(1987) (noting that "[iun the 1960s and 1970s nearly all states imposed on landlords an ob-
ligation to maintain the habitability of leased premises"). According to the Supreme Court
of California's opinion in Peterson, replacing "the outmoded common law doctrine" of no
duty with a rule "that every lease of a dwelling contains an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity" was "more in line with the modern reality," reflecting an awareness of "'the typical
inequality in bargaining positions of the landlord and tenant," that "'landlords were usu-
ally better positioned to make needed repairs'," and "'the public policy concern over the
quality of the nation's housing stock.'" 899 P.2d at 915-16 (quoting Freyfogle, supra, at
297-99).
198. LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. c. "Where the
landlord is able to discover the condition by the exercise of reasonable care, he is subject to
liability after he has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to remedy
it." Id.
199. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 917; see also id. at 918 n.13 (noting that "a landlord's re-
sponsibility ... to maintain residential rental property in a habitable condition gives rise
to a duty to inspect the property"); cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, at 449 (noting
that harm caused by defects in real property would traditionally result in liability attach-
ing to the new owner, at least once the new owner "acquires notice of the condition and
fails within a reasonable time thereafter to act reasonably to rectify it").
200. LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. c. In addition,
a landlord must repair "promptly any conditions, of which the landlord has actual or con-
structive notice, that arise during the tenancy and render the dwelling uninhabitable."
Peterson, 899 P.2d at 917. Furthermore, a landlord who makes repairs negligently so as to
make the leased property more dangerous or give it a deceptive appearance of safety is
also subject to liability for any harm resulting therefrom to the tenant or others. See LAND-
LORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.7.
201. See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 916-17 & n.10; DOBBS, supra note 160, § 241, at 628. See
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The fact that the tenant is aware of the defective condition does
not excuse the landlord's liability.2 °2
The duty of a landlord who purchases an apartment building
from another has been likened to that of a seller of used machin-
ery,2°3 i.e., such a person is generally not subject to strict liability
for defects in the property,20 4 unless he "rebuilds or reconditions
the product and thus assumes a role analogous to that of a manu-
facturer."20 5 Thus, while structural defects in an apartment com-
plex would presumably justify holding the original builder strictly
liable,2 6 a landlord who purchases such a complex may only be
held liable for injuries resulting from defects in the premises if he
has breached the applicable negligence standard.2 7
The point here is not to establish that a post-construction pur-
chaser of an inaccessible apartment complex would be liable for
the property's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations based on state negligence
law, although this is a real possibility.2 8 Rather, the point is to
generally SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 286-288C (describing the cir-
cumstances under which violation of a legislative enactment amounts to negligence per
se).
202. LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. b.
203. See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914. A commercial seller of a defective used product is
liable for harm caused by the defect if the defect arises either from the seller's "failure to
exercise reasonable care" or from the product's noncompliance "with a product safety stat-
ute or regulation applicable to the used product." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, su-
pra note 155, § 8(a), (d).
204. See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 907-11, 914-16; DOBBS, supra note 160, § 241, at 628-
29. But see APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (assum-
ing landlord to be strictly liable for furnace explosion along with the furnace's manufac-
turer and installer).
205. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914.
206. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. As a result, in those cases where
the landlord participated in the construction of the building, strict liability might attach to
such a landlord "based on the landlord's status as a builder who is engaged in the business
of constructing (i.e., manufacturing) rental properties." Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914; see also
APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 22 cmt. f, illus. 8 (assuming builder-
landlord is strictly liable for defects in construction).
207. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 920-21. Bringing an action for negligence against the land-
lord does not, of course, bar an injured tenant from also asserting a strict liability claim
against the manufacturer of the building. See id. at 921.
208. Cf. Saedi v. Kriz, No. B167250, 2004 WL 2537568 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004)
(upholding $250,000 jury verdict based on negligence per se theory against landlord who
failed to reasonably accommodate disabled tenant in violation of state law equivalent of
the FHA's § 3604(f)(3)(B)). See generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng's &
Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (2005) ("The violation of federal statutes and regulations is
commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings."); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 140, § 36, at 221 n.9 (noting that "the breach of a federal statute may support a
negligence per se claim as a matter of state law"); see supra note 201 and accompanying
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show that well established tort principles, which were in place at
the time of the 1988 FHAA's enactment and which continue in
force today, provide for liability for residential landlords based on
their property's defects, even if such a landlord had no role in
causing those defects and so long as he has had sufficient time to
discover and correct the defects. Based on these principles, it is
surely plausible to conclude that Congress intended for landlords
to be liable to disabled residents and prospective residents under§ 3604(f)(1)-(2) as a result of their offering rental units that do not
comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C).
Nor is this conclusion inconsistent with the decision in Silver
State, which, in ruling for the defendant-purchaser of an inacces-
sible apartment complex on statute-of-limitations grounds, did
not address the issue of whether such a purchaser could be made
liable to disabled prospective tenants through timely claims
based on § 3604(f)(1)-(2). °9 Indeed, no court has yet ruled on this
issue, but the nature of the FHA violation prompted by noncom-
pliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and the congressional goal in enacting
this provision suggest that current landlords of inaccessible
dwellings may well be liable.
A final note is in order concerning the responsibilities of cur-
rent landlords of inaccessible multi-family dwellings. Apart from
the design-and-construction mandates of § 3604(f)(3)(C), the FHA
in § 3604(f)(3)(A) requires all landlords, regardless of the age of
their buildings or who constructed them, to allow disabled ten-
ants, at their own expense, to make "reasonable modifications...
necessary [to afford them] full enjoyment of the premises."21 ° The
interplay between this reasonable-modifications provision and
the FHA's design-and-construction requirements has not yet been
the subject of any judicial opinion, but it has been addressed by
HUD. In commenting on who is responsible for the costs of mak-
ing dwellings accessible, HUD's 1991 Accessibility Guidelines
noted that, while the costs of the design-and-construction re-
quirements are to be "borne by the builder," a tenant who needs
to make additional modifications to make a particular unit acces-
sible "for that person's particular type of disability ... would in-
text (describing negligence per se theory based on landlord's failure to comply with appli-
cable housing laws).
209. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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cur the cost of this type of modification."211 Thus, according to
HUD:
For dwellings subject to the statute's accessibility requirements, the
tenant's costs would be limited to those modifications that were not
covered by the Act's design and construction requirements. (For ex-
ample, the tenant would pay for the cost of purchasing and installing
grab bars... [but not for] the costs associated with adding bathroom
wall reinforcement [which is required by § 3604(fX3)()].)
However, if the dwelling is not subject to § 3604(f)(3)(C) (e.g., be-
cause it was constructed prior to 1991), "the tenant would pay the
cost of all modifications necessary to meet his or her needs. 213
This commentary does not address the responsibilities of post-
construction purchasers of multi-family dwellings built in viola-
tion of § 3604(f)(3)(C), but it does purport to protect tenants in
such dwellings from having to incur the costs of making their
units comply with this provision. Consider the situation of a mo-
bility-impaired individual who, though not deterred from moving
into a building that fails to comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C), now
wants to make his dwelling fully accessible. According to HUD,
such a tenant should be financially responsible only for those
modifications that go beyond what is required by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
(i.e., someone else must pay for the § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated
modifications). 214 The HUD commentary says that this someone
else should be the builder, but this may not be a realistic possibil-
ity if the builder has departed after selling the development to a
new owner-landlord.
In these circumstances, a tenant who is entitled to have his
costs limited to those modifications not covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
might well accuse a landlord that tries to put all of these costs on
the tenant of discriminating in the "privileges of ... rental of a
dwelling" in violation of § (f)(2). 215 Obviously, if such a tenant is
required to pay for the entire cost, then he is worse off than a
comparable tenant in a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-compliant building. This
211. See 56 Fed. Reg. 9495 (Mar. 6, 1991), in HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note
36.
212. Id. at 9495-96.
213. Id. at 9496.
214. See id. at 9495-96.
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000) see also Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Sterling
Homes Corp., 1999 WL 1068458, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 1999) (holding that § (f)(2) pro-
hibit's a provider of housing covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) from charging "a premiun for acces-
sibility features requried by the FHAA").
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seems a perverse result. It not only puts the financial burden for§ 3604(f)(3)(C) compliance on the very class of persons that this
law was intended to help, it also provides an additional barrier
against persons with disabilities moving into or remaining in
noncompliant buildings. While this perspective does not inevita-
bly lead to the conclusion that new owner-landlords should bear
the costs of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated modifications-the builder
may, after all, continue to be available as a source of funds-it
does suggest an additional argument for this result that is based
both on equity to disabled tenants and on the congressional
goal of having all post-1991 multi-family dwellings comply
with § 3604(f)(3)(C).216
3. Other Potential Defendants
a. Those Making or Failing to Make Renovations or Repairs
The previous section argued that there may be a duty on cur-
rent owners of noncompliant buildings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
to provide the features mandated by this law. If so, the natural
follow-up question, addressed here, is whether that duty extends
to making whatever renovations or repairs may be necessary to
maintain such compliance. For purposes of this section, therefore,
it is assumed that the buildings involved are covered by §
3604(f)(3)(C) and have at one time contained the required fea-
tures, either through proper initial design and construction or
through post-construction improvements.
A necessary preliminary step in cases involving new work is to
determine whether § 3604(f)(3)(C) even applies to the buildings
involved; that is, are they "covered multi-family dwellings for first
216. Apart from the question of who is responsible for the costs of accessibility-
enhancing modifications, it would at least seem clear that current landlords of noncompli-
ant buildings would be required to approve all § 3604(f)(3)(A)-based modification requests
that simply seek to provide the accessibility features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) (i.e., that
all such requests would be considered "reasonable modifications" as a matter of law). See,
e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.2 03(c), ex. 2 (2005) (providing that a landlord must, pursuant to §3604(f)(3)(A), allow a tenant to widen the bathroom doorway so that the tenant's wheel-
chair could pass through); cf. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 494-95,510 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that disabled plaintiff still retains a reasonable accommoda-
tion claim under § 3604(f)(3)(A) against her condominium association despite the court'sdismissal of her § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims against entities involved in the property's
original construction on statute-of-limitations grounds).
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occupancy after [March 13, 1991]? 217 The quoted language means
that some types of work after the triggering date are not covered.
For example, an older building that was used for a nonresidential
purpose (e.g., a warehouse) and that has been converted post-
1991 to multi-family housing is apparently not subject to §
3604(f)(3)(C), because HUD has interpreted the phrase "first oc-
cupancy" to mean "a building that has never before been used for
any purpose."21' Furthermore, as to housing built before 1991, §
3604(f)(3)(C) "does not require any renovations to [such] existing
buildings."21 9 However, when a post-1991 "addition is built as an
extension to an existing building, the addition of four or more
units is regarded as a new building and must meet the design re-
quirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] .... If, for example, an apartment
wing is added to an existing hotel, the apartments are covered."
220
Assuming that a structure is covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) and has
at one time included the features mandated by this law, does its
current owner have a duty to maintain these features without
facing liability under § 3604(f)()-(2)? No court has addressed this
issue, and the signals given by HUD are mixed, although tradi-
tional tort principles do suggest that there may be an on-going
duty of repair.221
As for HUD, it announced just prior to § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s effective
date in 1991 that "alteration, rehabilitation or repair of covered
multifamily dwellings are not subject to the Act's accessibility re-
quirements."22 2 Some years later, however, in its Accessibility De-
sign Manual, HUD opined that the corridor space in an accessible
217. See supra text accompanying notes 24 and 26.
218. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (providing definition of "first occupancy"); see also HUD
Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 36, at 56 Fed. Reg. 9477 ('Existing facilities that are
converted to dwelling units are not subject to the Act's accessibility requirements."); HUD
Questions and Answers, supra note 36, at 59 Fed. Reg. 33,362, 33,365 (indicating in Ques-
tion and Answer No. 9 that buildings converted from nonresidential purposes are not cov-
ered). However, where only the facade of such a building is preserved, § 3604(f(3)(C) does
apply if "the interior of the building, including all structural portions of floors and ceilings
is removed, and a new building is constructed behind the old facade" that would otherwise
be covered. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 11.
219. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 12.
220. Id. at 11.
221. Apart from the duty-of-repair question, it would seem clear that a landlord should
at least have the duty to avoid taking action that would un-do existing features mandated
by § 3604(f)(3)(C), as, for example, by putting in a new sidewalk that transforms a previ-
ously accessible front entrance to an inaccessible one.
222. HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 36, at 56 Fed. Reg. 9477.
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route "must be free of hazardous protruding objects that project
from walls and posts," 223 implying that a continuing duty exists
with respect to at least some of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements.224
As for traditional tort principles, the modern view is that a
residential landlord has a duty to reasonably inspect and repair
the rental premises, which includes complying with applicable
housing codes, and that a breach of this duty should result in li-
ability to tenants and others for harm resulting from defects in
the property.225 If this duty is sufficient to make a current land-
lord liable under § 3604(f)(1)-(2) for the absence of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
mandated features to disabled tenants and prospective tenants as
discussed above in Part JV.B.2.c, then it would seem a necessary
corollary that such a landlord would also have to take all reason-
able steps to maintain these features.
b. Real Estate Agents and Other Facilitators of Sales and
Rentals of § 3 604(f)(3)(C)-Covered Dwellings
Real estate agents often play a key role in housing transac-
tions, making them a natural target for liability when such
transactions involve FHA violations,226 but thus far, no reported
case has considered their potential liability for facilitating the
sale of a building constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C). The
threat of such liability does exist, however, as demonstrated by
the fact that the National Association of Realtors ("NAR") in 1999
sought, unsuccessfully, to have Congress amend § 3604(f)(3)(C) to
specify that realtors would not be liable "for brokering a transac-
tion involving a property which was designed and constructed
improperly."227 According to the NAR, one such claim had been
filed with HUD, which ultimately "exonerated the real estate
agents" involved and provided "verbal assurances" to the NAR
that HUD would not charge such cases in the future.28 HUD has
not formally taken this position, however, and even if it did, pri-
223. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 2.13.
224. See also text accompanying note 435 (noting that the requirements of §
3604(f)(3)(C) are written in the present tense).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202.
226. See, e.g., ScHwEMM, supra note 7, at § 12B:2 n.5.
227. 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 56.
228. Id. at 55.
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vate litigants would remain free to bring such claims under §
3613.229
Realtor liability could arise in two types of situations.23 ° One is
where a real estate agent represents the buyer of a multi-family
dwelling that lacks the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C), and
the buyer is subsequently sued for disability discrimination as a
result of the absence of these features. Whether such a buyer
could be made liable under the FHA is an open question, but, as
discussed above in Part IV.B.2.c, an affirmative answer is a dis-
tinct possibility. A buyer who is sued in these circumstances
might be expected to bring a claim against his realtor if the latter
had failed to point out the building's noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) and/or the buyer's potential liability for such non-
compliance .231
The other situation in which a real estate agent might risk li-
ability in connection with a noncompliant building is where the
agent represents a disabled homeseeker. Presumably, a compe-
tent agent will notice and point out to his client the absence of §
3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated features in any dwelling being consid-
ered. An agent failing to do so might be liable for whatever dam-
ages the client suffers as a result of moving into such a unit, al-
though, as in the situation discussed in the preceding paragraph,
such liability would be based on the agent's violation of his state-
law duties and not on the FHA.
The competent agent, however, may risk FHA-based liability if
care is not taken in how the § 3604(f)(3)(C) information is con-
veyed to the client. In an analogous situation, real estate agents
who volunteered racial information in an effort to influence their
clients' housing choice have been held liable for illegal steering
under the FHA.232 The corresponding problem in accessibility
229. See text accompanying notes 67-71.
230. Realtors may also prosecute their own FHA-based claims in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases.
See infra text accompanying notes 369-71.
231. Not surprisingly, therefore, the NAR's position is that buyers not involved in the
design-and-construction process should not be liable under the FHA based on their build-
ings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 54-
56. If they are liable, then their realtors could face derivative liability, although the latter
would presumably be based on the realtors' violation of their state-law duties rather than
on the FHA.
232. See, e.g., Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529-34 (7th Cir. 1990)
(opining that the FHA prevents agents from trying to mold their customers' preferences in
favor of choosing segregated housing, but that the law allows agents to serve customers'
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cases would be agents who assume that their clients would choose(or reject) housing based on its § 3604(f)(3)(C) status and there-
fore steer them illegally instead of simply providing information
and allowing the clients to decide for themselves.
In addition to real estate agents, other facilitators of housing
transactions involving dwellings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) may
be targets of suit. The FHA prohibits disability-based discrimina-
tion in the insuring, financing, and appraisal of housing.233 Thus,
for example, in situations where the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) are present, an insurance company's decision to
treat such features negatively (e.g., through a refusal to insure or
higher rates) would presumably violate the FHA.234 A similarly-
based negative decision by a mortgage provider or appraiser
might also violate the FHA, at least if it made housing unavail-
able in violation of § 3604(f)(1) or resulted in discriminatory
terms or conditions in violation of § 3604(f)(2). 23 With regard to
preferences by providing racial information requested by them). See generally SCHWEMM,
supra note 7, at §§ 13:5-13:7.
233. Home insurance is not explicitly mentioned in the FHA, but a HUD regulation
and many judicial decisions have held that insurance discrimination violates § 3604(a)/§3604(f)(1) and § 3604(b)/§ 3604(f)(2). See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005); SCHWEMM, supra
note 7, at § 13:15; text accompanying notes 13-32 (discussing cases under § 3604(a) and §3604(b)); see also infra note 234 (listing disability cases under § 3604(f)(1) and §
3604(f)(2)).
Housing-related financial discrimination is explicitly outlawed by the FHA's § 3605
and may also violate § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2). See, e.g., Hargraves v. Capital CityMortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (upholding race-based claims under §3604(a) and § 3604(b)); United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 27-29(D. Mass 1996) (upholding claims under § 3604(f)(1) and § 3605); SCHWEMM, supra note 7,
at § 13:15 n.4 (citing cases upholding § 3604(a) claims).
Appraisal discrimination is explicitly outlawed by § 3605 and may also violate §3604(f)(1). See Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
claim based on § 3604(a)); United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F.Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at §§ 18:-1, 18:7-18:8.
234. See, e.g., Nevels v. Western World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117-20 (W.D.Wash. 2004) (upholding § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) claims based on defendant's refusal toinsure long-term-care facilities that housed many disabled residents); Wai v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-7 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) claimsbased on defendant's refusal to provide standard insurance at ordinary rates to landlords
with disabled tenants).
235. Financing and appraisal claims based on § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be somewhat moredifficult to maintain than those against insurance companies. This is because the FHA
provision most clearly applicable to financial and appraisal discrimination (i.e., § 3605),
see supra note 233, is not one for which noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is considered
discrimination. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23; cf. Gaona v. Town & CountryCredit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a mortgage lender accused of
violating § 3605 was under no obligation to provide reasonable accommodations pursuant
to § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Webster Bank v. Oakley, 830 A.2d 139, 152 (Conn. 2003) (agreeing with
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those buildings that do not have the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C), insurance companies and other housing facilitators
could presumably treat this fact as a negative without violating
the FHA, so long as they do not do so in a way that discriminates
against persons with disabilities (e.g., by charging higher rates to
disabled individuals who live in a noncompliant building than are
charged to non-disabled tenants in the same building).236
c. Local Governments and Building Officials
Before any multi-family housing development may be built, it
must go through a review-and-approval process by a unit of local
government, whose officials are charged with determining
whether it meets the requirements of that government's building
code and other applicable laws. Put another way, every dwelling
constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C) was once approved by
local building officials. This fact, which the home-building indus-
try contends is one of the principal reasons for the high degree of
noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), 237 suggests that local officials
bear at least some responsibility for violations of this statute. As
noted above, proper defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases generally
include anyone whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing a
Gaona that § 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reasonable accommodations requirement does not apply to §
3605 claims). As to § 3604's coverage of discriminatory financing, some courts have held
that this provision, unlike § 3605, applies only where financing is sought in connection
with "acquiring a home" and not also to loans "for maintaining a dwelling previously ac-
quired." Webster Bank, 830 A.2d at 152 (quoting Eva v. Midwest Nat'l Mortgage Bank,
Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 886 (N.D. Ohio 2001)). But see Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 22
(noting the argument made by the United States as amicus curiae that § 3604 as well as §
3605 applies to home equity loans and concluding that this "appears to be a close issue").
In any event, this problem does not exist in insurance cases, because the main source of
the FHA's condemnation of insurance discrimination is § 3604, see supra note 233, thereby
making § 3604(f)(3)(C) available.
236. See, e.g., HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
(Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,156, at 26,248, 26,252-54 (HUD ALJ 2001) (holding that defen-
dant's policy of requiring tenants who used motorized wheelchairs to obtain special liabil-
ity insurance violates the FHA's ban on discriminatory terms and conditions in rentals);
see also Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. GE Fin. Assurance Co., 72 F. App'x 35,
36-37 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no FHA violation where defendant offered equal insurance
coverage to disabled and non-disabled persons); cf. McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179,
186-87 (5th Cir. 2000) (interpreting ADA provision forbidding businesses from denying
people with disabilities "the full and equal enjoyment of [its] goods [and] services" as re-
quiring that insurance companies offer the disabled access to the same products offered to
others).
237. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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violation of this provision,238 and it could certainly be argued that
local building officials fit within this category.
The problem is that this general standard and the torts princi-
ples on which it is based only govern FHA cases if Congress has
not explicitly provided to the contrary,239 and the 1988 FHAA
does include some explicit provisions relating to the role of local
governments vis-a-vis § 3604(f)(3)(C). In one such provision, Con-
gress directed HUD to "encourage, but.., not require, States and
units of local government to include in their existing procedures
for the review and approval of newly constructed covered multi-
family dwellings, determinations as to whether the design and
construction of such dwellings are consistent with [§
3604(f)(3)(C)]." 240 This provision, which gives local governments
the option of ignoring § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements in their re-
view-and-approval procedures, implies that such governments
should not be made liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C)-related violations
based on their building codes' failure to include the FHA-
mandated features.24'
A more difficult question, however, would be presented where a
local government's building laws do include the § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
mandated features, but municipal officials mistakenly approve a
proposed development that fails to include these features. Con-
gress in the FHAA was aware of this possibility, but provided
only limited guidance as to what legal consequences should fol-
low. Thus, where a local government has incorporated in its laws
accessibility requirements equivalent to § 3604(f)(3)(C), the
FHAA specifies that compliance with such laws "shall be deemed
238. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(C) (2000).
241. Even traditional tort principles might support this result, for ordinarily:
[Flailure to object to [the commission of a wrong] is not enough to charge one
with responsibility. It is, furthermore, essential that each particular defen-
dant who is to be charged with responsibility shall be proceeding tortiously,
which is to say with the intent requisite to committing a tort, or with negli-
gence. One who innocently, and carefully, does an act which happens to fur-
ther the tortious purpose of another is not acting in concert with the other.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 46, at 323-24 (citations omitted). Cf. City of Cuya-hoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 195 (2003) (holding that city en-gineer's decision as to whether to issue a building permit was, being controlled by locallaw, merely a "nondiscretionary ministerial act" and thus could not be the basis for a find-ing of discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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to satisfy the requirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)],"242 and local offi-
cials are invited to review proposals for new multi-family devel-
opments "for the purpose of making determinations as to whether
the design and construction requirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] are
met."243 The statute makes clear, however, that such local compli-
ance determinations "shall not be conclusive in [FHA] enforce-
ment proceedings."2'
This latter provision shows Congress's awareness that local of-
ficials might err in their evaluation of a proposed development's
compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), but it does not say what the legal
implications of such an occurrence should be. For its part, HUD
has commented that it "is reluctant to assume that State and lo-
cal jurisdictions, by performing compliance reviews, will subject
themselves to liability under the Fair Housing Act."245 But HUD's
being "reluctant to assume" is not a guarantee, much less an au-
thoritative interpretation of the statute. Thus, if a local govern-
ment approves a multi-family housing proposal in violation of its
own § 3604(f)(3)(C)-like building laws and thereby negligently
permits construction of a dwelling that violates § 3604(f)(3)(C),
traditional torts principles might well suggest that this conduct,
being a substantial factor in producing the violation, is sufficient
to make such a government and its responsible officials proper
defendants in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) suit.246
4. Liability Issues Among Potential Defendants
Thus far, Part IV.B has established that a variety of different
entities might be liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations, and
indeed many reported cases have named multiple defendants
based on a single development's noncompliance with §
242. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(A) (2000).
243. Id. § 3604(f)(5)(B).
244. Id. § 3604(f)(6)(B).
245. HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 36.
246. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Historically, the common law provided
immunity for local governments and their officials from most tort actions. See DOBBS, su-
pra note 160, § 269, at 718-19. In recent decades, however, this immunity has generally
been abandoned, although it still applies in certain situations. See SECOND TORTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 895C, 895D. FHA claims have always been considered
appropriate against local governments, although their officials have occasionally been
granted immunities from damage claims similar to those applicable in § 1983 suits. See
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 12B:5.
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3604(f)(3)(C). 47 This section discusses how liability should be ap-
portioned in multiple-defendant cases and the extent to which an
individual defendant may have a right of contribution against
other potentially liable entities. As with most other issues con-
cerning proper defendants and their respective liabilities under
the FHA, this matter is not explicitly dealt with in the statute
and thus must be resolved by resorting to traditional tort princi-
ples.24
8
Once it is determined that a particular defendant is liable in a
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) case, the question becomes, "Liable for what?" (The
related question of "Liable to whom?" is dealt with below in Part
IV.C.) As noted earlier, the FHA provides for a full range of
monetary and equitable relief in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, 249 but the
statute does not say whether each proper defendant should be re-
sponsible for all of the relief ordered. In one early § 3604(f)(3)(C)
opinion, a district court seemed to find unpersuasive the plain-
tiffs' argument that "all entities involved in" a § 3604(f)(3)(C) vio-
lation "should be liable as joint tortfeasors,"2'0 but it later did hold
three of the defendants "jointly and severally liable."21' Neither
opinion, however, provided any real analysis of how liability
might be apportioned among multiple defendants nor how tradi-
tional tort principles might resolve this question.
Thereafter, in 2003, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Ayers,252 the Supreme Court dealt with contribution issues in a
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") case. In Ayers, the
Court ruled unanimously that a FELA defendant was not entitled
to have its liability reduced based on the contribution of others to
the plaintiffs' injuries,2" a ruling that was justified in part be-
cause "joint and several liability is the traditional rule."254 Thus,
247. See, e.g., United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 260 & n.1 (6th Cir.
2004); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 771; Fair Hous. Council v. Vill. of
Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706, 708-09 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
248. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 71, 77, 80, and 83 and accompanying texts.
250. Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662
(D. Md. 1998).
251. Id. at 664-65; Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460
(D. Md. 2000).
252. 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
253. Id. at 159-66.
254. Id. at 163. The modern meaning ofjoint and several liability is that:
(1) the plaintiff may sue each tortfeasor, A or B, separately; (2) the plaintiff
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the Court in Ayers employed the same technique of statutory con-
struction that it had earlier held was appropriate for the FHA-
that is, interpreting statutory silence as an indication that Con-
gress intended the statute to be governed by traditional tort prin-
ciples .255
It seems likely, therefore, that joint and several liability should
be the rule in FHA cases. Certainly this would be appropriate in
those situations where the potential defendants are involved in a
"joint enterprise," as, for example, where a builder and developer
work together in the design and construction of a multi-family
structure.25 6 But even in situations where the potential defen-
dants have not worked together (e.g., where the original devel-
oper has sold the property to an unrelated entity that is now the
landlord), the traditional rule of joint and several liability would
probably govern pursuant to Ayers. 5 7
may sue both tortfeasors in a single action; (3) the plaintiff may obtain a
judgment against one tortfeasor alone and enforce it against that one; (4) the
plaintiff may obtain a judgment against both tortfeasors and enforce it
against both; but (5) the plaintiff may not actually collect more than one full
compensation.
DOBBS, supra note 160, § 170, at 413.
255. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003); supra note 132 and accompany-
ing text. In Ayers, the Court responded to the defendant's argument that the modern trend
is to apportion damages between multiple tortfeasors by first noting that "the more impor-
tant inquiry" in interpreting the FELA would be the state of the law when that statute
was enacted (i.e., in 1908). 538 U.S. at 145, 164. This suggests that the proper focus in a §
3604(f)(3)(C) case would be 1988 when the FHAA was enacted, but even with this later
perspective, joint and several liability would probably be the proper rule. Citing the mod-
ern Torts Restatement on apportionment, the Ayers opinion noted that "many States re-
tain full joint and several liability, even more retain it in certain circumstances, and most
of the recent changes away from the traditional rule have come through legislative enact-
ments rather than judicial development of common-law principles." Id. at 164-65 (cita-
tions omitted). Significant here to the Court's decision to apply the traditional rule was the
fact-also true for the FHA-that Congress "has not amended the FELA" to reflect a new
view of apportionment. Id. at 165. The Ayers opinion also found support for applying the
traditional joint-and-several-liability rule in the fact that requiring apportionment among
potential defendants "would handicap plaintiffs and could vastly complicate adjudica-
tions." Id.
256. For purposes of tort law, a joint enterprise is a form of joint venture in which "two
or more persons tacitly or expressly undertake an activity together" and share a pecuniary
interest. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 340, at 933. Thus, "persons who act in concert, pursu-
ant to a common plan or design, to commit a . . . tort are true joint tortfeasors; each is li-
able for harm done by the others involved." Id. § 170, at 413.
257. The textual conclusion here is limited by "probably" because Ayers recognized that
this issue must be answered for each statute based on its own structure, purpose, and time
of enactment. See 538 U.S. at 165 n.22 (rejecting the analogy of decisions holding that ap-
portionment of liability is appropriate under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, because that statute's "structure, purpose, and
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Joint and several liability means that each proper defendant
may be held fully responsible for all appropriate relief in a §
3604(f)(3)(C) case.25 8 It does not mean, however, that such a de-
fendant is barred from recouping some of its liability by asserting
a right of contribution against other responsible entities.2 9 Al-
though there was no right to contribution at common law, that
rule had been changed in most American jurisdictions by 1988
when § 3604(f)(3)(C) was enacted.2 ° As the Court in Ayers pointed
out in 2003, its holding that a FELA defendant was subject to
joint and several liability still allowed such a defendant to iden-
tify "other responsible parties and demonstrat[e] that some of the
costs of the injury should be spread to them."26'
While Ayers strongly suggests that a right of contribution
should be recognized in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, there is a counter
argument based on the Court's 1981 decision in Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,262 which held that no such
right exists for employers in Title VII cases. Noting that Title VII
did not expressly create such a right, Northwest Airlines rejected
the idea that a right of contribution should be implied for this
statute, principally because it was clear that Title VII was not
created for the benefit of the employers who would be claiming
such a right.263
more recent vintage may differentiate that measure from the FELA in ways relevant to
the question presented").
258. See supra note 254.
259. "Typically, a right to contribution is recognized when two or more persons are li-
able to the same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors has paid more
than his fair share of the common liability." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981).
260. See id. at 87-88 & n.17 (noting in 1981 that thirty-nine states and the District of
Columbia had come to recognize some right to contribution among joint torttfeasors). The
trend in favor of contribution has continued. In 2000, Professor Dobbs observed "a right of
contribution is now a generally accepted part of the joint and several liability system" for
all except intentional torts (i.e., for negligent tortfeasors and those who are strictly liable).
DOBBS, supra note 160, § 386, at 1078-80; see also id. § 170, at 413 ("If the plaintiff col-
lects all her damages from one tortfeasor [who is jointly and severally liable], most states
today permit the defendant who paid more than his just share of liability to recover con-
tribution or indemnity from the other tortfeasor.").
261. 538 U.S. at 165. Furthermore, according to Ayers, such defendants "may be able to
implead third parties and thus secure resolution of their contribution actions in the same
forum as the underlying FELA actions." Id. at 165 n.23.
262. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
263. Id. at 91-92. Furthermore, since Title VII itself did not intend to create such a
right, the Court in Northwest Airlines felt that it would be inappropriate to establish this
right as part of the judiciary's power to create federal common law. Id. at 95-99.
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Lower courts, including one in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case, have read
Northwest Airlines to bar FHA defendants from asserting a right
to contribution.264 The § 3604(f)(3)(C) case is United States v.
Quality Built Construction, Inc.,265 where a district court held
that the builders had no claim for either contribution or indemni-
fication against their architect under the FHA.266 The Quality
Built court felt that Northwest Airlines governed the contribution
issue, because the FHA, like Title VII, is silent on this matter and
the parties asserting the right of contribution (i.e., the builders)
clearly were not the intended beneficiaries of § 3604(f)(3)(C). 267
At this stage, therefore, the contribution issue in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases must be considered unresolved. The only case on point is
Quality Built, and the district court there did not consider Ayers,
which the Supreme Court had decided just a few months earlier.
For its part, Ayers neither made clear whether the defendant's
right of contribution recognized therein was to be based on the
federal statute, federal common law, or state law, nor did it show
any awareness of Northwest Airlines, much less discuss whether
this old Title VII precedent was being distinguished or disap-
proved. The fact that, in the same year as Ayers, the Supreme
264. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 594 F. Supp. 466, 473-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
265. 309 F. Supp. 2d 767, 778-79 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
266. "Indemnity differs from contribution. While contribution contemplates that two
defendants will share in the ultimate liability, indemnity contemplates that one will fully
repay the other. Indemnity was and is permitted in only a few situations [in the joint and
several liability system]." DOBBS, supra note 160, § 386, at 1079.
267. 309 F. Supp. 2d at 778-79. Although Quality Built Construction held that there
was no right of contribution under the FHA, it did recognize that the builders there might
have state law claims against the architect. Id. at 779; see also Options Ctr. for Indep. Liv-
ing v. G & V Dev. Co., 229 F.R.D. 149 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (upholding defendant-developer's
cross claims against defendant-architect based on the latter's alleged breach of contract
and professional malpractice in § 3604(f)(3)(C) case).
In Quality Built Construction, the builders' state law claims were apparently not based
on the state law of contribution, but rather on the architect's alleged negligence and
breach of contract. See 309 F. Supp. 2d at 779. The court refused to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims, dismissing them without prejudice so that the builders
could file them in state court. Id. With respect to the builders' claim for indemnification
based on state law, the court dismissed this on the merits, holding that
to allow a wrongdoer to shift the entire liability to another party "Would run
counter to the basic policy" of the [federal] statute designed to regulate or re-
strict specific behavior. To allow [the builders] to seek indemnity from [the
architect] would run counter to the purpose of the FHAA and undermine the
regulatory goal by allowing the builder to escape any liability for violating
the Act.
Id. (quoting Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir.
1989) (citation in omitted)).
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Court held that liability issues under the FHA should generally
be governed by traditional torts principles hardly clarifies the
matter, because the "common law" of contribution has changed
substantially in modern times. Fairness considerations do sup-
port the idea that a single defendant-among the many who
might be sued for a particular § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation-should be
able to make the other responsible entities bear their share of the
liability. This factor, however, was also present in Northwest Air-
lines, and the Court simply responded that it was up to Congress,
not the judiciary, to determine whether to include such considera-
tions in Title VII law.268
Thus, while the parameters of how the § 3604(f)(3)(C) contribu-
tion issue should be decided can be set forth here, its ultimate
resolution requires further judicial or congressional attention.
Furthermore, a related, though distinct, issue-the degree to
which the settlement of a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim against
one or more joint tortfeasors is to be credited in favor of the non-
settling defendants-also remains in an uncertain state.269
268. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 88-89, 97-98; see also Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Rad-
cliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (declining to provide a right of contribution
under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act on the ground that "regardless of the
merits of the conflicting [policy] arguments, this is a matter for Congress, not the courts,
to resolve").
269. Compare Miller v. Apartments & Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 108-10 (3d
Cir. 1981) (holding that nonsettling defendants in a fair housing case are entitled to a pro
tanto reduction in the judgment against them for the amount that other defendants have
settled for), with Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1453 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that nonsettling defendant in a fair housing case is not entitled to any re-
duction in its judgment as a result of plaintiffs settlement with other defendants).
In the one § 3604(f)(3)(C) case to deal with this issue, the court in Baltimore Neighbor-
hoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474-75 (D. Md. 2000), held that it was bound
by Pinchback to deny any reduction in the judgment against the nonsettling defendant for
the plaintiffs' earlier settlement with other defendants. The LOB opinion noted that this
"permits the seemingly peculiar result of allowing the plaintiffs to recover more than the
total amount of the judgment," a result that "contradicts the 'almost universally held prin-
ciple that there can only be one satisfaction for an injury or wrong.'" Id. at 474 (quoting
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 596 (4th Cir.
1996)); see also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208 (1994) ("It is generally
agreed that when a plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors, the nonsettling
defendants are entitled to a credit for that settlement."). Furthermore, the LOB court
identified a number of decisions in addition to Miller that permitted some credit to nonset-
tling defendants where civil rights plaintiffs had settled with other defendants. See 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 475 n.19. Nevertheless, LOB noted that "there is no federal statute addressing
a joint tortfeasor's right to a setoff" and that "[t]he law contains no rigid rule against over-
compensation.'" Id. at 475 (quoting McDermott, 511 U.S. at 219). Thus, if felt bound to fol-
low Pinchback's no-setoff rule.
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Even if one were able to resolve apportionment, contribution,
and setoff issues among § 3604(f)(3)(C)-liable entities, two diffi-
cult questions would remain concerning the assessment of liabil-
ity in these cases: (1) what types of plaintiffs can recover? and (2)
how long does a defendant's liability continue? These questions
are dealt with next in Parts IV.C and IV.D.
C. Identifying Proper Plaintiffs: Standing to Sue
1. Overview and Government-Initiated Claims
As described above in Part II.D, the FHA provides for enforce-
ment by HUD- and Department of Justice-initiated actions and
by private claims brought by any "aggrieved person."27 ° Even be-
fore the 1988 amendments added the disability prohibitions to
the FHA,27 1 the Supreme Court had decided three cases holding
that persons aggrieved under the FHA extended well beyond the
direct targets of a defendant's discrimination to include a variety
of other individuals and entities. 2 The Congress that passed the
1988 FHAA endorsed these decisions and actually expanded the
definition of "aggrieved person" for purposes of the amended
FHA. 273
The accessibility mandates of § 3604(f)(3)(C) do not specify who
would be proper plaintiffs in litigation based on this provision. As
270. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a), 3613(a)(1)(A) (2000). See supra notes 67-69, 73-74 and 78
and accompanying texts.
271. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
272. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 372-79 (upholding standing of fair housing organization
and minority tester to challenge racial steering by real estate firm); Gladstone Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979) (upholding standing of community residents
and municipality to challenge defendants' racial steering); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972) (upholding standing of white residents of apartment
complex to challenge their landlord's discrimination against minority applicants).
273. As a result of the 1988 FHAA, the FHA now defines "aggrieved person" as "any
person-who (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or...
(2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2000). "Discriminatory housing practice" here means
any act that is unlawful under the FHA's substantive provisions. See id. § 3602(f). The
comparable pre-1988 definition was similar but more narrow with respect to the second
element as a result of inclusion of the word 'irrevocably" to describe the injury required
(i.e., a "person aggrieved" was defined as "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur"). See id. § 3610(a) (1970) (amended
by Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988)).
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noted above, § 3604(f)(3)(C) simply identifies certain behavior-
failure to design and construct covered multi-family dwellings in
specified ways-as "discrimination" for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2).114 True, one of these referred-to provisions-§
3604(f)(2)-is directed against discrimination "against any per-
son" in the terms or conditions of a housing transaction "because
of a handicap of that person" or of someone residing or associated
with that person.2 75 Therefore, a person with a disability who is
seeking housing and applies for a unit that is built without the §
3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated features would be a proper plaintiff,276 as
would anyone residing or associated with that person. 7 In addi-
tion, other types of "aggrieved persons" injured by a §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation may be entitled to sue, along with
HUD and the Department of Justice in certain circumstances.
To date, HUD has not initiated any of these cases,2 7' but the
Department of Justice has filed quite a few actions pursuant to
its authority under § 3614 of the FHA.279 In § 3614 cases, the De-
274. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 22 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000)).
276. See infra note 282.
277. The fact that § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) outlaw discrimination against buyers
and renters who reside or are associated with disabled persons means that these provi-
sions were intended to "prohibit not only discrimination against the primary purchaser or
named lessee, but also to prohibit denials of housing opportunities to applicants because
they have children, parents, friends, spouses, roommates, patients, subtenants or other
associates who have disabilities." 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 24; see also 134
CONG. REC. S10,539, S10,541 (Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Senator Kennedy) (noting, as a
principal sponsor of the FHAA, the value of § 3604(f)(3)(C) for nondisabled tenants who
want to have visitors with disabilities).
Just how far the "associated with" phrase in subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) goes is unclear.
Even without the benefit of this phrase, courts have long held that white tenants who are
discriminated against because they entertain black guests have a cause of action under §
3604(a) and/or § 3604(b). See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 13:16, n.5, § 14:3, n.29. It
seems probable, therefore, that a tenant who could not have a mobility-impaired guest
visit him because the tenant's building does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) would have
standing to sue. Cf. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(5) (2005) (providing HUD regulation outlawing the
eviction of tenants "because of the . . . handicap ... of a tenant's guest"). One race case
even held that the black guest in this situation has standing to challenge the landlord's
discriminatory policy. See Lane v. Cole, 88 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The the-
ory in Lane was that the black visitor suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a result of
the landlord's unlawful policy of conditioning rentals on exclusion of minority guests. If
Lane were extended to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, then standing could be recognized in disabled
would-be guests who are deterred by a building's inaccessible features from visiting there.
278. HUD lawyers have, however, prosecuted § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases on behalf of private
complainants in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. 25,136 (HUD ALJ 1998).
279. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The Department of Justice has also
prosecuted some § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases pursuant to its authority to handle cases that are
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partment of Justice must prove either a "group denial of rights"
or a "pattern or practice," but this has not been a significant ob-
stacle in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, because courts have invariably
found a "group denial of rights" in such cases2 ' ° and have also
recognized the possibility of a "pattern or practice" in these
cases.281
2. Privately Initiated Claims
Thus far, most privately initiated § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have
been brought by one of three types of "aggrieved persons:" (1) dis-
abled homeseekers; (2) disabled testers; and (3) advocacy organi-
zations. The first two groups will be considered next; advocacy or-
ganizations will be dealt with in the following section; and a final
section will consider other potential plaintiffs.
a. Disabled Homeseekers and Testers
The right to sue of disabled homeseekers would seem rather
obvious,2 2 although it has been questioned on occasion when such
elected to court out of the HUD administrative process. See supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text; see infra note 431 (listing cases).
280. See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39, 1153; Hallmark Homes,
Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *4-6; Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990,
at *33-36; Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61 (quoting United States v.
Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97C8175 1998 WL 42265, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1998)).
281. See infra note 431 (citing cases).
282. See, e.g., Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d
700, 703, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999) (ruling in favor of a disabled individual "who uses a wheel-
chair for mobility" and fair housing organization). See generally supra notes 67-69 and 73
and accompanying texts.
Because § 3604(f)(3)(C) seems particularly intended to benefit persons with mobility
impairments and certain other kinds of disabilities, there may be some question whether
homeseekers with disabilities that do not benefit from the mandated features (e.g., per-
sons with mental disabilities) should have standing to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims.
Some of the features mandated by this provision are indeed specifically addressed to the
needs of individuals with mobility impairments. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(ii), (iii)(IV)
(2000) (requiring, respectively, that doors be "sufficiently wide to allow passage by handi-
capped persons in wheelchairs" and that kitchens and bathrooms be "such that an indi-
vidual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space"). The other mandated features,
however, do not include such language, and one of them by its terms covers all persons
with disabilities. See id. § 3610(f)(3)(C)(i) (specifying that public and common use areas
must be "readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons" without limiting the
latter phrase).
The FHA's enforcement provisions do not exclude persons with certain types of disabili-
ties from making § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims, and no case has thus far raised this issue.
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plaintiffs were not actually ready, willing, and financially able to
live in the defendant's housing.8 3 For example, in an unpublished
1996 decision, the Ninth Circuit in Ricks v. Beta Development
Co." held that a paraplegic individual who had alleged "merely a
general interest in . . . accessible housing" lacked standing to
bring a § 3604(f)(1) claim against the developer of a condominium
complex that was built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C).1 5 According
to Ricks, standing to assert such a claim requires a disabled
plaintiff to show that "but for the architectural barriers in the
condominium, he would purchase a unit"2 6 or at least that he was
"a prospective buyer"28 7 with an interest in the condominium.2 8
Ricks also held that standing was barred by the plaintiffs "failure
to allege that he had sufficient financial means to purchase a
condominium,"289 both because this failure meant there was no
"actionable causal relationship between [defendant's] alleged dis-
criminatory action[ I and [plaintiffs] asserted injury"29 ° and be-
cause "a court order directing the removal of architectural barri-
ers will not remedy his problem,"291 i.e., "it is his financial
inability, rather than any action on the part of the developers and
designers, which prevents Ricks from obtaining a condomin-
"292
Still, it may be that courts will insist that a homeseeker-plaintiff present proof of a "quali-fying" disability to invoke § 3604(f)(3)(C). In any event, for present purposes, this section's
conclusion that a disabled homeseeker has standing to bring a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim
assumes that the disability involved is one that would benefit from the § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
mandated features.
283. See Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill v. St. Johns County, 376 F.3d 1292, 1295(11th Cir. 2004) (denying standing for disabled persons who alleged that they "might" livein the particular housing involved and holding that such persons must instead show that
they were "qualified" and "sought [to live there]"); Whitaker v. West Vill. Ltd. P'ship, 2004WL 2008502, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2004) (dismissing claims by disabled individuals
who had no interest in seeking units at defendant's complex); Montana Fair Hous., Inc. v.Am. Cap. Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (D. Mont. 1999) (questioning standing ofdisabled homeseeker whose application to defendant's housing complex may have beendenied because of his income); infra notes 284-92 and accompanying text (discussing
Ricks v. Beta Dev. Co., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,107 (9th Cir. 1996)).
284. Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,107 (9th Cir. 1996).
285. Id. at 16,107.2.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 16,107.1-2.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 16,107.3.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 16,107.2.
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Although Ricks is clearly a restrictive holding, its importance
in limiting standing on behalf of disabled homeseekers and even
disabled testers is limited by the fact that it only considered a
claim under § 3604(f)(1)'s refusal-to-sell provision and not also
under § 3604(f)(2)'s guarantee of nondiscriminatory terms and
conditions.293 Thus, an internal HUD memo responding to Ricks
concluded that, while § 3604(f)(1) complaints based on §
3604(f)(3)(C) noncompliance "should be dismissed where the com-
plainant did not have the interest in living in and/or the financial
means to live at the housing. Such complaints should be investi-
gated as possible violations of [§ 3604(f)(2)1."294 More importantly,
the Ninth Circuit itself eight years after Ricks held that a dis-
abled tester with no interest in purchasing or renting particular
housing had standing to bring a § 3604(f)(2) claim based on a de-
velopment's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) in Smith v. Pa-
cific Properties & Development Corp.295
The plaintiffs in Smith were a polio victim who used a wheel-
chair (Smith) and a disability rights organization ("DRAC") on
whose behalf Smith had visited various properties to test for
compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). 296 The plaintiffs concluded that
five of the defendant's properties did not comply with §
3604(f)(3)(C), and they brought suit alleging that these develop-
ments violated their rights under § 3604(f)(2).297 The district court
dismissed, holding that § 3604(f)(2) "requires that a disabled per-
son have an interest in actually renting or purchasing a dwelling
in order to allege a violation,"29" but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Noting that § (f)(2) prohibits "a broader set of behavior" than §
293. See supra note 22 for the text of these provisions.
294. Memorandum from Sara Pratt, Director, Office of Investigations, Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity, to HUD Fair Housing Enforcement Center Directors and Program
Operators and Compliance Center Directors, Standing in Accessibility Cases in Light of
Ricks v. Beta Development Co.," available at http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?
method=page.display&pageID=
2 7 3 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). Pursuant to this memo,
HUD investigators of (f)(1)-based accessibility claims were instructed to ask the complain-
ant "to provide evidence showing that he/she actually was interested in purchasing a unit
and could afford to do so." Id. The memo concluded, however, that an (f)(2)-based claim
may be brought by "[a] complainant who is not actually interested in purchasing, or able
to purchase, a unit ... against a respondent for the latter's failure to design and construct
housing so as to be accessible." Id.
295. 358 F.3d 1097, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2004).
296. Id. at 1099.
297. Id. at 1100.
298. Id. at 1101.
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(f)(1)," the court of appeals rejected the lower court's view that
injury to a tester making an § (f)(2) claim "must arise from some-
thing more than merely observing a discriminatory architectural
feature."30 ' According to the Ninth Circuit:
To read an additional standing requirement into [§ 3604(0(2)] be-
yond mere observation ... ignores that many overtly discriminatory
conditions, for example, lack of a ramped entryway, prohibit a dis-
abled individual from forming the requisite intent or actual interest
in renting or buying for the very reason that architectural barriers
prevent them from viewing the whole property in the first in-
stance.
3 0 1
The Ninth Circuit then went on to make what it considered an
even stronger point:
More importantly, the district court's reasoning fails to recognize the
dignitary harm to a disabled person of observing such overtly dis-
criminatory conditions.
Interpreting § 3604(f)(2) to exclude these individuals from enforcing
their right to be free from discrimination undermines the specific in-
tent of the FHAA, which is to prevent disabled individuals from feel-
ing as if they are second-class citizens. The district court therefore
erred as a matter of law in interpreting § 3604(f)(2) to preclude
tester standing, and as a consequence, DRAC's representational
standing.
3 0 2
Smith's recognition of tester standing for § (f)(2) claims based
on a defendant's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) was based on
299. Id. at 1104.
300. Id.
301. Id. (emphasis in original).
302. Id. (internal citations omitted). Because Smith died while the case was pending,the parties and the Ninth Circuit treated the issue of his standing as whether DRAC had
representational standing based on the injuries that its members with disabilities, includ-ing Smith, suffered when they encountered § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations while testing.Id. at 1100-02. This was appropriate pursuant to Hunt v. Washington Apple AdvertisingComm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). It is not true, however, that an individual's FHA claimdies with him, for such a claim may be prosecuted on behalf of his estate. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 7, at § 12:1 n.5 and accompanying text. Smith's death may have mooted his es-tate's claim for injunctive relief, but not for damages. See, e.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 371; cf.Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a dis-
abled plaintiff's death moots his ADA claim for prospective relief, but not his claim fordamages). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized that testers like Smith wouldhave such a damage claim by pointing out the dignitary harm they may suffer while test-ing a prospective defendant's noncompliant properties. See 358 F.3d at 1104. Still, to se-
cure injunctive relief in Smith, DRAC needed to have standing, and the Ninth Circuit heldthat it did, both in its representational capacity, id. at 1101-04, and, in a later part of the
opinion, on its own behalf. Id. at 1104-06.
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its view of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman."3 In Havens, the Court unanimously held that
a minority tester who had been falsely told by the defendants that
no units were available in their apartment complexes had stand-
ing to sue under the FHA's § 3604(d).304 This provision, the Court
noted, makes it unlawful "[t]o represent to any person because
of race ... that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale,
or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available," meaning
that "Congress has thus conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to
truthful information about available housing. "30" The Court also
found significant that Congress in § 3604(d) "plainly omitted" the
requirement "that there be a 'bona fide offer' to rent or purchase,"
which it did include in § 3604(a).0 6 The congressional determina-
tion in § 3604(d) to give all persons "an enforceable right to truth-
ful information concerning the availability of housing
"3°1 was the
key to the Court's recognition that tester claims could satisfy Ar-
ticle III standing requirements. Because "[tlhe actual or threat-
ened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of
'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing,"'30 ' Havens held that the minority tester there suffered
"specific injury" from the defendants' misrepresentations to her,
and thus "the Article III requirement of injury in fact is satis-
fied. 309
303. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
304. Id. at 373-74.
305. Id. at 373 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000)).
306. Id. at 374. The Court's reading of § 3604(a) in Havens, while not wrong, amounted
to a half-truth. That provision makes it unlawful "Itlo refuse to sell or rent after the 
mak-
ing of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race [or other prohibited
ground]." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). Thus, the "bona fide offer" phrase modifies only the
first prohibition and not also the prohibitions against discriminatory refusals to negotiate
and discriminatory practices that make housing "otherwise . . .unavailable." Indeed, 
at
least one court after Havens has suggested that testers have standing to sue under §
3604(a) based on the latter parts of this provision. See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895
F.2d 1521, 1525, 1527 (7th Cir. 1990).
307. 455 U.S. at 373. The Art. III standing requirements are identified supra note 69.
308. 455 U.S. at 373 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
309. Id. at 374. The Court went on to reject the standing of a white tester who had re-
ceived truthful information from the defendants about their available units. Id. "As such,
[the white tester] has alleged no injury to his statutory right to accurate information con-
cerning the availability of housing.... [B]ecause [he] does not allege that he was a victim
of a discriminatory misrepresentation, he has not pleaded a cause of action under [§
3604(d)]," and therefore his claim was ordered dismissed. Id. at 375.
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Extending Havens' precise holding to disability claims is both
easy and unhelpful. Clearly, Havens means that a disabled tester
has standing to bring a § 3604(d) claim if a housing provider
falsely tells him that no units are available. But such a § 3604(d)
claim is not what occurred in Smith nor could it be the basis for
claims challenging noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), which, by
its terms, defines discrimination only for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2) (i.e., the disability equivalents of § 3604(a) and §
3604(b)),31 ° and not also § 3604(d). The real problem in Smith and
in other cases dealing with a disabled tester's right to challenge §
3604(f)(3)(C) noncompliance is whether Havens should be ex-
tended beyond § 3604(d) to include claims under § 3604(f)(2).
Two Seventh Circuit decisions have read Havens to authorize
tester claims under § 3604(b), the non-disability counterpart of §(f)(2). 31 However, the problem with these decisions-and with theNinth Circuit's reliance on them to recognize a disabled tester's
standing in Smith312
-is that they too readily conclude that §§
3604(b), (f)(2) confer substantive rights on non-home-seekers. It is
true that these provisions outlaw discrimination against "any
person," which does contrast with § 3 6 04(f)(1)'s language banning
discrimination toward "any buyer or renter."313 But § 3 6 04(f)(2)'s
use of the "any person" phrase is quite different from how this
phrase is used in § 3604(d). The latter provision defines the pro-
310. See supra note 18.
311. See United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 929 (7th Cir. 1992); Vill. of Bell-
wood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526-27 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Wheatley HeightsNeighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (find-ing, in a pre-Havens decision, that testers have standing under § 3604(b) to challenge ra-
cial steering directed against them).
In the Dwivedi case, Judge Posner noted that "Congress can create new substantive
rights, such as a right to be free from misrepresentations [referring to Havens and §3604(d)], and if that right is invaded the holder of the right can sue without running afoul
of Article III, even if he incurs no other injury." 895 F.2d at 1526-27. Dwivedi was a casein which testers and other plaintiffs challenged racial steering by a real estate firm under§ 3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3604(d), and the court concluded that, while no misrepresenta-
tions had been proved, the testers had standing because "the logic of Havens embraces dis-
crimination in the provision of services, [which is] forbidden explicitly by section 3604(b)
and implicitly by section 3604(a)." Id. at 1527. Two years later in United States v. Balistri-
eri, another Seventh Circuit panel held that black testers who were offered apartments athigher rental rates than their white counterparts had standing to receive damage awards
under § 3604(b) because Havens' "logic also extends to § 3604(b), which prohibits discrimi-
nation against 'any person' in the terms or conditions of rentals, and, like § 3604(d), does
not require a bona fide offer." 981 F.2d at 929.
312. See 358 F.3d at 1103.
313. For the text of§ 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2), see supra note 22.
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hibited behavior as making a misrepresentation "to any per-
son,"314 whereas § 3604(f)(2) bans discrimination "against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling."31 5 The implication is that the "any person"
protected by § (f)(2) must suffer discrimination in a sale or rental,
suggesting that § (f)(2) confers rights only on those persons who
have an interest in buying or renting a dwelling. 6
It is important here to note that the key to Havens' interpreta-
tion of § 3604(d) as including tester standing was not merely, or
even primarily, the "any person" phrase in that provision, but
rather the fact that Congress made clear in § 3604(d)-by ban-
ning misrepresentations "to any person"-that this provision con-
fers on all persons the substantive right to be free from discrimi-
natory misrepresentations. This is shown by Havens' additional
holding that the white tester there, who had not been given false
information, lacked standing to state a "cause of action under [§
3604(d)]," even though he was obviously covered by the "any per-
son" phrase just as much as his black counterpart.1 7
The key, therefore, to determining whether Havens should be
extended to § 3604(f)(2) is to decide what substantive rights are
conferred on the "any person" of this provision and in particular
whether Congress intended to provide a cause of action under §
(f)(2) for non-homeseekers. As pointed out in the previous para-
graph, § (f)(2)'s language does not compel an affirmative answer,
which suggests that the Ninth Circuit in Smith may have erred
in allowing disabled individuals to sue under it without having an
interest in actually buying or renting housing.
Certainly one questionable part of Smith's analysis is its con-
clusion that "the dignitary harm to a disabled person of observ-
314. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
315. Id. § 3604(f)(2) (emphasis added).
316. Further support for this view occurs in a later part of (f)(2), which provides that
the discrimination banned includes that based on the disability of "a person residing in or
intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available." Id. §
3604(f)(2)(B). This same language also appears in (f)(1). Id. § 3604(f)(1)(B).
317. See supra note 309. Because FHA standing extends to the outer limits of Art. III,
see supra note 69 and accompanying text, the issue of whether a particular plaintiff has
standing to sue under a specific FHA provision is, as the textual quote from Havens sug-
gests, essentially the same as the issue of whether that plaintiff has a substantive cause of
action under that provision. See Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing
Cases, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23-25, 56-58, 66-67 (1980).
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ing" a development's inaccessible conditions could serve as an in-
dependent basis for upholding tester standing.31 It is true that a
proper FHA plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the dignitary
harm of being the target of illegal discrimination,319 and testers
may receive such awards.32 0 But to say that a tester who has been
sufficiently injured to have standing (e.g., by being the target of a§ 3604(d) misrepresentation) may collect for the dignitary harm
illegal discrimination causes is far different from saying that dig-
nitary harm itself creates a sufficiently particularized injury in
testers to establish standing. The standing issue, as already
noted, turns on whether § 3604(f)(2) was intended to confer legal
rights on testers who merely observe inaccessible housing. On an
analogous point-whether the FHA's ban on discriminatory ad-
vertising in § 3604(c) was intended "to confer a legal right on all
individuals to be free from indignation and distress" caused by
merely seeing a discriminatory ad-a 1990 opinion by then-
Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested a negative an-
swer, 321 although some courts have endorsed such claims.322 As in
these § 3604(c) cases, 323 the concern in accessibility-based tester
claims brought under § 3604(f)(2) is that a particularized injury
to the plaintiff must be shown and that the harm suffered by an
individual who merely observes a building's noncompliance with §
318. See supra text accompanying note 302.
319. See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 25:5.
320. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930-33 (7th Cir. 1992); Davis
v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
321. Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (questioning in-dividual plaintiffs standing who "alleged only that he 'incurred indignation' and 'distress'
as a result of the [defendants' § 3604(c)] violation," while opining that an individual would
"no doubt" have standing if she "alleged and later proved that an advertisement indicating
a racial preference deterred her from seeking housing in the advertised property").
322. E.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 904 (2d Cir. 1993)(upholding § 3604(c) claim by minority individuals who were not actively looking for hous-ing when they saw defendant's ads, because there is "no significant difference between the
statutorily recognized injury suffered by the tester in Havens and the injury suffered by
the [plaintiffs here], who were confronted by advertisements indicating a preference based
on race"); Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding
that, "[ulnder the Havens Realty rationale," a minority individual's mere receipt of "an
unlawful advertisement indicating a tenant preference based on race" is sufficient to vio-
late § 3604(c) and establish her standing).
323. The appropriateness of using § 3604(c) cases to reason by analogy in accessibility
cases is supported by Congress's recognition that noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is thefunctional equivalent of a sign saying "No Handicapped People Allowed." See supra text
accompanying note 28.
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3604(f)(3)(C) cannot be distinguished from that of countless other
potential claimants who may be similarly exposed.324
Smith's other identified source of injury to disabled individuals
who inspect inaccessible housing, however, is legitimate. This is
the notion that a building's lack of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated fea-
tures would deter such an individual from developing a specific
interest in buying or renting at this particular property. 325 This is
the same concept that Congress recognized when it identified the
absence of some § 3604(f)(3)(C) features in terms of discouraging
disabled homeseekers as the functional equivalent of a sign say-
ing "No Handicapped People Allowed."326 It is also similar to the
kind of deterrence by a specific property that was seen by Justice
Ginsberg as clearly sufficient to confer standing on a minority
homeseeker who observes discriminatory ads.327
Thus, while a disabled individual may have to be in the market
for housing to pursue a § (f)(2) claim, he should not be required to
have formed a specific interest in the defendant's development, so
long as the development's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) can
be shown to have deterred him from further pursuing a housing
opportunity in that development. This might even be true for §
(M(1) claims as well-Ricks to the contrary notwithstanding-
because the development's lack of accessible features means that
such an individual is being discouraged from negotiating for or
otherwise becoming a prospective buyer or renter by the defen-
dant's noncompliance with the FHA.
Thus, while Ricks may have been correct that a disabled indi-
vidual needs to be "a prospective" buyer or renter with an "inter-
est" in the defendant's development,328 it was wrong in thinking
that a second reason for denying standing was that the plaintiff
was financially unable to close the deal.3 29 This might be a rele-
vant factor if the plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief (e.g., a
324. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times, Inc., 923 F.2d 995, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting in a §
3604(c) advertising case that "a multitude of plaintiffs," each claiming to be a newspaper
reader who "was substantially insulted and distressed by a certain ad," could lead to "large
numbers of... damage awards," but nevertheless allowing such claims based on the view
"that courts will be able to keep such awards within reason").
325. See supra text accompanying note 301.
326. See supra text accompanying note 28.
327. See supra note 321.
328. See supra text accompanying note 288.
329. See supra text accompanying note 292.
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specific performance order requiring the defendant to sell to Ricks
or an order directing the removal of architectural barriers). Ap-
parently the Ninth Circuit in Ricks presumed this was the case,
for it held that Ricks's standing was barred by the absence of the
required elements of causation and redressibility because "it is
his financial inability, rather than any action on the part of the
developers and designers, which prevents Ricks from obtaining a
condominium."33 ° But Ricks's financial situation was irrelevant to
his ability to bring a damage claim, which would have been ap-
propriate if he was sufficiently interested in the defendant's hous-
ing to have standing and if he suffered the kind of dignitary harm
that Smith recognized could result from contact with the defen-
dant's inaccessible building." 1
The Ricks opinion shows no awareness of the fact that such a
damage claim is available to a proper FHA plaintiff.332 Thus,
Ricks was wrong to suggest that standing for all claims by dis-
abled homeseekers require a showing that they are financially
able to buy or rent a unit at the defendant's inaccessible property.
The only requirements for such homeseekers to bring at least a
damage claim are that they be prospective buyers or renters with
an actual interest in seeking housing generally and that their
housing search brought them in contact with the defendant's in-
accessible building (i.e., that they were ready and willing to pro-
ceed to form a specific interest in the defendant's housing and
might have done so but for its noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C)). This would certainly be enough for a damage claim
under § (f)(2) and probably should be enough for such a claim un-
der § (f)(1) as well.
330. Id.
331. See supra text accompanying note 302.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 319-20. The Ricks opinion does not indicate
whether the plaintiff's complaint included such a claim. In cases where only equitable re-
lief is sought, such as those brought under Title III of the ADA, see supra note 162, recog-
nizing tester standing is obviously more difficult than it is in FHA cases where damages
as well as injunctive relief are sought. See generally Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users
Who Lack "Standing": Another Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and
III of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69 (2004). For a case showing how tester-standing
issues are treated differently for injunctive and damage claims under the ADA's Title II,
which does allow both types of relief, see Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1286-90
(10th Cir. 2004).
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b. Advocacy Organizations
The Ninth Circuit in Smith not only upheld the tester's claim,
and therefore the standing of organizations whose members in-
clude such individuals, but it also recognized the standing of
DRAC, a disability rights organization, to sue on its own behalf.'
The latter holding was based on DRAC's allegations that the de-
fendant's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations had frustrated DRAC's
mission and caused it to divert resources.334 These allegations
were similar to the allegations in the Havens case, where the Su-
preme Court upheld the organization's standing.3 5
In Havens, a fair housing organization named HOME alleged
that the defendants' FHA violations had "'frustrated ... its efforts
to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other re-
ferral services... [causing HOME] to devote significant resources
to identify and counteract the defendant's [sic] racially discrimi-
natory steering practices. '336 The Court held that "[siuch concrete
and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the
consequent drain on the organization's resources-constitutes"
sufficient injury to establish the standing "of the organization in
its own right."
337
In the wake of Havens, numerous organizations have been al-
lowed to bring FHA claims on their own behalf based on the alle-
gations that their efforts have been frustrated and/or their re-
sources diverted as a result of the defendant's illegal practices.338
The standing of such organizations to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
333. See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1101-04 (discussing DRAC's representative standing),
1104-06 (discussing DRAC's organizational standing).
334. Id. at 1104-06.
335. Id.
336. Havens, 455 U.S at 379.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 12A:5, n.6 (citing cases in which fair hous-
ing organizations have been allowed to sue on their own behalf). In the post-Havens era,
some issues may still be disputed about organizational standing, such as whether the nec-
essary diversion-of-resources injury can be based solely on litigation-related expenses
prompted by a particular defendant's FHA violation. See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at §
12A:5, text accompanying notes 12-14 (describing a circuit split over this issue). If an or-
ganization's injuries are like those claimed by HOME, however, Havens establishes that it
satisfies the injury part of the requirements of standing. Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79.
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claims has also been regularly recognized, both before and after
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith.339
Clearly Havens establishes that an advocacy organization may
suffer injury sufficient to allow it to sue, but this answers only
part of the standing problem in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case. The other
part is whether a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation caused the or-
ganization's injury. As noted earlier, the FHA authorizes suit by
anyone who "claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice"340 (i.e., by "an act that is unlawful"341 under the
FHA's substantive provisions).342 Thus, according to the Supreme
Court, standing in FHA cases extends to anyone who suffers ac-
tual injury "as a result of the defendant's [FHA-prohibited] con-
duct."343 Notably, the plaintiff organization in Havens alleged that
its injuries resulted from the "'defendants' racial steering prac-
tices, ' ' 3€ which were claimed to be "violative of § [3604]."
For an organization to be able to bring a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
claim, therefore, its injury (e.g., diversion of its resources) would
have to be caused by the defendant's FHA violation. If-as argued
earlier-a defendant's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) results
only in a potential § 3604(f)(1)-(2) violation and such a violation
occurs only when an actual homeseeker with a disability is ex-
posed to such noncompliance,346 then an organization that has di-
verted resources in response merely to becoming aware of the de-
fendant's inaccessible property (e.g., through the reports of its
339. See, e.g., Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133
F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Land-
mark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236, at 16,236.2-.3 (D. Md. 1997); see also Silver
State Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. ERGS, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1219-21 (D. Nev. 2005)
(assuming that fair housing organization is a proper plaintiff); Hallmark Homes, Inc.,
2003 WL 23219807 (assuming that fair housing organization is a proper complainant in
election case); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464-68 (D.
Md. 2000) (awarding damages to fair housing organization and assuming it may seek pro-
spective relief); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d
700, 703, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999) (ruling in favor of fair housing organization); HUD v. Per-
land, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,136, at 26,128-31 (HUD AIJ 1998) (awarding
damages and other relief to organizational plaintiff).
340. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2000).
341. Id. § 3602(f).
342. See supra notes 67, 273 (quoting, respectively, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) and § 3602(i)).
343. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979); see also infra
note 362 and accompanying text (discussing this standard in greater detail).
344. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.
345. Id. at 366.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 180-85 and 310-24.
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testers) lacks a necessary element for standing to sue. In other
words, such an organization's diversion-of-resources injury cannot
be claimed to have been caused by an FHA violation.
This seems an unfortunate result. Making an organization's
standing turn on its awareness of an actual homeseekers' encoun-
ter with the defendant's building would presumably call into
question its ability to sue at an early stage of construction when
noncompliance could be more easily corrected.1
47
In an analogous situation, the Department of Justice has been
allowed to sue at the pre-occupancy stage. For example, in United
States v. Edward Rose & Sons,348 the Sixth Circuit upheld a Jus-
tice-secured preliminary injunction halting further construction
of the defendants' noncompliant dwellings because their plans
called for an inaccessible front entrance in violation of §
3604(f)(3)(C)(i).3 49 The suggestion implicit in Edward Rose is that
in-progress construction of dwellings designed not to comply with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) is a violation of the FHA, even before these dwell-
ings are offered to actual homeseekers. In other words, a defen-
dant's failure to design and construct dwellings as required by §
3604(f)(3)(C) may by itself violate the FHA, whether or not it also
violates any individual's rights under § (f)(1) or § (f)(2). The De-
partment of Justice certainly takes this view, for its complaints in
Edward Rose and other § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases often allege
violations of § 3604(f)(3)(C) as well as § (f)(1) and § (f)(2). 350 Also,
347. The Congress that passed § 3604(f)(3)(C) understood "that it is cheaper to make
housing available and accessible to the handicapped when it is being constructed, rather
than making modifications later on." 134 CONG. REC. S10,536 (1988) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
348. 384 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2004).
349. Id. at 260.
350. See First Am. Compl. at para. 16, United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (No. 02-73518), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crtl
housing/documents/rosemichamendcompl.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The complaint
alleged that the defendants "have failed to design and to construct the covered dwelling
units" and thereby have:
a. Discriminated in the rental of, or otherwise made unavailable or denied,
dwellings to persons because of handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(1);
b. Discriminated against persons in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with the rental of a dwelling, because of handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(2); and
c. Failed to design and construct dwellings in compliance with the require-
ments mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C).
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the Department of Justice has been able to establish a "group de-
nial of rights" in its § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases without having to
show that any actual homeseekers encountered the defendant's
housing, because courts thought it "obvious that housing that is
inadequately designed and constructed to serve persons with dis-
abilities denies that class of persons rights granted by the[FH{A] "351
Apart from whether noncompliant housing is itself an FHA vio-
lation or whether the Department of Justice's ability to bring pre-
occupancy claims should be extended to private advocacy organi-
zations, 35  an additional argument for "early" organizational
standing is based on the fact that the FHA authorizes suit not
only by those injured by a discriminatory housing practice, but
also by those who believe they "will be injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur."353 This provision ap-
plies to situations where, if a potential complainant takes an ac-
tion, it is clear that the complainant "will be subjected to a
discriminatory act which will result in an injury." 3" HUD has
consistently interpreted this provision to permit complaints by
organizations that "allege[ ] that a discriminatory housing prac-
tice . . .is about to occur and which will result in an injury to
them."35 5 Because an inaccessible building is always "about to"
discriminate against disabled homeseekers in violation of § (f)(1)
and/or § (f)(2)-thereby triggering sufficient organizational in-
Id. at para. 17. The same basic allegations are made in other Department of Justice com-
plaints in § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 24, in United States v.
Cedar Builders, Inc., No. 05-478 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.us
doj.gov/crt/housing/docu ments/cedarcomp.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (containing the
same allegations of FHA violations as quoted above in the Edward Rose complaint).
351. Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *6 (quoting Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *35).
352. Such an extension is supported by the Supreme Court's observation that private
FHA complainants "act not only on their own behalf but also 'as private attorneys general
in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.'" Trafficante
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting the Solicitor General).
353. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(2) (2000); see, e.g., Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendants' acts of "informing the [plaintiffs] of their discrimi-
natory policy and of their intention to enforce it" against the plaintiffs "provides the
[plaintiffs] with standing" under the "'about to occur'" language of § 3602(i)(2)).
354. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,
3238 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.20).
355. Id.
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jury-an organization might well be permitted to sue before such
an encounter based on the FHA's "about to occur" provision.356
Finally, even if an actual homeseeker's encounter with the de-
fendants' building is required for an advocacy organization to
have standing, such an organization will always be able to chal-
lenge any dwelling built without the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) eventually (i.e., after such an encounter and based
on the organization's properly alleged and proven injuries).
What's more, as Havens and Smith make clear, a proper organ-
izational plaintiff may sue on its own behalf with or without other
plaintiffs and regardless of whether its own testers have stand-
ing. This means that every potential defendant with an inaccessi-
ble building may be subject to a privately initiated claim under
the FHA, even if, as suggested in the previous section, disabled
testers lack standing in such a case.
c. Other Potential Plaintiffs
In addition to minority testers and fair housing organizations,
the Supreme Court has recognized FHA standing in two other
types of "indirect" victims of housing discrimination: local resi-
dents and municipalities. In 1972 in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.,"' the Court held that current residents of a
large apartment complex had standing to sue their landlord for
its discrimination against minority applicants, which allegedly
deprived the plaintiffs of the social, professional, and economic
benefits of living in an integrated community. Seven years later
in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,55 the Court upheld
a similar claim by a municipality and four of its residents who al-
leged that local realtors were destroying integration in their
community by steering white and black homeseekers to different
neighborhoods. 3 9 Havens also recognized the standing of local
356. Cf. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) (not-
ing that similar "about to be subjected" to discrimination language in the ADA's Title III
authorizes proper plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief during the pre-construction phase of
a public accommodation that is likely to be built without the accessibility features man-
dated by this statute); Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (holding the same as that of the Lonberg court).
357. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
358. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
359. Id. at 109-15.
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360residents to complain about racial steering in their area, in ad-
dition to upholding the claims of the minority tester and the fair
housing organization as discussed above.36' The general rule un-
derlying these decisions is that standing extends to anyone who is
"genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone's [§ 3604]
rights."362
Thus far, few reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have been brought
by either a local resident or municipality, 363 but these types of
plaintiffs would seem to have the right to do so in a proper case.
With respect to local residents, the basic Trafficante theory of in-
jury based on lack of associational contacts seems easily transfer-
able to disability cases.3" This would mean that any non-disabled
resident of a housing complex built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
could sue based on his loss of the benefits of living near disabled
individuals, 36 ' assuming this injury could be traced to the defen-
dant's violation of the FHA.366
For a municipality to bring such a claim might be more diffi-
cult. The injury to the village recognized in Gladstone flowed from
the "adverse consequences attendant upon a 'changing' neighbor-
hood," which included "an exodus of white residents" and the re-
sulting "reduction in property values" that "directly injures a mu-
360. Havens, 455 U.S. at 375-78.
361. See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text (minority tester), notes 336-37
and accompanying text (fair housing organization).
362. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9. Thus, a plaintiffs standing does not depend on
whether he has been "granted substantive rights" by the FHA nor on "who possesses the
legal rights protected by [§ 3604]." Id. Rather, standing is recognized "as long as the plain-
tiff suffers actual injury as a result of the defendant's [FHA-prohibited] conduct." Id.
363. See, e.g., Options Ctr. for Indep. Living v. G & V Dev. Co., 229 F.R.D. 149, 150(C.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that a variety of individual and organizational plaintiffs sought
damages for, inter alia, "the community's deprivation of a diverse group of residents");
Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
16,236, at 16,236.3 (D. Md. 1997) (upholding an organization's representational standing
based on the fact that two of its members lived in the defendants' allegedly inaccessible
housing and were thereby deprived of"living in a diverse community that includes persons
who use wheelchairs").
364. See Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 318 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826-27 (D.
Minn. 2004), affd, 419 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing Trafficante-type claim in FHA
disability case); cf. Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 231-34 (6th Cir.
2004) (applying Trafficante theory in FHA familial status case).
365. A resident of a building that does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) might also have
a claim based on the fact that he is unable to entertain mobility-impaired guests. See su-
pra note 277.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 343-56 for a discussion of the need to link the
plaintiffs injury to the defendant's FHA violation in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases.
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nicipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability
to bear the costs of local government and to provide services."
367
Whether similarly dire consequences could be shown by a mu-
nicipality as a result of a housing complex's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
violations is an open question.36' The Gladstone theory of munici-
pal standing, however, is at least potentially available.
Another potential set of plaintiffs in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is real
estate agents. For example, a realtor representing the owner of
an individual condominium unit whose sale is blocked because
the prospective buyer objects to the fact that the common areas
are not accessible may have a damage claim against those re-
sponsible for this FHA violation. 369 Furthermore, a realtor repre-
senting a homeseeker who would have purchased or rented a unit
but for the building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) may
have an FHA-based claim.37°
Presumably, such realtor claims would only be for the mone-
tary damages caused by the defendant's FHA violation (e.g., the
realtor's lost commission). 37' This serves as a reminder of the fact
that every proper plaintiff in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case does not nec-
essarily have standing to seek all forms of relief authorized by the
FHA.37 ' Retrofitting relief, for example, may be inappropriate for
certain types of claimants. However, the availability of monetary
damages in FHA cases-and in particular the fact that actual
damage awards may include an element for intangible injuries
such as dignitary harm and the loss of associational benefits-
means that establishing standing in a variety of potential plain-
367. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11. The Gladstone opinion also recognized "[o]ther
harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community," including the fact
that school segregation is often "linked closely to housing segregation." Id. at 111 & n.24.
368. In addition to showing sufficient injury, a municipal plaintiff would also have to
show that this injury was caused by the defendant's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations. See
supra text accompanying notes 346-56 for a discussion of the latter issue in the context of
claims by advocacy organizations.
369. Cf. HUD v. Hope, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,160, at 26,284-85 (HUD AUJ
2002) (ruling for realtor of would-be house seller where sale was blocked by neighbors'
race-based discrimination).
370. Cf. Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 465, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1977) (endorsing
claims for lost commissions by realtors who brokered house purchase for minority couple
that was blocked by sellers' racial discrimination); Williams v. Miller, 460 F. Supp. 761
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (endorsing claim for lost commission by realtor who brokered house pur-
chase for minority couple that was blocked by sellers' racial discrimination).
371. See, for example, supra note 370 for a listing of such cases.
372. See supra note 302 and text accompanying notes 330-32.
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tiffs should not be difficult' in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Of course,
standing will be recognized and actual damages will be awarded
only if a plaintiff proves that the defendant's FHA violation
caused the plaintiff a particularized injury, but this is true for all
FHA plaintiffs, including those who are the more "direct" victims
of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations.373
D. Timeliness Issues
1. The FHA's Statutes of Limitations and the Basic Problem
When is a § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim timely? This seemingly simple
question turns out to be quite difficult to answer. What's more, its
answer may well raise the biggest challenge to enforcement of the
FHA's design-and-construction requirements through the possi-
bility that noncompliant housing may ultimately be deemed ac-
ceptable by virtue of the running of the FHA's statutes of limita-
tions. This may be illustrated by considering the following
hypothetical:
On February 1, 2000, Developer D purchases land for a multifamily
housing development and hires Architect A to draw up plans for the
development, which are completed on July 1. By October 1, D has se-
cured the necessary zoning and other land-use approvals from the lo-
cal municipality and has hired Builder B, who obtains a building
permit on November 1, and completes the project on April 1, 2002,
when it receives a certificate of occupancy. Throughout the first half
of 2002, D seeks tenants and rents the final unit on June 30, 2002.
On July 1, 2004, an individual who uses a wheelchair (P) inspects a
unit whose original tenant has decided to move and observes that
the unit/development does not comply with one or more of the re-
quirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C). On August 1, 2004, P files an FHA
claim against A, B, and D.
In determining whether P's claims are timely, the first step is
to identify which of the FHA's multiple statutes of limitations ap-
plies. For privately initiated claims, the two possibilities are the
one-year statute for administrative complaints to HUD under §
3610 and the two-year statute for direct lawsuits under § 3613. 374
373. See supra notes 69, 362 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 343.374. See supra text accompanying note 73 (§ 3610) and note 67 (§ 3613). Section 3610provides that "[an aggrieved person may, not later than one year after an alleged dis-
criminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated, file a complaint with the Secre-
tary [of HUD] alleging such discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i)
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Apart from the different time periods in these provisions, their
basic texts are virtually identical; that is, the limitations period
runs from when "an alleged discriminatory housing practice oc-
curred or terminated" in § 3610 and "after the occurrence or the
termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice" in §
3613. 3 " A "discriminatory housing practice" here means "an act
that is unlawful" under the FHA's substantive provisions.
6
Thus, the statute-of-limitations question for both § 3610 and §
3613 raises the issue of whether a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation
should be seen as having "occurred" or "terminated" at a particu-
lar time or for as long as the building continues to be noncompli-
ant and, if the former, at what particular time.
While the difference between the one- and two-year limitations
periods in § 3610 and § 3613 might be crucial in some cases, it is
not in the hypothetical, for P has filed promptly (within one
month) after first encountering the defendants' building. On the
other hand, if the triggering date for these limitations periods is
when the defendants completed their design-and-construction
work, then P's claims are too late even if brought under § 3613,
because suit was filed over two years after the last act in the de-
velopment process.
Of course, one could adjust the hypothetical's dates to make the
results differ for the individual defendants. For example, if P
were one of the initial prospective tenants and thus sued earlier,
say on August 1, 2002, then his claim would be within § 3613's
two-year period after D completed its work, but beyond this pe-
riod as to A's completion of the architectural work. Indeed, as to
D, there may be an issue as to when its work was completed (e.g.,
when the building's construction was finished; when the certifi-
cate of occupancy was issued; when the first tenant was rented to;
(2000). Section 3613 provides that "[ain aggrieved person may commence a civil action...
not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice." Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A). With respect to HUD-initiated complaints under §
3610, no limitations period is specified in the statute, but HUD has interpreted the law to
require it to file within the same one-year period that applies to private complainants. See
Who May File Complaints, 54 Fed. Reg. 3293 (Jan. 23, 1989) (promulgating former 24
C.F.R. § 103.15). The filing of a timely § 3610 claim tolls § 3613's two-year limitations pe-
riod during the time that the administrative proceeding is pending (i.e., that time is not
included in calculating the two-year period). 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B) (2000); see, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 90 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Tabrizi v. Vill. of Glen Ellyn, 883
F.2d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989).
375. See supra note 374.
376. See supra note 67.
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or when the last of the initial rentals occurred). And perhaps if P
files early enough so that his claim against D is considered
timely, then the claims should also be allowed against A and B,
for their participation in the overall "design and construction"
process could be seen as not being completed until D's last act.
The original hypothetical, however, serves to demonstrate the
key problem for privately initiated § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims: whether
the FHA's limitations periods begin to run when the defendants'
work in the design-and-construction process ends or not until an
individual with a disability is injured as a result of encountering
their noncompliant building. If the answer is the former-a posi-
tion thus far taken by a number of courts377-- then inaccessible
buildings will be able to achieve "repose" two years after their
construction is completed, and future disabled homeseekers will
never be able to bring timely § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims regardless of
how promptly they file their claims. On the other hand, if claims
may be brought so long as a building remains out of compliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-the position taken by HUD and some
courts37 -then no potential defendant will be able to enjoy re-
pose, at least until the required accessibility features are added.
It must also be noted that § 3614, which is the FHA's third en-
forcement technique and which authorizes the Department of
Justice to bring "pattern or practice" and "group denial of rights"
actions,3 17 9 presents an additional set of its own statute-of-
limitations issues. Such § 3614 actions may seek three different
types of relief (equitable orders, monetary damages to persons
aggrieved, and civil penalties),3 ° and each of these types of relief
is governed by a different limitations period.
Section 3614 does not specifically provide for a statute of limi-
tations for "pattern or practice" or "group denial of rights" actions.
In these circumstances, courts have uniformly held-both in §
3604(f)(3)(C) and in other types of FHA cases-that such actions
seeking equitable relief are not subject to any time limit.3"' On
377. See infra notes 418-19.
378. See infra notes 415-16.
379. See supra note 79 and accompanying. text.
380. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (rejecting "laches" de-fense in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case); Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *4 (rejecting
statute-of-limitations defense in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case); United States v. Marsten Apart-
ments, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 257, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1997); United States v. Incorp. Vill. of Island
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the other hand, § 3614 claims for monetary damages for persons
aggrieved are subject to the three-year limitations period pro-
vided in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b)," 2 and those for civil penalties must
be "commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued."3  To make matters even more complicated, the
former contains an explicit discovery rule,3" 4 while the latter does
not and has generally been interpreted in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases
not to be extendable by a discovery rule.85
Applying these various rules to the hypothetical, the § 3614
claim for civil penalties could be brought against D any time up
through at least April 1, 2007 (i.e., five years after construction
was completed and the building received its certificate of occu-
pancy), which would be well beyond the period in which P could
file under § 3613. With respect to the § 3614 claim for monetary
relief for persons aggrieved-which presumably would include P
even if his own § 3613/§ 3610 claims are time-barred3 6 -the De-
partment of Justice could sue up to three years after its key offi-
cial became aware of the facts materials to this claim (e.g., within
three years after P sends his complaint to Justice, if this is how
the responsible Justice official first learns of the defendants' §
Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 364-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.
Supp. 1049, 1094 n.63 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 26:5,
nn.4-8 and accompanying text.
382. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (2000) (providing that "every action for money damages
brought by the United States or an officer or an agency thereof which is founded upon a
tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of ac-
tion first accrues"). Design-and-construction cases applying this statute to monetary
claims in § 3614 actions include Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1144-47, and
Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *3.
383. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000). Design-and-construction cases applying this statute to
civil penalty claims in § 3614 actions include Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at
1143-44, Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *2-3, and United States v. Pac.
Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *8-9 (D. Idaho 2003).
384. See 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (2000) (providing that, for purposes of computing § 2415's
limitations periods, "there shall be excluded all periods during which ... facts material to
the right of action are not known and reasonably could not be known by an official of the
United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances").
385. E.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44 (holding that this limita-
tions period is triggered on the date "the design or construction was completed"); Hall-
mark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *3 (holding that this limitation period is trig-
gered on the date "the design and/or construction is completed"); Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *28 (holding that this limitations period is triggered
on the date "the design and/or construction is completed"). For more on the discovery rule
in privately initiated cases, see infra Part IV.D.2.a and note 443.
386. See, e.g., Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *1-3 (holding timely a §
3614 claim for monetary damages for, inter alia, an individual complainant whose § 3610
claim was held not timely).
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3604(f)(3)(C) violations).387 Expansive as these time periods are
for the Department of Justice's claims for civil penalties and
monetary relief, they will eventually expire, but this is not true
for the § 3614 claim for equitable relief. That claim, not being
subject to any time limit, may be brought indefinitely into the fu-
ture so long as the development does not include the features
mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C). And because equitable relief in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases includes retrofit orders,"' the specter of this
major type of relief will continue for as long as the building re-
mains out of compliance with this provision.
As complicated as this may seem, the situation presented in
the hypothetical is obviously a relatively simple case. Given the
potential for additional defendants and plaintiffs identified above
in Parts IV.B and IV.C, the building involved could produce many
more types of claims (e.g., by a local fair housing organization
against a subsequent owner). In addition, the Department of Jus-
tice or an organizational plaintiff may want to sue early in the
design-and-construction process well before any units are avail-
able for sale or rental, so as to insure that the development is
built in compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) rather than having to be
retrofitted later,389 which raises the issue of how early-rather
than how late-such a claim may accrue.39 °
The remaining parts of this section deal with these problems as
follows: Part IV.D.2 considers the relevant doctrines, court deci-
387. It is not clear whether the triggering date for this time period is when the De-partment of Justice first receives such notice or sometime later (e.g., when Justice officials
have obtained sufficient facts to make them aware that a "pattern or practice" or "group
denial of rights" case under § 3614 is appropriate). See, e.g., Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc.,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *27 (considering Department of Justice's argument that
discovery rule in § 3614 action should not begin until the Attorney General "has actual
notice" of a "pattern or practice" or "group denial of rights" violation); Taigen & Sons, Inc.,303 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34, 1145-47 (holding that § 2416(c)'s discovery rule was not trig-
gered when HUD first received the § 3610 claim, but only when HUD completed its inves-
tigation and referred this case to the Department of Justice).
388. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 347-56.
390. Defendants in reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have yet to object that the claim was
being brought too soon, perhaps because they prefer to learn early whether their planned
developments are going to be seen as violating the FHA. In any event, such an objection
would probably fail, because the FHA defines those persons who are sufficiently aggrieved
to sue as including not only those who "have been injured" by FHA-banned discrimination,
but also those who "believe [they] will be injured" by a violation "that is about to occur."
See supra notes 273 and 353 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f)(2) (2000)); cf. supra note 356(providing citations to ADA cases).
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sions, and HUD guidance concerning how the FHA's statutes of
limitations in privately initiated cases should apply to a case like
the original hypothetical (i.e., one involving a single homeseeker
with a disability as plaintiff); Part D.3 provides a suggested ap-
proach for dealing with this basic, but crucial, issue; and Part D.4
reviews some of the additional issues that might arise in more
complicated types of claims based on noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C).
2. Two Doctrines Justifying Later Claims and the Courts'
Responses
a. The Discovery Rule
Both § 3613's two-year statute of limitations and § 3610's one-
year period specify that the triggering event is the occurrence or
termination of the "alleged discriminatory housing practice."
391
The focus thus seems to be on the defendant's violation of the
FHA, rather than when the plaintiff became aware of this viola-
tion. If a "discovery rule," however, were followed in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, all of P's claims in the original hypothetical
would be timely.392
Courts in a number of privately initiated FHA cases based on
provisions other than § 3604(f)(3)(C) have held that the claims
were timely if brought within the relevant time period after the
plaintiff first discovered the defendant's violation.
393 The theory of
391. For the text of these provisions, see supra note 374.
392. The discovery rule serves to extend the time from which the limitations period
starts to run until "the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury."
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979) (discussing the Federal Tort Claims
Act); see also id. at 120-21 n.7 (quoting SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §
899, cmt. e (1979), to the effect that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases
is often held not to start until the plaintiff has "discovered the fact that he has suffered
injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it"); Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1949) (holding that plaintiffs claim under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act did not accrue until his disease was diagnosed). For more on the
discovery rule, see infra notes 394, 443.
393. See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding in civil rights case that included an FHA claim that "[u]nder fed-
eral law a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the
harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action"); Tolbert v. Ohio
Dep't of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 938-39 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that FHA claim only arises
when plaintiffs "knew or should have known of [defendant's] allegedly discriminatory con-
duct"); Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (noting
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such a discovery rule is that it would be unfair to destroy the
claim of a plaintiff who was not responsible for the delay in filing
it.
3 9 4
Using a discovery rule in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases would mean that
a noncompliant building could never be finally protected by the
FHA's statutes of limitations. If, for example, the hypothetical
plaintiff above did not first visit the development until many
years after it was completed, say April 1, 2010, but then promptly
filed suit on May 1, 2010, a discovery rule would deny defendants
statute-of-limitations protection even though all of their unlawful
activities took place many years before the suit was filed. And if
the discovery rule allows this plaintiffs claim, then it would also
presumably make timely the claims of other future disabled
homeseekers, even if brought decades in the future. 95 Indeed,
given the many different types of potential plaintiffs in such
cases-including fair housing organizations and non-disabled
current residents as well as homeseekers with disabilities 396
-it
will always be possible to find some plaintiff whose discovery of a
defendant's violation is "new."'97
Courts have given a mixed reception to the discovery theory in§ 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. The leading case opposing this theory is
Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc.,39 a decision that dismissed as un-
timely a § 3613 claim filed in 2001 where the defendants com-
pleted construction in 1995 but at least one of the plaintiffs did
in fair housing case that "[a] federal civil rights claim accrues when a plaintiff knows orhas reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the plaintiffs action"); cf. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 n.7, 123-24 (2002) (suggesting, in both the
Court's opinion and Justice O'Connor's partially concurring opinion, that some version of
the discovery rule should apply to discrete-act claims brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
394. See, e.g., Urie, 337 U.S. at 169-70. See generally James R. MacAyeal, The Discov-
ery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitationsfor Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 594-610 (1996) (discuss-
ing the discovery rule's development and rationale).
395. See Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *27-28 (D. Idaho
2003) (noting that adoption of the discovery rule in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case "would mean that
twenty, thirty, fifty, even one-hundred years could pass between the completion of the de-
sign and construction of covered housing and the date a cause of action.., would accrue").
396. See supra Part IV.C.2.
397. See, e.g., Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 509 n.19 (E.D. Va.2002) (noting that, while one plaintiffs claim here would be too late under the discovery
theory, the other plaintiffs claim would be timely because the second plaintiff learned of
defendants' § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations later than first plaintiff).
398. 202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (2002).
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not learn of the § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations until 2000 (i.e., within
the applicable two-year limitations period).399  According to
Moseke, § 3613's statute of limitations should not be extended by
a discovery rule, because it is written to be triggered by "the oc-
currence or the termination" of an illegal practice.4 °° Moseke
viewed this language as focusing on a defendant's actions, in con-
trast to differently worded statutes of limitations that either spe-
cifically provide for a discovery rule or are vague enough to per-
mit such a rule by focusing on when the plaintiffs claim
"'accrues" or "'arises.'"4 0 ' Thus, Moseke rejected a discovery rule
in favor of holding that the limitations period begins to run when
the defendants' final act of construction occurs,4 °2 a decision at
odds with two earlier opinions,4 3 but one that was soon followed
by other trial courts faced with statute-of-limitations challenges
to § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims.404
b. The Continuing Violation Theory
i. Havens and the FHA's Use of the Continuing Violation Theory
A second way that § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims filed years after
a building's completion might be seen as timely is under the "con-
tinuing violation" theory, which is a well-established part of the
FHA. In 1982 in the Havens case,4 °5 the Supreme Court endorsed
this theory for purposes of dealing with the statute of limitations
for private lawsuits under the FHA.4 6 The plaintiffs in Havens
399. Id. at 501, 509.
400. See supra note 374.
401. 202 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
402. Id.
403. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp.
2d 203, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (assuming that the date when plaintiff "became aware" of de-
fendants' § 3604(f(3)(C) violations triggers § 3613's limitations period, but deciding case
on other grounds); Mont. Fair Hous., Inc. v. Am. Cap. Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063
(D. Mont. 1999) (assuming that the date when disabled plaintiffs moved into defendant's
complex-and thus its § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations "were apparent" to them-would be the
earliest that the § 3613 limitations period could be triggered, but deciding case on other
grounds).
404. See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *2 (following Moseke in reject-
ing discovery rule in case originally filed as an administrative complaint under § 3610);
Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at, 1143-44 (rejecting discovery rule in § 3614 claim
for civil penalties).
405. Havens, 455 U.S. 363.
406. Id. at 380-81.
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accused a real estate firm and one of its agents of illegal racial
steering, citing five specific incidents in which black and white
testers were directed to homes in different areas.40 7 Although only
one of these incidents occurred within the applicable limitations
period, the Court held that most of the plaintiffs' claims were
timely, stating that:
a "continuing violation" of the Fair Housing Act should be treated
differently from one discrete act of discrimination. Statutes of limita-
tions such as that contained in [the FHA] are intended to keep stale
claims out of the courts. Where the challenged violation is a continu-
ing one, the staleness concern disappears. [Defendants'] wooden ap-
plication of [the FHA's statute of limitations], which ignores the con-
tinuing nature of the alleged violation, only undermines the broad
remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act .... [Wie therefore
conclude that where a plaintiff, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act,
challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act, but
an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the
complaint is timely when it is filed within 180 days of the last as-
serted occurrence of that practice.
40 8
Applying this principle in Havens, the Supreme Court held
timely the claims of two of the individual plaintiffs who had al-
leged that defendants' "continuing pattern, practice, and policy of
unlawful racial steering has deprived them of the benefits of in-
terracial association arising from living in an integrated
neighborhood." 4 9 These claims were seen by the Court as "based
not solely on isolated incidents involving the two [defendants],
but a continuing violation manifested in a number of incidents-
including at least one" that occurred within the limitation
period. 10 On the other hand, the Court held that another individ-
ual plaintiff in Havens could not take advantage of the continuing
violation theory, because her claim was that "on four isolated oc-
casions"-all of which occurred prior to the limitations period-
the defendants had given her false information in violation of the
407. Id. at 366-68.
408. Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted). At the time of Havens, the FHA provided for a
180-day limitations period. See id. at 380. This limitation period was changed to one year
for administrative complaints and two years for private lawsuits by the 1988 Fair Housing
Amendments Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a)(1)(A), 3613(a)(1)(A) (2000).
409. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381.
410. Id. In addition, Havens held timely the claims of the organizational plaintiff,
whose alleged injury stemmed not from certain dated incidents, but also "from a continu-
ing policy and practice of unlawful racial steering that extends through the last alleged
incident." Id.
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FHA.41 Six years after Havens when Congress passed the FHAA,
it not only lengthened the limitations periods for filing private
lawsuits and administrative complaints,412 it also endorsed the
applicability of the continuing violation theory to these new limi-
tations periods.41 3
Thus, under Havens and the FHAA, the continuing violation
theory may be invoked where the defendant is accused of an ongo-
ing unlawful "policy" or "practice" that extends into the limita-
tions period, but this theory is not appropriate where "isolated oc-
casions" or "one incident" or a "discrete act of discrimination" is
alleged. For purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, then, the question
becomes whether a defendant's FHA violation is a "discrete act of
discrimination" ending with the completion of the design-and-
construction process or an ongoing "unlawful practice" that con-
tinues as long as a building remains inaccessible.
ii. HUD and Judicial Responses to the Continuing Violation
Theory in § 3604(f)(3)(C) Cases
Judicial opinions-thus far, virtually all at the trial court
level-are divided over whether the continuing violation theory
may significantly extend the limitations period in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases. 41 4 For its part, HUD has endorsed an expansive view of this
411. Id.
412. See supra note 408.
413. This was done by identifying the starting time for these statutes of limitations as
either when a discriminatory housing practice "occurred" or when it "terminated." See su-
pra note 374 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) and § 3613(a) (using "occurrence" or "termina-
tion")). According to the FHAA's key congressional report, the use of the term "terminated"
here was "intended to reaffirm the concept of continuing violations, under which the stat-
ute of limitations is measured from the date of the last asserted occurrence of the unlawful
practice." 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 33, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2194.
HUD regulations promulgated shortly after the FHAA's enactment also endorsed the
continuing violation theory. The regulation governing the timeliness of an administrative
complaint under § 3610 originally provided: "Where a complaint alleges a discriminatory
housing practice that is continuing, as manifested in a number of incidents of such con-
duct, the complaint will be timely if filed within one year of the last alleged occurrence of
that practice." See 54 Fed. Reg. 3293 (Jan. 23, 1989) (promulgating 24 C.F.R. § 103.40(c)).
The current version of this regulation provides: "If you indicate that there is more than
one act of discrimination, or that the discrimination is continuing, we must receive your
information within one year of the last incident of discrimination." 24 C.F.R. § 103.35
(2005).
414. See infra notes 416-19 (citing cases). To date, the only appellate decision dealing
with this issue is Alliance for Disabled in Action, Inc. v. Renaissance Enters, Inc., 853 A.2d
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theory in design-and-construction cases, opining that §
3604(f)(3)(C) complaints may be filed "at any time that the build-
ing continues to be in noncompliance, because the discriminatory
housing practice-failure to design and construct the building in
compliance-does not terminate."415 Some courts have agreed.416
The leading case rejecting this view is again Moseke. There,
Judge Lee, noting that the continuing violation theory requires at
least one unlawful act within the limitation period and not
merely the continuing effects of an old violation,417 held that the
last unlawful act in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case-and therefore the time
when § 3613's statute of limitations begins to run-is when con-
struction is completed on the noncompliant building.48 A number
of subsequent decisions have agreed with the Moseke analysis.419
334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see infra note 419 (discussing Renaissance Enters.).
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are currently considering cases that raise this issue. See
Fair Housing Council v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, No. 05-5862 (6th Cir. 2006) (review-
ing 250 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. Ky. 2003)); Thompson v. Gohres Construction Co., No. 06-
15042 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing unreported decision from D. Utah in Thompson v. Rancho
Del Norte Villas, Inc.); Garcia v. Brockway, No. 05-35647 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing unre-
ported decision from D. Idaho).
415. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 22; see also U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Handbook 8024.01: Title VIII Complaint Intake, Investigation,
and Conciliation Handbook, CHG-1, at 3-5 (1995) (providing that a person aggrieved by a
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) violation may file a "continuing violation" complaint with HUD "regardless
of when construction of the building was completed"), available at
http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/cgi/hudclips.cgi (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
416. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp.
2d 203, 205-06, 212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that claim that 438-unit development
violated § 3604(f)(3)(C) in numerous ways so as to be "unavailable to wheelchair users"
describes "an unlawful practice that began on November 17, 1993, and has continued to
the present day" and is therefore timely under the continuing violation theory); Mont. Fair
Hous. Inc. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (D. Mont. 1999) (relying on
the "termination" language of § 3613's statute of limitations to hold that defendants' §
3604(f)(3)(C) violations continue, at least until a "cure'" occurs); cf. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Jupiter Realty Corp., No. 05-CVH-02-1638 (Ohio Common Pleas 2005) (apply-
ing the continuing violation theory to uphold accessibility claims under the Ohio fair hous-
ing law on the ground that the "fact that violations have not been remedied and remain in
place indicates that they are continuing in nature") (copy on file with the author).
417. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 506-07 (E.D.Va. 2002) (citing
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 557-58 (1977)). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 470-77 and
accompanying text.
418. Moseke, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 507-09.
419. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-42; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003
WL 23219807, at *2; Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *9-20; see
also Renaissance Enters., Inc., 853 A.2d at 342-44 (agreeing with Moseke that limitations
period starts on the date construction is completed, but finding that this date was within
limitations period here); infra note 427 (describing cases).
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Moseke and its progeny do not, of course, reject the fact that the
continuing violation theory is available in FHA cases, a fact that
is firmly established by Havens, the 1988 FHAA, and HUD regu-
lations.42 ° Rather, their view is that the "discriminatory housing
practice" in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case is limited to the defendants' de-
sign-and-construction activities, thereby occurring and terminat-
ing at a definitive time.
Some courts taking this view have been willing to extend the
triggering date to a slightly later time based on the particular
facts involved. For example, in Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Vil-
lage of Olde St. Andrews, Inc.,42 the court held timely a complaint
against a condominium development whose construction was
completed before § 3613's two-year time period, but whose last
unit was not sold until within this period, because the court
viewed the defendants' illegal acts as including the sale of their
improperly designed-and-constructed dwellings.4 2 Having thus
determined that "at least one incident of alleged discrimination
occurred during the limitations period," the Olde St. Andrews
court held that, under the continuing violation theory, all of the
defendants' acts pertaining to this development could be chal-
lenged in this suit.423 A limited version of the continuing violation
theory was also employed in Silver State,424 which held timely a
complaint against a developer of two apartment complexes, one of
which had been completed many years earlier, because the court
viewed the completion of that project and the beginning of the
second project, which was still under construction when this suit
was filed, as "seamless in time" and involving "the same or simi-
lar FHA violations."42" Because "the development of multiple
FHA-violating apartment complexes" was seen as a single illegal
practice that "can ensnare discriminatory occurrences that took
place outside of the two-year statute of limitations," the Silver
420. See supra text accompanying notes 405-11 and note 413 and accompanying text.
421. 250 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
422. Id. at 718-19.
423. Id. at 719; accord Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 709-10 (D. Md. 1999) (relying on the continuing violation theory to hold
timely a complaint against a condominium development where the defendants offered to
sell at least one of their newly constructed units within the applicable limitations period).
424. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218.
425. Id. at 1220-22.
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State court held that the suit was timely as against both projects
under the continuing violation theory.426
In both Olde St. Andrews and Silver State, however, the courts
made clear that they did not think the continuing violation theory
could be used in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases to prolong liability indefi-
nitely.427 Thus, while these courts used the continuing violation
theory to extend the limitations period in the particular circum-
stances presented (i.e., where first-time sales occur beyond the
construction-completion date and where similar developments are
constructed in a serial fashion), their views are consistent with
Moseke in that a noncompliant development's time period does
eventually begin to run, thus rendering it safe from suit at some
point.
iii. Further Analysis of the Continuing Violation Theory in §
3604(f)(3)(C) Cases
Though not spelled out in the cases, there are essentially three
arguments in favor of viewing a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation as con-
tinuing indefinitely. The first argument contends that §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims are challenging, in the words of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Havens, "an unlawful practice that
continues into the limitations period" rather than merely an "iso-
lated incident."428 Cases such as Silver State that involve the
same developer producing a series of buildings with the same de-
426. Id. at 1221-22; accord Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Makowsky Constr. Co.,
No. 01-2069 D/Pha, 4-7 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (relying on the continuing violation theory to
hold timely a complaint against three apartment complexes-only one of which was com-
pleted within § 3613's two-year time period-that were constructed by the same developer
using essentially the same design plans and were therefore seen as amounting to a single
"pattern or practice" of illegal discrimination) (unpublished opinion) (copy on file with the
author).
In the Silver State case, the court did dismiss a claim against the subsequent owner of
the first-completed development on the ground that this new owner was "an independent
entity" which took no part in the design and construction of this development and which
had no connection with the second development. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. This part of the
Silver State opinion is discussed supra text accompanying notes 147-49 and 153.
427. The Olde St. Andrews opinion specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
"the statute of limitations never begins it [sic] run so long as the offending buildings re-
main non-compliant." 250 F. Supp. 2d at 719 n.ll. Similarly, the court in Silver State
noted that there had to be some "outer limits of the 'continuing violation' doctrine in FHA
construction claims" and made clear its agreement with Moseke that an "'open-ended pe-
riod of liability' would 'read the statute of limitations right out of existence.'" 362 F. Supp.
2d at 1222.
428. See supra text accompanying note 408-10.
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sign flaws have concluded that such a developer's acts may
amount to an ongoing illegal "practice" justifying use of the con-
tinuing violation theory to capture older as well as recent viola-
tions.429
The argument based on Havens' use of the term "practice" can
be taken farther than this, however.: Even a single building de-
signed and constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be seen
as an unlawful "practice" rather than simply a single "isolated in-
cident." There is some support for this view in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases brought by the Department of Justice under its "pattern or
practice" authority pursuant to § 3614.430 The Department of Jus-
tice regularly alleges that it may proceed against a single build-
ing because the design-and-construction violations there amount
to a "pattern or practice" of FHA violations, and a number of
courts have accepted this argument, some in cases that began
simply as private claims under § 3610.4 11 All of these cases, how-
ever, have involved sizeable developments with numerous design-
and-construction violations, and the courts have generally con-
cluded that, while a "pattern or practice" may exist in such a
situation, the resolution of this issue depends on the particular
facts of the case.432 In other words, the argument that a design-
and-construction violation is an ongoing "practice" for purposes of
the Havens continuing violation theory, while appropriate for
some single-development claims, would not succeed in all §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases.433
429. See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
431. See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *5 (holding, based on the size of
defendants' single apartment complex, the length of time it took to construct, and the
number of alleged violations, that sufficient evidence exists to create a fact issue as to
whether defendants engaged in a § 3614 "pattern or practice" of discrimination); Taigen &
Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1135, 1138 (holding, in case involving single apartment
complex with 86 units in four buildings, that whether defendants engaged in a § 3614
'pattern or practice" of discrimination in constructing this complex is a question of fact not
appropriate for summary judgment resolution); see also Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 2d at, 760 (holding that alleged violations consisting "of numerous features planned
and constructed in over one hundred units at two separate developments ... clearly indi-
cate a regular or repeated violation of the protections afforded by the [FHA]" sufficient to
establish a § 3614 "pattern or practice" of discrimination).
The Hallmark Homes and Taigen & Sons cases began as private claims under § 3610.
See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *1; Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d
at 1133.
432. See supra note 431.
433. It may also be argued that a "pattern or practice" of discrimination for purposes of
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The second argument for viewing design-and-construction vio-
lations as continuing is based on § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s description of
the unlawful activity as "a failure to design and construct" cov-
ered multi-family dwellings in a certain manner.434 The argument
is that while the acts of design and construction may have oc-
curred at specific times in the past, the "failure" that is the es-
sence of a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation is inherently an ongoing con-
cept (i.e., one that continues as long as the improperly designed-
and-constructed dwelling fails to meet the statute's specified re-
quirements). This view finds some support in the fact that the
language used to describe the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) is in the present tense (e.g., that a dwelling's com-
mon areas "are readily accessible"). 435 Thus, the argument goes,
when a decision like Moseke concludes that no "discriminatory
act" has occurred within the limitations period,436 it is applying
too narrow an understanding of the nature of the "act" barred by
§ 3604(f)(3)(C).
The problem with this argument is that the term "failure" does
not always connote an ongoing activity. A common dictionary
definition of this word-the "omission of performance of an action
or task; esp.: neglect of an assigned, expected, or appropriate ac-
tion"43 7 -suggests that a "failure" may indeed be tied to a specific
time period (i.e., when the "omission of performance" takes place).
This might seem particularly so for purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C),
which speaks in terms of "a failure" to properly design and con-
struct, thereby suggesting that the offending behavior is seen as
an isolated event. Furthermore, courts dealing with other civil
rights claims based on a defendant's failure to act have generally
not been receptive to viewing the violation as ongoing, noting that
justifying a Department of Justice action under § 3614 is not the same as a discriminatory
"practice" under Havens for purposes of justifying use of the continuing violation theory.
See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-43 (holding in single-development
case that sufficient violations may exist to justify a § 3614 "pattern or practice" action and
also that the continuing violation theory is inapplicable here). But see Wallace v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 321 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-75 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (applying the continuing viola-
tion theory on the ground that the plaintiffs were essentially alleging a "pattern or prac-
tice" of FHA violations).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000); see supra note 24 (quoting § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
435. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)()(i)-(iii) (using "are" and "contain").
436. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505 & n.15 (E.D. Va. 2000);
see supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text (discussing Moseke).
437. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 815 (unabridged ed. 1986); see
also THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 692 (unabridged ed.
1987) (defining "failure" as "nonperformance of something due, required, or expected").
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the continuing negative effects of an unlawful failure are not suf-
ficient to justify use of the continuing violation theory.43
The third argument for using the continuing violation theory
derives from the fact that the FHA is written so that a failure to
design and construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is de-
clared to be unlawful "discrimination" for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2), the FHA's bans on discriminatory sales and
rentals, and discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, and fa-
cilities.439 The fact that housing built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
is a form of illegal discrimination in sales and rentals under §
(f)(1) may underlie decisions like Olde St. Andrews, which hold
that the limitations period does not begin to run until the last
unit in an illegally designed-and-constructed building is first sold
or rented." °
Seeing a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based suit as a claim under §
(f)(1)-(2) would, however, take the relevant time period even far-
ther than this moment, because the discriminatory sales and
rental practices outlawed by § (f)(1)-(2) are those based on a
handicap of "any buyer or renter." This language suggests, in a
438. E.g., Tolbert v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 939-41 (6th Cir. 1999); see
also Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 957 n.5 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), sub-
sequent decision, 103 Fed. Appx. 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tolbert, 172 F.3d at 942, for
the proposition that "[plassive inaction ... does not support a continuing violation theory"
in holding that this theory does not apply to claims by a black property owner that defen-
dant failed to provide him with city water and sewer services in violation of federal civil
rights laws); Deck v. City of Toledo, 56 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892-95 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (applying
the continuing violation theory to an ADA claim based on the defendant's failure to install
curb ramps in streets and sidewalks worked on over many years only because some of this
work was done within the limitations period). But see Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682,
686 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying the continuing violation theory in a race discrimination claim
based on defendant's closure of a black school and subsequent failure to assign students to
it on the ground that "each year's decision to leave the building shuttered is a new viola-
tion").
Tolbert was a race discrimination case brought under the FHA and other civil rights
laws by residents of a poor black area who alleged that the defendant-officials failed to
provide the same degree of noise protection from a nearby interstate highway to plaintiffs
as they did to a similarly situated white neighborhood. The Sixth Circuit refused to apply
the continuing violation theory, noting that the basic allegation of discriminatory failure
to provide equal public amenities could not justify this theory because "[plassive inaction
... does not support a continuing violation theory." 172 F.3d at 940. The Tolbert opinion
distinguished the Seventh Circuit's decision in Palmer, noting that the defendants there
had regularly revisited their decision to close the school and concluding that the continu-
ing violation theory does not apply to cases challenging discriminatory failures to act ab-
sent such a systematic and repeated revisiting by the defendant of its original action. Id.
at 940-41.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 180-85.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 421-23.
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condominium situation such as Olde St. Andrews, that the pro-
hibited discrimination is not merely the initial sale of units, but
also subsequent offers of sale to any disabled prospect. And even
if the "any buyer or renter" phrase in § (f)(1) might be considered
ambiguous enough to justify limiting that provision to initial pur-
chasers and tenants, this cannot also be true for § (f)(2), which
specifically bans discrimination "against any person" in, inter
alia, the "privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling" and in the "fa-
cilities in connection with such dwelling."" 1 Given that a failure
to design and construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is a
type of discrimination banned by § (f)(2), and that § (f)(2) bans
discrimination in the "privileges" and "facilities" of rental, it is
certainly arguable that a nonconforming building amounts to an
ongoing discriminatory denial of "privileges" or "facilities" to dis-
abled tenants and homeseekers regardless of how many years
have passed since the building was completed." 2
This argument has some traction, as will be further explained
in the next section. For now, it need only be noted that the suc-
cess of this argument on behalf of P in the original hypothetical-
as well as all other disabled homeseekers regardless of their date
of contact with the defendant's building-does not require either
the discovery rule or the continuing violation theory. The discov-
ery rule is not needed because for a disabled homeseeker assert-
ing a "new" § (f)(1)-(2) claim, the date of his injury and resulting
cause of action is the same as the date he became aware of this
injury (i.e., when he first encountered the defendant's inaccessi-
ble housing)." 3 The continuing violation theory, which focuses on
the defendant's behavior rather than the plaintiffs discovery to
441. See supra notes 22 and 183 and accompanying text.
442. See also supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
443. See supra note 392. Thus, the only potential applicability of the discovery rulehere might be the disabled homeseeker's argument that the time period should not begin
to run until he first learns that the inaccessible features of the defendant's building violate
the FHA, which might be after his first encounter with the building. This argument islikely to fail, however, because the discovery rule serves only to extend the limitations pe-
riod to the time when "the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury"
and not also to a later time when he learns "that the acts inflicting the injury may consti-
tute" unlawful behavior. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979). According to
Kubrick, the equitable factors favoring a plaintiff who is ignorant "of the fact of his injury
or its cause" do not extend to "ignorance of his legal rights," because if a plaintiff is "in
possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury," he
is "no longer at the mercy of the [defendant]. There are others who can tell him if he has
been wronged, and he need only ask." Id. at 122.
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trigger the limitations period,4" is not needed because the dis-
criminatory housing practice alleged is the defendant's current
isolated violation of the plaintiffs § (f)(1)-(2) rights, not a continu-
ous series of violations that date back to the time of the building's
original construction.
3. A Suggested Approach to Statute-of-Limitations Problems
a. Seeing the Basic Claim as a "New" (f)(1)-(2) Violation
As noted above, the FHA declares that a failure to design and
construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is "discrimination" for
purposes of § 3604(f)(1) and § (f)(2)." 5 Thus, a building con-
structed without the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) does
not by its mere existence violate the FHA; a statutory violation
occurs only when the discrimination embodied in the building vio-
lates someone's rights under § (f)(1)-(2). This means that, while
such a building may be a potential source of § (f)(1)-(2) claims, a
particular homeseeker with a disability such as P in the hypo-
thetical has no FHA claim until his § (f)(1)-(2) rights are violated
by, for example, visiting the building and encountering its inac-
cessible features. As with all FHA violations, a § (f)(1)-(2) claim
brought by such a homeseeker requires a showing that this par-
ticular plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's FHA-
prohibited behavior. 46
Also as noted above, the Supreme Court requires that the FHA
be governed by ordinary tort principles absent explicit instruction
to the contrary in the statute." Traditionally in tort claims, the
limitations period begins to run "when the plaintiffs claim ac-
crued."" Thus, for example, a negligence claim does not accrue
and therefore the statutory clock does not start to run "until (a)
444. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 160, § 220, at 561.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 180-85.
446. This causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's behavior
is a basic requirement both for a substantive cause of action under the FHA and for the
plaintiff to have Article III standing to bring an FHA claim. See supra notes 69, 317 and
accompanying text.
447. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
448. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 217, at 553.
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the defendant ha[s] committed a negligent act and (b) it ha[s]
caused legally cognizable harm.""9
Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court has made
clear that a limitations period "ordinarily does not begin to run
until the plaintiff has a 'complete and present cause of action.' 450
Furthermore, "[u]nless Congress has told us otherwise in the leg-
islation at issue, a cause of action does not become 'complete and
present' for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit
and obtain relief."451' Thus, as Judge Easterbrook has observed in
rejecting a statute-of-limitations defense in another civil rights
context: "A wrongful act does not mark the accrual of a claim... ;
the time begins with the injury rather than with the act that
leads to the injury."" 2
Applying this insight to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, a disabled home-
seeker's cause of action does not become complete until he per-
sonally encounters the defendant's inaccessible building. This en-
counter creates the claim-triggering injury, which may take the
form of the homeseeker being denied access to a particular unit or
having his intent to rent blocked "for the very reason that archi-
449. Id.; see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979) (noting that the
"general rule under the [Federal Tort Claims] Act has been that a tort claim accrues at the
time of the plaintiffs injury").
450. Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,522 U.S. 192, 195 (1997) (quoting Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)).
451. Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201; see also Graham County Soil & Water Con-
servation Dist. v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2450 (2005) ("We have repeatedly recog-
nized that Congress legislates against the 'standard rule that the limitations period com-
mences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.'") (quoting Bay Area
Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201 ("'While it is theoreticallypossible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the purpose of
calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the pur-pose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indi-
cation in the statute.") (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993)). The GrahamCounty opinion also quoted with approval Justice Scalia's concurrence in TRW Inc. v. An-drews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001), to the effect that "[aibsent other indication, a statute oflimitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff" may apply to the court for relief. 125 S.
Ct. at 2451.
452. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling on a § 1983 case).In Palmer, Judge Easterbrook distinguished two cases-Delaware State College v. Ricks
and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans-that did not find ongoing violations. Id. at 685-86(noting that the premise of those cases was "that the employer took one dispositive act.Like punching someone in the nose, this act may lead to injury in the future, but when
there is only one wrongful act the claim accrues with the first injury."). See infra notes470-77 and accompanying text (discussing Ricks and Evans). Based on this analogy, adisabled homeseeker complaining about an apartment building's noncompliance with §3604(f)(3)(C) has not been "punched in the nose" until he first encounters this building.
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tectural barriers prevent [him] from viewing the whole property
in the first instance."453
If a disabled homeseeker's § (f)(1)-(2) rights are not violated un-
til his first encounter with the defendant's building, then a com-
plaint filed promptly thereafter is timely, regardless of how old
the building is. Furthermore, as noted above, the continuing vio-
lation theory is not needed to uphold such a claim.454 Of course,
from the point of view of a defendant who constructed this build-
ing years ago, allowing such an individual to sue now may feel
like being subjected to a continuing violation charge. But this is
inherent in the way Congress wrote § 3604(f)(3)(C): a violation of
this provision is "discrimination" but is only actionable discrimi-
nation if and when it violates the rights of an aggrieved person
under § (f)(1)-(2).455
The situation is somewhat analogous to Bazemore v. Friday,
456
a Title VII case that challenged the use of different salary sched-
ules which paid black employees less than whites. The pay
schedules dated back to before the time Title VII applied to the
Bazemore defendants, and they argued that their behavior was
excused by the fact that they had not engaged in any new dis-
crimination. The Court disagreed, concluding that "[e]ach week's
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated
white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact
that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title
VII."457 Like a building constructed without the § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
mandated features, the salary structure in Bazemore was dis-
criminatory, but only actionable when applied to specific employ-
ees. The Court in Bazemore distinguished this situation from the
one in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,5 8 where only the conse-
quences of an old violation were now occurring, noting that the
employer in Evans was simply not engaged in a discriminatory
453. See supra text accompanying note 301 (quoting Smith v. Pac. Prop. & Dev. Corp.,
358 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004)).
454. See supra text accompanying note 444.
455. Cf. Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 204 (rejecting an argument based on the con-
cern that choosing a particular triggering date for the statute of limitations here would
improperly plac[e] the running of the limitations period in the control of the plaintiff" on
the ground that "that is an unavoidable consequence of the scheme Congress adopted").
456. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
457. Id. at 395-96.
458. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Evans is also discussed supra note 452 and infra note 473.
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practice that currently violated Title VII.459 On the other hand,
the focus in Bazemore was properly "on the present salary struc-
ture, which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the pre-1965
discriminatory pay structure."46 ° Just as a new black employee in
Bazemore would have a current Title VII claim even though his
inferior wages were based on a previously adopted pay structure,
so too would a new homeseeker with a disability have a current §(f)(1)-(2) claim even though the housing discrimination he is sub-jected to is based on a previously constructed dwelling.
A number of policy reasons support the idea of allowing a cur-
rent disabled homeseeker to bring a prompt § (f)(1)-(2) claim even
though the building involved was constructed some years before.
First, focusing on the rights to nondiscriminatory sales and rent-
als guaranteed by § (f)(1)-(2) provides a reminder that the whole
point of § 3604(f)(3)(C) is to help insure equal access to housing
opportunities for people with disabilities. As Congress noted in
enacting § 3604(f)(3)(C), its required features are "essential for
equal access" by mobility-impaired people and their absence can
"just as effectively exclude[ such people] from the opportunity to
live in a particular dwelling ... as by a posted sign saying 'No
Handicapped People Allowed.' 46'
Second, to bar a disabled homeseeker who files promptly after
first encountering the defendant's building because of the build-
ing's age would, by making it impossible for such a person ever to
assert a claim involving this building, be inconsistent with the
key goal of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-to make all post-1991 multi-family
dwellings accessible-and the FHA's reliance on private com-
plainants to enforce the statute. 62 Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with federal statutes' limitations periods invariably interpret
these provisions in light of the legislative intent underlying the
substantive statute involved.46 3
Third, equitable considerations favor a disabled homeseeker
who files suit promptly after first visiting an inaccessible build-
459. 478 U.S. at 396 n.6.
460. Id. at 397 n.6.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17, 27-29 and 352 (quoting Trafficante,
409 U.S. at 209, 211).
463. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 408 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 380(1982)); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-20, 125 (1979).
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ing, regardless of that building's age.464 Certainly, one major rea-
son given for barring tardy claims-that the plaintiff has not
been diligent in asserting his rights465-does not exist here. In
addition, two major justifications for statute-of-limitations dis-
missals-courts' preference for dealing with evidence whose qual-
ity has not been unduly diminished by the passage of time and
potential defendants' entitlement to eventual repose 6-are weak
or nonexistent here. The preference for fresh evidence is rarely a
concern in § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases for, as one court has noted,
because this provision "requires no showing of intent, defendant's
architectural plans and apartment complexes can themselves
speak to the alleged construction violations."467 And potential §
3604(f)(3)(C) defendants can never achieve full repose from FHA
liability, because a § 3614 action by the Department of Justice for
retrofits and other equitable relief may always be brought against
them.
468
A final point needs to be made about Moseke and other deci-
sions that have held untimely a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim be-
cause they saw the plaintiff as merely complaining about the cur-
rent "effects" of the defendant's "prior discriminatory acts."
469
These decisions ignore the fact that the only unlawful act involv-
ing this particular disabled individual-the discriminatory denial
of housing access and privileges to him in violation of § (f)(1)-(2)-
464. Cf. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980) (noting in Title VII cases
that "limitations periods ... guarantee[ ] the protection of the civil rights laws to those
who promptly assert their rights"). The Ricks case is further discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 470-77.
465. See, e.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123 (noting that the purpose of the FELA's statute
of limitation "is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims against the
Government"). See generally DOBBS, supra note 160, § 216, at 551 (noting that one of the
reasons for a limitations system is that plaintiffs who delay in bringing suit may be con-
sidered to have "waived" their claims).
466. See, e.g., Del. State Coll., 449 U.S. at 256-57 (noting in Title VII case that "limita-
tions periods .. protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from em-
ployment decisions that are long past"); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (noting that statutes of
limitations "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise").
See generally DOBBS, supra note 160, § 216, at 551-52 (identifying as two of the major jus-
tifications for a limitations system that "[elvidence will deteriorate" and "[the defendant.
is entitled at some point in time to peace of mind").
467. Silver State Fair Hous. Council v. ERGS, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1222 n.1 (D.
Nev. 2005).
468. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
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is happening now. This situation is fundamentally different from
those in which the Supreme Court has ruled against the continu-
ing violation theory because only discriminatory "effects" occurred
within the limitations period.
The principal Supreme Court decision on this point is Delaware
State College v. Ricks,47° a Title VII case in which a college profes-
sor claimed that he was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons.
After the college's Board of Trustees denied Ricks tenure, he was
given a standard one-year "termination" contract before being
discharged, and he also pursued internal grievance procedures.
The question for the Supreme Court was whether Title VII's limi-
tations period began to run when the Trustees denied Ricks ten-
ure or at a later date, either when this decision was affirmed at
the end of the grievance proceedings or when Ricks was ulti-
mately discharged. The Court held that the earlier date con-
trolled, because only the tenure-denial decision was claimed to be
based on discrimination.4 7' Ricks's loss in the internal grievance
procedure and his ultimate dismissal were not alleged to have
been prompted by discrimination and thus were seen by the
Court as merely the "effects" of the denial of tenure.472 "'[Tihe
proper focus,"' according to Ricks, "'is upon the time of the dis-
criminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of
the acts became most painful."'473
The Ricks opinion made two other points that are important for
purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims. First, having based its decision
on the fact that Ricks was complaining only about his tenure de-
470. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
471. Id. at 257-58.
472. Id. at 258.
473. Id. (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979) (empha-
sis added by the Supreme Court)). Another case relied on in Ricks was United Air Lines,Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), where the Court rejected the continuing violation the-
ory in a Title VII case brought by a female plaintiff who alleged that, having been dis-
charged by the defendant some years earlier based on a discriminatory policy, her later
rehire without retroactive seniority should be seen as a continuing violation. The Evans
opinion recognized that the defendant's "seniority system does indeed have a continuing
impact on [plaintiffs] pay and fringe benefits," id. at 558, but concluded that:
the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is
whether any present violation exists. [Plaintiff) has not alleged that the sys-
tem discriminates against former female employees or that it treats former
employees who were discharged for a discriminatory reason any differently
from former employees who resigned or were discharged for a non-
discriminatory reason. In short, the system is neutral in its operation.
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nial, the Court noted that employment termination cases can
"present widely varying circumstances" and that therefore "appli-
cation of the general principles discussed herein necessarily must
be made on a case-by-case basis."474 Thus, even in Title VII cases
involving faculty terminations, the determination of the trigger-
ing date for statute-of-limitations purposes depends on when the
defendant's discrimination against a particular plaintiff occurred.
In a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based case brought by a homeseeker with a
disability, this will presumably be when he first encounters the
inaccessible features of the defendant's building and is thus de-
nied equal opportunity there in violation of § (f)(1)-(2).
The Ricks opinion also made a point to recognize that "limita-
tions periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes
difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights
statutes."475 The Court held, however, that Ricks could not benefit
from this concern, since he was "abundantly forewarned" in this
case (e.g., because the Trustees' tenure-denial decision was sim-
ply the customary response to the faculty's earlier "no tenure"
recommendations and was therefore "entirely predictable").476
Ricks's situation is in stark contrast to that of a disabled home-
seeker, who is likely to have had no prior contact with the defen-
dant's building and whose encounter with its illegal features may
well be his only interaction with the defendant. Indeed, as noted
above, an individual homeseeker with a disability simply has no
FHA claim until he encounters a dwelling that fails to comply
with § 3604(f)(3)(C). 477
b. Variations on the Basic Theory
The previous section argued that a disabled homeseeker's §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim does not occur until that individual per-
sonally encounters, and is thereby injured by, a building's inac-
cessible features. If, indeed, the proper triggering date for the
FHA's statutes of limitations in privately initiated cases is when
a plaintiff first sustains injury, then it is clear that a disabled
homeseeker's complaint brought within the applicable limitations
474. 449 U.S. at 258 n.9.
475. Id. at 262 n.16.
476. Id.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 445-53.
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period after his first encounter with the defendant's building
would be timely, regardless of the building's age.
As noted above in Part IV.C, a number of other types of plain-
tiffs may have claims as a result of a building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C), and resolution of the statute-of-limitations
problem for these claims may be more difficult, even if the date-
of-first-injury theory is conceded to govern. This section deals
with these more complicated cases in two categories: (i) claims
that may later be made by disabled tenants and those individuals
associated with them; and (ii) claims by other types of plaintiffs.
i. Additional Claims by Disabled Tenants and Persons
Associated with Them
Assume that a homeseeker with a disability who visits a hous-
ing development that does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) decides
not to sue, but rather moves into the building despite its inacces-
sible features. After living there for a time that is longer than the
applicable limitations period, he then decides that these features
are unacceptable and files a claim under the FHA's ban on dis-
criminatory "terms and conditions" in § 3604(f)(2).
While § (f)(2) does provide a cause of action for current resi-
dents,478 the reported cases have rarely discussed the timeliness
of such claims, perhaps because they have generally been brought
promptly in response to the defendant's challenged behavior.47 9
Thus, there is little guidance on when a § (f)(2) claim by a current
tenant accrues.
Unlike the situation where a homeseeker with a disability files
promptly after first encountering an inaccessible building, a cur-
rent tenant's delayed § (f)(2) claim does not seem to be complain-
ing about any "new" discrimination experienced by him. Rather,
the complaint is about the painful consequences of a violation of
his § (f)(2) rights; in other words, the very situation where plain-
tiffs are not permitted to invoke the continuing violation the-
478. See, e.g., Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 363-65 (8th Cir. 2003). See
generally SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 14:3.
479. Cf. Neudecker, 351 F.3d at 363 (holding timely tenant's (f)(2) claim of disability
harassment based on the continuing violation theory, where the harassment allegedly oc-
curred throughout the latter years of plaintiffs tenancy up to within the FHA's limitations
period).
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ory.4" ° One reason that mere consequences of a violation are in-
sufficient to extend a limitations period is that they could go on
indefinitely, thereby essentially negating a statute of limitations.
Allowing a current tenant to file a § (f)(2) claim whenever he de-
cides that the building's discriminatory features have become in-
tolerable seems to be a classic example of this problem. Nor would
the discovery rule help such a tenant, for he was in a position to
and probably did know all of the facts relevant to his potential
claim early in his tenancy.4"' Furthermore, because this individ-
ual has been on notice of his building's inaccessible features for
some time, the equitable considerations, which helped lead to the
conclusion than a homeseeker with a disability should be allowed
to sue promptly after first encountering a building's inaccessible
features,482 are absent here. Finally, even if a disabled tenant in
these circumstance might succeed in arguing that his claim is not
barred by the statute of limitations, a defense based on the re-
lated doctrine of laches might block this claim.4"3
Assuming that a disabled tenant's § (f)(1)-(2) claim is time
barred in this situation, the same might not be true for an indi-
vidual who is associated with him. The rights protected by both §
(f)(1) and § (f)(2) extend not only to buyers and renters with dis-
abilities, but also to those buyers and renters who either reside or
are associated with a disabled person.4" Presumably, this means
that such an associated person would be injured at the same time
as his disabled companion, with the result that such a person's §
480. See supra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 392-94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 443.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 464-65, 475-77.
483. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002), where
the Court, in dealing with statute-of-limitations issues under Title VII, noted that courts
have discretionary power to reach "a just result" to protect employers "when a plaintiff un-
reasonably delays filing a charge" and that, in addition to other equitable defenses, "an
employer may raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from maintaining a suit if he
unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result harms the defendant." According to
Morgan, a laches defense "'requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom
the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.'" Id. at 121-22
(quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)).
A potential problem with the laches defense in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is that establishing
the second element might be difficult. This element is usually shown by proof that the
plaintiffs delay has caused the defendant to lose valuable evidence, see, for example,
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282-83 (1961), but, as noted above, the key evi-
dence in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases usually remains available for an indefinite period of time.
See supra text accompanying note 467.
484. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (2000).
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(f)(1)-(2) claim would occur at the initial encounter with an inac-
cessible building and similarly would be time barred to the same
extent as the disabled tenant's in the previous paragraph. But
what if the person residing or associated with a disabled resident
leaves and is replaced by another individual? This new renter-
associate would not only seem to have a § (f)(2) claim, but his
claim would be "new" (i.e., his first injury and thus the occurrence
of his claim would not take place until he started to reside or as-
sociate with the disabled person). Thus, absent proof that this
new arrangement was created simply to manufacture the neces-
sary recent injury-claim-which might result in its dismissal
based on some equitable doctrine4 8 -the theory of first-injury ar-
gued for in the previous section would make this § (f)(2) claim
timely, so long as it is brought within the limitations period after
the new companion begins his association with the disabled per-
son.
Finally, what if a non-disabled tenant moves into an inaccessi-
ble building, lives there for a number of years, and then becomes
mobility-impaired due to a car accident or other cause? He then
brings an FHA claim, either under § (f)(1) because the inaccessi-
ble features make the dwelling "unavailable" to him (i.e., he has
to move) or under § (f)(2) because a "terms-and-conditions" viola-
tion affects his current residency. Even assuming that he knew or
reasonably should have known of the building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C) when he first moved in, the issue is whether
this knowledge triggered his § (f)(1)-(2) claim. Such knowledge
may have allowed the tenant during his period of non-disability
to assert a lack-of-association claim-an issue dealt with further
in the next section-but not a § (f)(l)-(2) claim as a disabled
renter. For the latter claim, the plaintiffs disability is a necessary
pre-requisite,8 6 which means that this claim could not accrue un-
til the tenant's disability occurs. Only upon becoming disabled,
and thereby suffering an injury to his § (f)(1)-(2) rights, is this
tenant in the same position as the homeseeker with a disability,
whose claim does not occur until he encounters a noncompliant
485. See supra note 483.
486. See, e.g., Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 F. App'x 603, 605-06 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the plaintiffs disability is a necessary element of his § 3604(f)(1) claim based
on the defendant's failure to reasonably accommodate under § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Prindable v.
Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254-55 (D. Haw.
2003) (reaching same conclusion for a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(2) claim).
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building. Based on the nature of his injury and the equities of this
situation, the newly disabled tenant should have as long to file
his claim as a disabled homeseeker does after his first encounter
with an inaccessible building.
ii. Claims by Other Types of Plaintiffs
As shown in Part IV.C.2, a building that lacks the features
mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be the target of claims not only
by disabled homeseekers and their associates, but also other
plaintiffs, such as testers, local residents, and fair housing or-
ganizations. The timeliness of claims by these other types of
plaintiffs is considered here.
With respect to testers, it was argued in Part IV.C.2.a that, de-
spite a recent Ninth Circuit decision to the contrary, they should
not have standing to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims. 7 That
argument was based on the view that testers lack substantive
rights under § (f)(1)-(2). Here, it is noted that an additional rea-
son for questioning testers' claims is that they could raise serious
equitable issues with respect to timeliness.
If, as argued in Part IV.D.3.a, a disabled homeseeker's §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim does not begin for statute-of-limitations
purposes until he first encounters an inaccessible building, then
presumably the same would be true for a disabled tester with
such a claim. Assuming for present purposes that testers do have
standing based on injury to their § (f)(1)-(2) rights caused by en-
countering such a building, they could presumably generate an
endless series of such injuries by repeated visits to the building.
These injuries would not just be the consequences of the violation
that occurred during the first visit. If a single encounter violates
a tester's substantive rights under § (f)(1)-(2), then a second en-
counter would be an independent violation of these rights creat-
ing a "new" cause of action, as would a third, a fourth, and so on,
indefinitely. Eventually, the limitations periods would run on the
claims based on the earlier encounters, 48 but the tester could al-
ways start a new clock by returning to the building.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 295-327.
488. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 381 (holding that a tester's claims were based only on
those "isolated occasions" when the defendants gave her false information and therefore
could not "take advantage of the 'continuing violation' theory").
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The problem may not seem inherently different from that of an
actual homeseeker who makes repeated visits to an inaccessible
building, but it is. An actual homeseeker may make additional
visits to further evaluate the building as a potential place to live,
although further visits for other purposes, such as evidence-
gathering for potential FHA claims, would not be in the role of an
actual homeseeker. Thus, subsequent homeseeking visits would
simply involve being subjected to the on-going consequences of
the discrimination suffered in the original visit, which would not
extend the limitations period for this claimant.
In any event, there can be no doubt that an actual homeseeker
has § (f)(1)-(2) rights and therefore standing to sue. Tester stand-
ing is problematic, however, and the specter of difficult statute-of-
limitations problems in testers' claims provides an additional rea-
son to avoid recognizing their standing in the first place.
The problem is different when considering the timeliness of
claims by non-disabled residents, fair housing organizations, and
other "indirect" victims of FHA violations caused by an inaccessi-
ble building. Recall that for these types of plaintiffs, while an in-
jury sufficient to satisfy Article III is required, it need not be an
injury based on violation of their own substantive FHA rights;
their standing is established if they are "genuinely injured by
conduct that violates someone's [N 3604] rights."48 9 In §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, the rights being violated are those under §
(f)(1)-(2), which belong to disabled buyers and renters and those
associated with them. A violation of such rights may cause suffi-
cient injury in another to create standing, but the question for
statute-of-limitations purposes is when the clock begins to run on
this other plaintiffs claim.
For non-disabled residents who make a Trafficante-type lack-
of-association claim because of their building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C), 490 this would probably be when they first
moved in or otherwise became aware of the building's inaccessi-
bility. The nature of this claim is that the plaintiffs are being de-
prived of the ability to associate with disabled persons in an inte-
489. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
490. See supra text accompanying notes 357-66.
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grated setting generally, not with a specific disabled person who
may have applied on a particular date, as Havens recognized.491
In Havens, where the defendants' alleged violation was racial
steering, the Court held that the plaintiffs making an associa-
tional claim could invoke the continuing violation theory, because
at least one of the incidents manifesting the defendants' steering
occurred within the limitations period.492 This part of Havens,
however, does not translate easily to § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims,
where a defendant's discrimination is not manifested in specific
incidents, but in its building's lack of accessibility features. The
building's very status is what is depriving current residents of the
opportunity to associate with people with disabilities. That in-
jury-to the extent it can be shown to be caused by noncompli-
ance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-presumably began for each individual
resident when he moved into the building. The harm may con-
tinue throughout an individual's tenancy, but this will probably
be seen as merely the consequences of the building's noncompli-
ance, thus barring a resident from invoking the continuing viola-
tion theory. Havens, however, does leave open the possibility that
a recent incident of a disabled homeseeker being deterred from
moving into the building because of its inaccessibility could allow
a current resident to use this theory.4 93 In any event, each new
resident will have his own individual lack-of-association claim, so
barring the claims of older tenants on statute-of-limitations
grounds will not protect a building from generating these types of
claims in the future.
As with the residents' claims, the Court in Havens recognized
that the injury of the organizational plaintiff was "not only from
the incidents involving [specific individuals who dealt with the
defendants], but also from a continuing policy and practice of
unlawful racial steering that extends through the last alleged in-
cident."494 Because this last incident occurred within the limita-
491. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 381 (holding that plaintiffs' associational claims "are
based not solely on isolated incidents" of the defendants' discrimination against individual
applicants, but rather on the defendants' "continuing violation manifested in a number of
incidents").
492. Id.
493. In addition, to the extent that a current resident has a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim
for his inability to entertain a specific mobility-impaired guest, see supra notes 277 and
365, this claim would presumably not occur until that particular guest was deterred from
visiting by the building's inaccessible features.
494. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381.
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tions period, Havens held that the organization's claim was
timely based on the continuing violation theory.495 Again, how-
ever, § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims by advocacy organizations raise
some special timeliness problems.
To sue on its own behalf under Havens, an organization must
divert some resources or have its mission frustrated by the defen-
dant's discrimination.496 Since an organization will not have
standing to sue unless it suffers such an injury, it has no claim
until this occurs. In the typical situation, a fair housing organiza-
tion learns of a building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) ei-
ther through a complaint by a homeseeker with a disability or the
organization's own testing program, after which it diverts some
resources to deal with this problem. 497 The resources whose diver-
sion is the key to an organization's standing obviously will not be
spent until after the organization becomes aware of a building's
noncompliance. Thus, the trigger for the limitations period appli-
cable to this claim will occur some time after this initial aware-
ness date.
What's more, new complaints against this building and there-
fore the need to devote additional resources may always occur,
potentially creating fresh claims for the organization and thus ex-
tending its time to sue.498 This situation, like that of the testers
discussed earlier, has some potential for self-generated injuries
designed simply to create "new" claims. Unlike testers, however,
organizations clearly have standing in a proper § 3604(f)(3)(C)
case. Of course, the possibility of a laches or other equitable de-
fense to an organization's complaint filed well after it first
learned of a building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) always
exists.499
495. Id.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 336-37.
497. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 250 F. Supp.
2d 706, 709-10 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495,
499-500 (E.D. Va. 2002); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207-08, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
498. In Havens, the Court recognized that the injury of the fair housing organization
there was "based not solely on isolated incidents involving [specific individuals who dealt
with defendants]," but also from a "continuing pattern, practice, and policy of unlawful
racial steering" that extends through the last alleged incidents, which occurred within the
limitations period. See 455 U.S. at 381.
499. See supra note 483.
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V. CONCLUSION
In order to help guarantee persons with disabilities equal ac-
cess to housing, Congress in the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments
Act provided in § 3604(f)(3)(C) that virtually all new multi-family
housing be designed and constructed with certain accessibility
features. Scores of states and localities quickly followed suit by
amending their fair housing laws to include the same require-
ment. Despite these provisions, a large portion of the millions of
multi-family units built since § 3604(f)(3)(C) became effective do
not include the mandated features.
A "failure to design and construct" under § 3604(f)(3)(C) is not
excused by ignorance of the law, lack of discriminatory intent, or
any other defense, except for a very narrow one involving unsuit-
able terrain. Thus, every noncompliant dwelling is not only a
lawsuit waiting to happen, but is also a lawsuit that generally
cannot be defended on the merits.
This leaves three questions: (1) who are proper defendants in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases; (2) who are proper plaintiffs; and (3) when are
§ 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims timely. These questions are not
merely "procedural." They go to the very heart of what is at stake
in § 3604(f)(3)(C); that is, defining the rights Congress intended
to create in this law and determining whether these rights can be
effectively enforced.
The FHA does not specify who may be sued for § 3604(f)(3)(C)-
based violations. The most obvious defendants are developers, ar-
chitects, and builders, whose activities are specifically targeted by
the "failure to design and construct" language in § 3604(f)(3)(C).
The Supreme Court's determination to interpret the FHA accord-
ing to traditional tort principles, however, suggests other proper
targets, including engineers, subcontractors, and anyone else who
is a substantial participant in the design-and-construction proc-
ess.
Perhaps the most important issue involving potential defen-
dants is how the sale of a noncompliant dwelling will affect the
potential liability of the original builder and the new owner. The
original builder's liability probably continues, based on the anal-
ogy to modern products liability law. The new owner, despite not
having participated in the faulty design-and-construction process,
may also be liable. This is because the FHA makes noncompliance
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with § 3604(f)(3)(C) discrimination for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2). These provisions ban disability discrimination in
sales, rentals, and the provision of a dwelling's privileges and fa-
cilities, and are obviously directed toward housing providers. Fur-
thermore, holding a current landlord liable for its building's fail-
ure to provide the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) would be
consistent with the view of modern torts law that landlords are
often responsible for dangerous conditions on their property.
The issue of who is a proper plaintiff under the FHA received a
great deal of attention prior to enactment of the 1988 FHAA. Re-
flecting the broad standing recognized by pre-1988 Supreme
Court decisions and confirmed by Congress in the FHAA, pri-
vately initiated cases involving § 3604(f)(3)(C) have been brought
not only by homeseekers with disabilities, but also by testers and
fair housing organizations. This article argues that the Supreme
Court's recognition of tester standing in Havens should not be ex-
tended to tester standing in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, although dis-
abled actual homeseekers should be able to sue, at least for in-
tangible damages, without having to establish their financial
ability to live in the defendant's housing. Havens' recognition that
fair housing organizations can sue on their own behalf for FHA
violations does translate to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, at least if their
injuries are caused by such a violation. Furthermore, a variety of
other types of plaintiffs, including non-disabled residents of the
defendant's housing, should be able to challenge a building's inac-
cessibility.
Determining the timeliness of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims has
already caused much difficulty among the lower courts. For pri-
vately initiated claims, the FHA provides a one-year limitations
period for administrative complaints and a two-year period for di-
rect lawsuits. No time limit applies to Department of Justice ac-
tions under § 3614 for injunctive relief, but two different limita-
tions periods govern such actions for civil penalties and monetary
damages. The key issue in privately initiated claims is whether
the time period begins to run when the faulty design-and-
construction process is completed. Two doctrines that might ex-
tend the limitations period-the discovery rule and the continu-
ing violation theory-have thus far been given a cool reception by
the courts.
This article argues that, as in analyzing the proper-defendant
issue, the timeliness issue must recognize that the FHA makes
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noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) a violation of § 3604(f)(1) and
§ 3604(f)(2), and that, consistent with Supreme Court treatment
of other federal statutory claims, the statute-of-limitations trigger
for § (f)(1)-(2) claims does not occur until a particular plaintiff has
a complete and present cause of action. This means that the limi-
tations period would not begin to run for a homeseeker with a dis-
ability until he first encounters the defendant's building, no mat-
ter how long ago this building was constructed. Such a claim
would be timely if brought within the limitations period after this
first encounter, even without the benefit of the discovery rule or
the continuing violation theory.
For the tens of thousands of developments built in violation of §
3604(f)(3)(C), full repose can never occur, because Department of
Justice claims seeking retrofits and other injunctive relief are al-
ways possible. Furthermore, litigation brought by individuals
with disabilities and some other types of private plaintiffs may
also turn out to be appropriate for as long as a building remains
inaccessible. Obviously, the better solution for all interested par-
ties would be voluntary compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). In the
meantime, this article provides a blueprint for analyzing the key
litigation issues in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases.
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